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The! thesis!aims! to!explore! the!UK! regulation!of! Act!2006! (Strategic!Report!and!Directors'!
Report)! Regulations! 2013!which!mandates! corporate! social! responsibility! (CSR)! reporting.!!
To!achieve!this!aim,!the!thesis!reviewed!relevant!theories!which! link!between!CSR]related!
regulation!and!CSR!reporting!quality,!earnings!management,!and!future!performance.!These!
include! legitimacy! theory,! agency! theory,! economic! theory,! signalling! theory,! stakeholder!
theory,! and! impression! theory.! The! legitimacy! theory! explains! the! relationship! between!
CSR]related! regulation! and! CSR! reporting! quality.! The! impression! theory! and! the!
opportunistic!perspective!of!agency!theory!clarify!the!impact!of!mandating!CSR!on!earnings!
management!practices!in!the!firms.!Lastly,!the!theories!of!the!neoclassical!economic!theory,!
agency! theory,! and! stakeholder! and! signalling! explicit! the! influence! of! mandating! CSR!
reporting!on!the!subsequent!performance!of!the!firms.!!!
In!addition,!the!thesis!examines!how!mandatory!reporting!of!CSR!influences!the!quality!of!
CSR! reporting!using!Ordinary! Least!Squares! (OLS)! regression! for! the!period!2009! to!2017.!
The! empirical! analysis! utilises! the! FTSE! All]share! firms! listed! in! the! UK! to! find! that!
mandatory! CSR! reporting! has! helped! to! enhance! CSR! reporting! quality! in! the! UK!
significantly.! Also,! three! firm! characteristics! enhance! the! quality! of! CSR! reporting! in! the!
context! of! mandatory! CSR! reporting;! these! are! corporate! governance! (CG),! international!
listing,! and! firms! listed! in! sensitive! industries.! In! an! additional! test,! high! and! low! CSR!
reporting! score! is! used! as! a! substitute! dependent! variable,! I! find! that! mandatory! CSR!




The! thesis!also!explores! the! impact!of!mandating! corporate! social! responsibility! reporting!
on! earnings! management! (EM)! practices! through! real! earnings! management! (REM)! and!








UK.! In! an! additional! test! I! document! that!mandating! CSR! reporting! restricts! providers! of!
both! high! and! low!CSR! reporting! quality! in! practising! REM!activities;! specifically,! it! has! a!
greater!effect!on!firms!reporting! low!CSR!quality.!However,! the!analysis! finds!no!evidence!
that!mandating!CSR!reporting!has!an!impact!on!the!AEM!practice.!
Finally,! the! thesis! investigates! the! influence! of! mandating! corporate! social! responsibility!
reporting! on! subsequent! financial! performance! through! accounting]based! measures! and!
market]based!measures.! It!provides!evidence!about! the! negative! impact!of! reporting!CSR!
voluntarily! on! the! firm’s! future! performance! due! to! the! increased! spending! on! and! costs!
related!to!such!activities.!On!the!contrary,!mandating!CSR!reporting!enhances!firms’!future!



















































































































































































Figure! 2.1! Main!CSR!Concerns!over!Decades! 18!
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this! importance,! in! July! 2013,! the! UK! parliament! approved! the! latest! provision! for! The!
Companies! Act! 2006! (Strategic! Report! and! Directors'! Report)! Regulations! 2013,! to! be!
applied! for! the! financial! year! ‘ending! on! or! after’! the! end! of! September! 2013.! This!
government]launched! action! plan! sets! out! guidance! about! the! importance! of! integrating!
human! rights!and! the!environment! into! firms’!operations!and!business!plans,!and!how! to!
apply!this.!Specifically,!this!thesis!examines!the!effect!of!mandating!CSR!reporting!legalised!
in!the!UK!in!2013!across!four!key!issues.!
First,! following! the! prior! studies,! this! thesis! examines! the! link! between! CSR]related!
regulation!and!CSR!reporting!quality,!earnings!management,!and!future!performance.!A!set!
of! research! hypotheses! are! developed! using! stakeholder,! signalling,! economic,! agency,!






the! context! of! mandating! CSR! reporting,! managers! who! opportunistically! manipulate!
earnings!become!less!interested!in!using!CSR!reporting!as!a!tactic!to!impress!stakeholders!
and! conceal! their! manipulation! behaviour! (e.g.,! Kim! et! al.,! 2012).! Depending! on! the!
neoclassical! economic,! agency,! stakeholder! and! signalling! theories,! two! main! points! are!
clarified.! The! first! aspect,! which! is! supported! by! the! neoclassical! economic! theory! and!





which! is! supported! by! stakeholder! and! signalling! theories,! argues! that! in! the! context! of!
mandatory! CSR! reporting,! practising! CSR! enhance! the! firm’s! future! performance! by!




the! relationship! of!mandatory! CSR! and!CSR! reporting! quality.! Also,! to! compare! the! high]
quality! CSR! reports,! and! the! low]quality! CSR! reports! in! the! context! of! mandatory! CSR!
reporting.!Recent!studies!of!mandatory!CSR!reporting!suggest!that!adopting!regulations!of!
CSR! reporting! has! improved! firms’! CSR! reporting! specifically! in! South! Africa,! Denmark,!
Malaysia,! and! China! (Ioannou! and! Serafeim,! 2017).! It! is! also! found! that! mandatory! CSR!
reporting! regulations! have! changed! firms’! behaviour! to! increase! their! spending! on! CSR!




impression! and! agency! theories.! Then,! a! more! detailed! investigation! is! implemented! to!
compare!between!the!high]quality!and! low]quality!CSR!reports.!The! literature!argues!that!
practising! CSR! restricts! the! opportunistic! behaviour! of! firms’! managers! towards! earnings!
management!(Alsaadi!et!al.,!2017).!On!the!other!hand,!the!agency!and!impression!theories!
argue!that!CSR!reporting!could!be!used!as!a!strategic!shield!to!cover!up!managers’!earnings!
management! practices;! this! takes! place! by! practising! and! reporting! CSR! which! helps! to!
maintain! the! negative! consequences! of! exercising! earnings!management! activities! (Watts!
and! Zimmerman,! 1978).! Conversely,! exercising! earnings!management! activities!motivates!
managers! to! practice! more! CSR! even! if! they! are! not! committed! to! sustainable! issues!
(Petrovits,!2006;!Prior!et!al.,!2008).!
Fourth,! this! thesis! suggests! that! this! change! in! regulation! may! impact! the! firm’s!
performance;!thus,!building!on!economic,!agency,!signalling,!and!stakeholder!theories,!this!
thesis! analyses! the! subsequent! effect! of! mandatory! CSR! reporting! on! the! firm’s!





firm! success,! then!managers!would! not! harm! the! firm! in! a!way! that! is! likely! to! displease!
stakeholders!(e.g.,!Kim!et!al.,!2012;!Cho!and!Chun,!2016).!Thus,!to!protect!themselves!from!
rebuke!or!possible! loss!of! their! jobs,!managers! have!no!choice!but! to!enhance! the! firm’s!
performance!and!satisfy!the!stakeholders!through!investing!in!CSR!practices!and!reporting!
as! an! entrenchment! tactic! (Cespa! and! Cestone,! 2007;! Martı´nez]Ferrero! et! al.,! 2014).!
Moving! beyond! these! theories,! CSR! reporting! is! built! on! the! fact! that! the! existence! of!
additional! factors!might! impact!the!relationship!between!CSR!reporting!quality!and!future!
performance,! which! worth! further! investigation! in! terms! of! mandatory! CSR! reporting! to!
understand! its! influence!(e.g.,! firm!size,!age,! industry!sensitivity).!Prior! literature! indicates!
inconsistent! findings! regarding! the! relationship! between! mandatory! CSR! reporting! and!
firm’s! performance.! Some! of! the! research! streams! support! the! positive! impact! of! CSR!
reporting!on!future!performance!based!on!the!accounting!measures.!Moreover,!based!on!
the! market! measures,! the! firm! signals! the! market! about! its! good! CSR! performance! to!
legitimise! itself! (Liu!and!Zhang,!2017;!Nekhili! et!al.,! 2017).! Furthermore,! in! the!context!of!
mandating!CSR!reporting,!an!increase!in!the!firms’!CSR!reporting!post!the!new!regulation!is!



















less! transparent! reported! information! (Solomon,! 2006).! Therefore,! the! main! aim! of! this!




•! To! investigate! whether! CSR]related! regulation! impacts! the! quality! of! CSR!
reporting!in!the!UK!firms!and!the!role!of!firm!characteristics!in!this!relationship.!
•! To! examine! whether! CSR]related! regulation! impacts! earnings! quality! through!
real!and!accrual!earnings!management!proxies.!!






This! narrows! our! understanding! of! the! consequences! of!mandating! CSR! reporting! on! the!
firms,! regulators,! and! stakeholders.! Thus,! the! thesis! problem! arises! to! understand! the!
consequences!of!adopting!this!regulation!in!UK!firms.!
















The! findings! of! the! thesis! could! have! important! implications! for! policy]makers! and!
regulators!who!implement!this!new!regulation!or!who!are!willing!to!do!so.!This!is!because!it!
provides! them!with! feedback! to! understand! the! effect! of! their! decision! in! terms! of! their!
efforts!to!(i)! improve!communication!between!firms!and!stakeholders!in!the!annual!report!
(CSR! section)! (FASB! 2013,! FRC! 2013),! where! firms!with! high! CSR! attract! a!more! positive!
investors’! assessment! of! their! firms’! future! value.! (ii)! Increase! firms’! reporting! quality! of!
financial! reporting! by! including!more! accurate! information,! specifically,! if!mandating! CSR!
reporting!impacts!managers’!opportunistic!practices!of!earnings!management.!The!findings!
will!be!useful!to!differentiate!accurate!information!from!less!quality!reported!information.!
(iii)! Enhance! firms’! environmental! and! social! roles2.! And! (iv)! make! them! more! loyal! to!
sustainability!issues.!Also,!it! is!important!to!the!stakeholders!regarding!firms’!performance!
and!the!impact!of!such!new!regulations!on!their!interests.!!




and! return,! and! the! stock! price! feedback! into! the! firm’s! investment! choices! (e.g.,! Gao,!















interesting! institutional! setting! for! empirical! analysis,! for! two!main! reasons.! First,! in! the!
context!of!the!UK!environment,!almost!no!evidence!is!found!regarding!the!new!regulation,!
where! the! UK! is! one! of! the! few! regions! to! have! enforced! the! regulation! requiring! CSR!
reporting!specifically!in!South!Africa,!Denmark,!Malaysia,!and!China!(Ioannou!and!Serafeim,!
2017).!This,!therefore,!narrows!our!understanding!of!the!impact!of!mandating!CSR!reporting!




and! regions! based! on! the! country]specific! context! (e.g.,! Cahan! et! al.,! 2016);! thus,! the!
findings! of! this! study! offer! details! about! a! new! important! institutional! environment.!






firms! and! financial! industry! firms! compared! to! LSE!which!mandates! CSR! reporting! for! all!
listed!firms!in!the!main!market.!!
Fourth,! the! required! information! to! be! disclosed! vary! from! region! to! another! between!










studies!the!consequences!of!mandating!CSR! reporting.!One! such! research! stream! focused!
on!firm!value!and!market!responses!to!disclosure!(Grewal!et!al.,!2015;!Chen!et!al.,!2018),!
whereas! another! focuses! on! disclosure! activities! and! environmental! impacts! (Hung! et! al.,!
2015;!Ioannou!and!Serefeim,!2017).!This!study!provides!a!new!research!insight!by!examining!
the! impact! of!mandating! CSR! reporting! on! the! quality! of! CSR! report! itself!which! resulted!
from!firms’!sustainable!practices!as!presented!in!the!firms’!financial!reports!measured!after!
the! regulation.! This! research! stream! needs! to! be! explored! in! the! first! place! due! to! its!
importance! in! enhancing! our! understanding! about! the! firms’! behaviour! towards! such!
regulations,! this! to! be! carried! out! before! exploring! the! consequences! of! CSR]related!
regulation!on!other!streams.!In!specific,!this!thesis!investigates!the!firm!characteristics,!such!
as!firm!size,!debt!ratio,!firm!age,!firm!external!auditors,!firm!cross]listing,!firm!growth,!firm!








this! narrows! the! understanding! of! the! impact! of! these! regulations! on! the! quality! of! CSR!
reporting!in!general,!and!specifically!in!the!UK!environment!which!has!different!institutional!
characteristics! and! capital! market! aspects! than! other! environments! that! mandate! CSR!






firms! and! financial! industry! firms! compared! to! LSE!which!mandates! CSR! reporting! for! all!
listed! firms! in! the!main!market.! Also,! the! required! information! to! be! disclosed! vary! from!





this! study! contributes! to! the! literature! by! (i)! investigating! the! consequences! of! adopting!
regulation!of!CSR!reporting!and!the!intentions!behind!the!CSR!practices!in!a!firm,!(ii)!how!it!
influences! the! harmful! practice! of! earnings! management! in! the! firms,! (iii)! and! to! what!




In! more! details,! the! findings! provide! unique! evidence! on! the! impact! of! mandated! CSR!





is! limitedly! used! in! the! literature! of! CSR! although! it! is! explaining! the! logic! behind! the!
overinvestment!in!such!practices.!!
While!several!studies!endeavour!to!investigate!the!relationship!between!CSR!reporting!and!
earnings!management! (e.g.,! Chih! et! al.,! 2008;! Liu! et! al.,! 2017),! they! present! inconsistent!
evidence! that! restricts! our! understanding! of! this! association.! Specifically,! almost! no!
evidence!provided! in! the! literature! regarding! the!mandatory!CSR! reporting! impact!on! the!
earnings!quality!either!in!the!UK!or!other!countries!adopts!the!same!regulation.!Accordingly,!
this! study! contributes! to! the! literature! through! (i)! introducing! new! evidence! of! research!
about! the! influence! of!mandating! CSR! reporting! on! utilising! CSR! practices! as! a! shield! to!
cover! the! consequences! of! the! opportunistic! behaviour! of! managers! towards! earnings!
management,!(ii)!sending!a!red!flag!to!regulators!and!stakeholders!to!warn!them!about!the!
fake! over]investment! in! CSR! practices! which! reflects! negatively! on! the! accuracy! of! their!
decisions,!and!the!quality!of!the!financial!reporting.!







the! firm! would! incur! new! costs,! or! face! more! pressure! than! usual! to! increase! CSR!
performance! to! be! able! to! compete! with! other! firms.! ! Specifically,! this! would! harm! the!
original! sustainable! firms! with! superior! CSR! performance.! To! conclude,! such! regulations!
have!both!benefits!and!costs,!but!if!the!costs!offset!the!potential!benefits,!this!might!harm!
the! shareholder’s! interest! (Ioannou!and!Serafeim,!2017).! Thus,! this! study!contributes!and!





management!practices,! and! subsequent!performance! in!UK! firms,! I! implement!a! series!of!
analysis! tests.! The! results! evince! that! firstly;! mandatory! CSR! reporting! enhances! CSR!
reporting! quality! in! the! UK.! They! also! show! that! the! characteristics! of! CG,! international!




providers! of! low! CSR! quality,! specifically! those! who! are! more! mature! and! listed! in!
multinational! markets.! Compared! to! providers! of! high]quality! CSR! reports,! the! thesis!
findings! document! that! large! firms! are! impacted!more! by! the! new! regulation! to! improve!
their!reporting!quality.!
Secondly,! the! findings! provide! evidence! that! managers! will! report! CSR! to! cover! their!
earnings!manipulation! practices;! this! is! consistent!with! Prior! et! al.! (2008)! and! Choi! et! al.!
(2013).! Conversely,! in! the! mandatory! context! of! CSR! reporting,! earnings! management!
activities!decrease!where!managers!lose!their!competitive!advantage!of!using!CSR!voluntary!
reporting!as!a!shield!to!cover!earnings!management!practices,!which!is!consistent!with!Hong!









Liu!and!Zhang!(2017)!and!Chen!et!al.! (2018).!On! the!other!hand,!the! impact!of!mandating!
CSR! reporting! appears! clearly! in! the! two]year]ahead! and! three]years]ahead! performance!
through! both! market]! and! accounting]based! indicators.! The! positive! impact! could! be!
explained!by!the!notion!that!mandating!CSR!reporting!results!with!a!better!performance!in!
the! future!by! signalling! to! the!market!about! the! firm’s!positivity! concerning! sustainability!
issues.!However,!the!impact!of!CSR!reporting!is!reflected!clearly!in!the!two]year]ahead!and!
three]years]ahead! performance! of! the! firm,! rather! than! on! the! one]year]ahead!
performance,! where! practising! CSR! is! considered! an! action! related! to! the! long]term!
improvement!of!a!firm’s!interest!(Liu!and!Zhang,!2017).!Therefore,!the!results!contribute!to!
the! literature! by! providing! direct! and! clear! evidence! of! the! influence! of! mandating! CSR!
reporting!on!a!firm’s!performance.!Also,!it!extends!the!literature!on!the!potential!benefits!of!




introduction.! It! sets! out! a! brief! contextual! background! and! explores! each! study’s! related!
aims! and! objectives,! and! research! related! literature.! It! also! discusses! the! research!
motivations.!In!brief,!it!outlines!the!adopted!research!design,!followed!by!a!summary!of!the!
findings!and!the!research!contribution.!The!rest!of!the!thesis!is!as!follows:!
Chapter!Two!–!Theoretical! Framework:!This! chapter!discusses! the!most! common! theories!




Chapter!Four!–!The! impact! of! regulation!on!earnings!management:!This! chapter!presents!









the! literature! review! and! hypotheses! development.! The! next! section! of! each! chapter!
highlights!the!research!methods!including!the!sample!discretion,!variables’!definitions,!and!
models! employed.! The! subsequent! section! discusses! the! results! of! the! data! analysis.! The!
final!section!concludes!and!summarises!the!main!points!in!these!chapters.!
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Recently,! increasing! awareness! of! CSR! importance! has! emerged! through! engaging! more!
firms!in!such!practices,!in!addition!to!the!growing!attention!of!public!users!of!annual!reports!
to! these! practices,!which! in! turn! increases! the! pressure! and! scrutiny! they! can! impose! on!
firms’! sustainable! behaviours! (Ioannou! and! Serafeim,! 2017).! However,! it! has! been! found!
that!CSR! reporting!practices!are!a! communicating! channel! that! firms!use! to!present! their!









builds! a! good! reputation! and! brand! name! in! the!market! (Branco! et! al.,! 2006;! Porter! and!
Kramer,!2011;!2006).!Moreover,!these!activities!would!enhance!investors’!assessment!of!the!
future! performance!and!value!of! these! firms.!Moreover,!managers!might! intentionally!be!
motivated! to! engage! in! CSR! activities! to! cover! their! earnings!management! activities! and!
protect!themselves!against!stakeholders!(Healy!and!Wahlen,!1999).!
On!the!other!hand,!reporting!of!CSR!activities!could!be!a!misleading!tool!for!annual!report!
readers! if! it! is! used! opportunistically! by! managers! (Verrecchia,! 1983).! Additionally,! CSR!
practices!incur!extra!costs!for!the!firm!to!compete!and!distinguish!itself!from!the!rest!of!its!
competitors,!or! to!announce! some!sensitive! information! to! the! public!which!might!affect!





Prior! studies! emphasise! the! link! between! CSR! reporting! and! different! theories! such! as!
stakeholder! theory,! signalling! theory,! economic! theory,! agency! theory,! legitimacy! theory,!
and! impression!theory!(Sun!et!al.,!2010;!Cheng!at!al.,!2014;!Christensen,!2016;!Martı´nez]
Ferrero!et!al.,!2016;!Ioannou!and!Serafeim,!2017;!Chen!et!al.,!2018).!!
Literature! related! to! CSR! reporting! quality! and! new! regulation,! CSR! reporting! quality! and!
earnings!management,!and!CSR!reporting!quality!and!future!performance!will!be!discussed!
in! chapters! three,! four,! and! five!of! this! thesis.! This! chapter!underpins! the! three!empirical!
studies’! theoretical! framework.! Section! 2.2! presents! the! legitimacy! theory! related! to! the!
first! empirical! on! the! impact! of! new! CSR! reporting! regulation! on! CSR! reporting! quality.!
Section!2.3!discusses!the! impression!theory!and!agency!theory!as!the!basis!of!the!second!
empirical! on! the! impact! of! CSR! reporting! quality! on! earnings! management.! Section! 2.4!
presents! the! last! empirical,! on! the! impact! of! CSR! reporting! quality! on! subsequent!




Howard!Bowen!(1953)! is!considered!the! ‘father’!of!corporate!social! responsibility!after!his!
remarkable!publication!Social!Responsibilities!of!the!Businessman.!He!defines!CSR!thus:!
“It! refers! to! the!obligations!of!businessmen!to!pursue!those!policies,! to!make!those!
decisions,! or! to! follow! those! lines! of! action! which! are! desirable! in! terms! of! the!
objectives!and!values!of!our!society”!(p.6).!!
During! the! 1970s! to! the! 1990s,! the! CSR! definitions! increasingly! developed! from!a! simple!











with! Moon! (2002)! who! argued! that! there! is! no! agreed! definition! of! corporate! social!
responsibility!reporting,!where!CSR!is!more!like!“democracy!and!justice”!definitions,!which!
are! disputed! concept! that! always! arguable.! Thus,! prior! literature! (e.g.,! Kok! et! al.,! 2001;!




in! their! business! operations! and! their! interaction! with! their! stakeholders! on! a!
voluntary!basis.”!
Also,!Smith!(2002:42)!defined!CSR!reporting!as!















Moving! forward,! during! the! 1980s,! two! new! concepts! related! to! CSR! were! developed! –!
stakeholder! theory! and! business! ethics.! Carroll! (2008)! documented! that! the! public’s!
consideration!was! directed! to!managerial! and! corporate!mistakes! and!wrong]doing! after!
witnessing!a!wide!range!of!ethical!scandals!during!this!period.!!
The! 1990s! could! be! considered! a! complementary! decade! to! the! 1980s! in! developing! the!









citizenship,! improving! the! quality! of! life! of! the! citizens,! human! rights,! labour! rights,!
protection! of! the! environment,! fight! against! corruption,! and! transparency! and!
accountability! (Katsoulakos! et! al.,! 2004).! In! this! era,! the! CSR! phenomenon! expanded!
globally,! and! new! foundations! and! regulations! were! introduced! to! support! CSR! and!
encourage!firms!to!apply!and!follow!the!CSR!concept!in!their!corporations.!!
In!the!meantime,!CSR!reporting! is!considered!one!of!the!core! issues!in!any!firm.!Recently,!
this! type! of! practice! has! become! mandatory! in! some! countries! (e.g.,! China,! UK),! which!
highlights! the! importance! of! disclosing! CSR! for! firms.! However,! as! Carroll! (2008,! p.! 64)!








adopt! different!methods! and! datasets! to! extract! and!measure! CSR! reporting! (Buzby! and!
Falk,!1978;!Abbott!and!Monsen,!1979;!Chih!et!al.,!2008;!Hung,!2011;!Simnett!et!al.,!2009;!








For! instance,! some! empirical! researchers! employ! surveys! to! measure! CSR! components!
(Buzby! and! Falk,! 1978;! Hung,! 2011).! However,! this! method! encounters! two! major!
difficulties,!which!are!low!survey!return!rates,!and!low!participant!consistency.!!
Other! researchers! adopt! a! content! analysis! of! either! 10]K! firms’! report! elements! (Abbott!
and!Monsen,!1979;!Webb!et!al.,!2009),!or!a! firm’s!stand]alone!CSR!report! (Simnett!et!al.,!
2009;! Dhaliwal! et! al.,! 2011)! which! can! be! collected! from! websites! such! as!
CorporateRegister.com!and!CSRwire.com.! Both! tools! depend!on! the! extensiveness! of! CSR!
reporting!within!the!firm!report!and!differ!from!one!firm!to!another,!which!often!raises!the!
inconsistency!problem!across!the!sample!in!the!study!context.!However,!many!researchers!
employ! this! method! to! measure! CSR! disclosure! quantity! using! an! index! that! consists! of!
predefined!categories!(e.g.,!Newson!and!Deegan,!2002).!Furthermore,!previous!researchers!
developed! a! quality! index! of! CSR! disclosure! based! on! the! suggested! characteristics! of!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Source:!The!researcher,!based!on!reading!Katsoulakos!et!al.!(2004)!and!Carroll!(2008).!
60s •Relationship between corporation and society
70s
•Education and training of minorities; enviromental issues (e.g., climate change, pollution
control)
80s
•Stakeholders' involvement; voluntariness practice; principles of sustainability; poverty;
population pressure; social inequity
90s
•Voluntariness practice; stakeholders' involvement; global social investment; corporate
reputation; community partnerships; corporate social policy; establishing reporting initiatives
(GRI, corporate impact reporting, AA1000, and Dow Jones sustainability index)
20th
•Voluntariness practice; Integration of social and environmental concern; adoption and
reporting practices; obligation to society; environmental stewardship; ethical behaviour;
economic development; improving the quality of life of the citizens; human rights; labour
rights; protection of environment; fight against corruption; transparency and accountability
Now
•Mandatory practice for some countries (e.g., the UK, China); the impact of a company’s
business on the environment; the company’s employees; social and community; human




accounting! information! in!the!conceptual! framework!of! IFRS!(e.g.,!Alotaibi!and!Hussainey,!
2016).!
O’Dwyer! (2011)! applies! a! different! method! in! investigating! CSR,! where! he! reviews! the!
sustainability!reports!of!two!Big4!professional!services!companies4.!However,!the!results!of!
this! type!of! study!–!namely!experimental!or! case! study!method!–!are! often!unable! to! be!
generalised! and! may! be! influenced! by! participant! bias.! Another! common! CSR! reporting!
quality!measure! is! the!existence!of!the!Global!Reporting! Initiative!(GRI)! framework! in!CSR!
reports.! Muslu! et! al.! (2017,! p.2)! state! that! “GRI! has! pioneered! a! comprehensive! CSR!
reporting!framework!that!is!used!worldwide.!GRI!seeks!to!improve!comparability,!credibility!
and! relevance! of! CSR! information! disclosed! by! different! firms! and! thus! to! improve! users’!
understanding!of!sustainabilityNrelated!risks!and!opportunities”.!
Archival!researchers!depend!on!several!databases!to!investigate!CSR!reporting!practice!that!
is! prepared! by! informal! external! parties.! One! of! the! most! distinguished! CSR! databases!
employed!in!the!accounting!literature!is!MSCI!ESG!STATS!(earlier!known!as!KLD)!(Prior!et!al.,!
2008;! Hong! and! Andersen,! 2011;! Kim! et! al.,! 2012;! Gao! and! Zhang,! 2015).!MSCI! provides!
information! about! firms’! CSR! reporting! transparency! in! the! form!of! a! score! and! presents!
strengths! and! concerns! about! the! firm.! This! score! is! based! on! rating! major! specific!
categories!such!as!corporate!governance,!environment,!community,!and!others.!!
Moreover,! the! Bloomberg! database! is! one! of! the! recent! methods! that! scholars! use! to!
measure! CSR! reporting! quality.! This! database! offers! information! about! the! firms’!
environmental,! social,! and! governmental! (ESG)! practices! in! the! form!of! net! score! ranging!
from!0! to! 100,!which! reflects! the! extensiveness!of! firms’! ESG! reporting.! Further,! the! ESG!
Bloomberg! score! includes! the! following! headings! for! the! environmental! dimension;! CO2!
emissions,!energy!consumption,!water!use,!and!total!waste.!The!social!dimension!items!are!
number!of!employees,!contract!type!and!turnover,!community!service!spending,!and!human!
rights.!The!other!dimensions,!which! is! corporate!governance! (CG),! consists!of! information!
about! board! structure,! board! independence,! board! executives! and! diversity,! board!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!The!Big!Four!(Big4)!are!the!four!biggest!professional!services!networks!in!the!world,!offering!audit,!assurance!














Currently,! we! can! see! a!movement! that! is! trying! to! promote! CSR! to! become! a! common!




actions,! business! responsibilities! must! include! the! known! results! of! business! dealings,!
whether!these!have!been!recognized!by!law!or!not".!This!indicates!the!early!stage!when!the!
attention! is! directed! to! CSR! phenomenon! The! corporate! social! responsibility! concept! is!
neither!new!nor!radical!in!the!UK,!where!the!main!principle!that!the!firm!has!responsibilities!
towards! the! society!has!a! long! historical!background,!an!approach! that!may! have! started!
from!the!nineteenth!century!as!‘business!philanthropy’!(Carroll,!2008).!!
Corporate! social! responsibility! issues!were! first!discussed! in! the! context! of! the!UK! in! the!




In! the! 1990s,! the! perspective! of! CSR! extended! to! an! ultimate! and! persisting! concern! for!
socially!responsible!employee!relations,!products,!and!processes!instead!of!being!limited!to!









organisations! (public,! governmental,! and! educational),! the! emergence! of! CSR! consultancy!
institutions,!and!finally!the!institutionalisation!of!CSR!under!the!corporate!management!to!
become! the! initial! part! of! an! annual! report! in! the! UK! (Moon,! 2005;! Carroll,! 2008).! This!
movement! put! the! UK! on! a! parallel! track! with! other! developed! countries! in! the! world,!
where! UK! firms! are! now! required! to! report! environmental,! social,! and! governmental!
information!to!the!stakeholders.!
2.2.4!Development!of!CSR!Regulations!in!the!UK!!
Normally,! CSR! practice! is! linked! with! the! “voluntary”! perspective! which! is! thought! to!
broaden!the!scope!of!a!firm’s!flexibility!and!creativity!reporting!practice!rather!than!produce!






reviewed! by! the! independent! Company! Law! Review! Steering! Group! (CLRSG).! The! review!
sought!to!develop!a!framework!for!business!activities!in!a!simple!and!effective!relevant!cost.!
Accordingly,! it!concludes!that!the!company! law’s!main!focus! is! to!develop!strong!financial!
reporting!systems!that!rely!on!historical!quantitative!information.!
On!the!other!hand,! its!critic! ignored!the!fact!that! firms!mostly!depend!on!their! intangible!










In!2002,! the!concept!of! corporate! social! responsibility!was! reflected!and!discussed!by! the!
DTI;! a!proposal!was!presented!about! requiring! the!directors! to! include!an!assessment! for!
firms’! relationship! with! employees,! customers! and! suppliers,! in! addition! to! their!
environmental! and! social! impacts,! which! was! to! be! directed! principally! to! shareholders!
rather!than!stakeholders.!!
Later,!2005!witnessed!the!approval!of! the!OFR!to!be!followed!by!repealing!and!additional!
amendments! among! the! following! years! until! the! completed! version! came! into! force! in!
2009.!These!amendments!and!provisions!affected!the!beneficiaries!of!this!reporting!and!the!
requirements!of!the!disclosure5!(Companies!Act!1985,!(Operating!and!Financial!Review!and!
Directors’! Report)! Regulations! 2005);! The! Companies! Act! 1985! (Operating! and! Financial!




review.! The! first! stage! started! with! the! repealing! of! the! OFR! in! 2005! which! required!
directors!of! large]sized! firms! to!prepare!a!director’s! report! including! the!business! review.!
Under!this!section!two!main!points!should!be!clarified:!!
“(a)!analysis!using! financial!key!performance! indicators,!and! (b)!where!appropriate,!
analysis! using! other! key! performance! indicators,! including! information! relating! to!
environmental!matters!and!employee!matters”!(The!Companies!Act!1985!(Operating!
and!Financial!Review)!(Repeal)!Regulations!2005).!!
The! second! stage! of! amendments! was! applied! through! The! Companies! Act! 2006! which!
required!(voluntary)!the!directors!to!reveal!information!about:!
!“(a)!environmental!matters! (including!the! impact!of! the!company's!business!on!the!

























To! the! extent! necessary! to! comply! with! the! general!
requirements!of!the!OFR,!the!review!must!include:!






e)! information! about! the! extent! to! which! those! policies!
have!been!successfully!implemented;!
f)! analysis! using! financial! and,! where! appropriate,! other!
key!performance!indicators,!including!information!relating!
to!environmental!matters!and!employee!matters!
g)! If! the! review! does! not! contain! this! information! and!









]Medium]sized! companies! do! not! have! to!
provide! CSR! type! information! in! the! business!
review!
]Small! companies! do! not! have! to! produce! a!
business!review!
To! the! extent! necessary! for! an! understanding! of! the!
development,! performance! or! position! of! the! company,!
the!review!must!include:!
where!appropriate,!!
analysis! using! key! performance! indicators,! including!










]Unless! the! company! is! a! small! company,! the!
directors’! report! must! contain! a! business!
review!
To! the! extent! necessary! for! an! understanding! of! the!
development,! performance! or! position! of! the! company,!
the!review!must!include!information!about:!
]environmental! matters! (including! the! impact! on! the!
environment),!employees,!social!and!community!issues!
]information! about! any! policies! in! relation! to! the! above!
and!the!effectiveness!of!these!policies!















To! the! extent! necessary! for! an! understanding! of! the!
development,! performance! or! position! of! the! company,!
the! review! must! include,! where! appropriate,! analysis!
using! key! performance! indicators! including! information!
relating!to!environmental!and!employee!matters!
Source:!Companies!Act!1985,! (Operating!and!Financial!Review!and!Directors’!Report)!Regulations!2005);! The!Companies!
Act! 1985! (Operating! and! Financial!Review)! (Repeal)!Regulations!2005;!The! Companies!Act! 2006! (Accounts! and!Reports)!
Regulations!2008.!
2.2.4.2!Mandatory!CSR!Reporting!Regulation!
The!Companies!Act!2006! (Strategic!Report!and!Directors'!Report)!Regulations!2013! is! the!
latest! provision! for! The! Companies! Act! 2006! which! in! July! 2013,! was! approved! by! the!
Parliament!for!application!to!the!financial!year! ‘ending!on!or!after’! the!end!of!September!
2013.! This! government]launched! action! plan! set! out! guidance! about! the! importance! of!
integrating! human! rights! and! environment! into! firms’! operations! and! business! plans,! and!














strategic! report! (which! includes! the! original! disclosure! from! the! business! review! in! addition! to! new!
requirements),! and! the! directors’! report! (which! discusses! the! greenhouse! gas! emissions! disclosure!
requirements).!








1.! ! ! ! Replace! the! duty! of! producing! ‘business! review! report’! with! a! duty! of! producing!
strategic!reports!(excludes!small!companies);!























of! emissions,! in! tonnes! of! carbon! dioxide! equivalent,! produced! by! ‘activities! for! which! that! company! is!
responsible’,!including!fuel!use!and!those!resulting!from!the!purchase!of!‘electricity,!heat,!steam!or!cooling’!by!
the! company;! and! appropriate! ‘intensity! ratios’! which! compare! the! company’s! emissions! data! with! an!





employee! matters! in! the! strategic! report! may! incur! a! risk! of! penalty! for! the! firm.! The!
Companies!Act!2006/414c!mentions:!
“…the! strategic! report! must! be! approved! by! the! board! of! directors! and! signed! on!
behalf! of! the!board!by! a!director! or! the! secretary! of! the! company”.! “If! a! strategic!
report! is! approved! that! does! not! comply! with! the! requirements! of! this! Act,! every!
director! of! the! company!who”! ”knew! that! it! did! not! comply,! or!was! reckless!as! to!
whether!it!complied”,!and!”failed!to!take!reasonable!steps!to!secure!compliance!with!
those! requirements! or,! as! the! case! may! be,! to! prevent! the! report! from! being!
approved”,!“!A!person!guilty!of!an!offence!under!this!section!is!liable”!”on!conviction!



































the! company’s! policies! and!









































or! position! of! the!
company’s! business,!


















the! company’s! policies! and!








































the! company’s! policies! and!

































actual! or! potential,! exists! between! the! two! value! systems,! there! is! a! threat! to! the!
entities!legitimacy.”!
According!to!this!definition,! legitimacy!theory!assumes!that! firms!do!their!best!to!fit! their!
norms!and!values!with!the!society!they!are!working!with,!particularly!when!they!are!in!an!
expanded!social!system!(Brown!and!Deegan,!1998;!Perks!et!al.,!2013).!Deegan!(2002)!argues!










The! legitimacy! theory! assumes! that! the! firm! operates! via! a! social! contract! with! the!
community,! considering! legitimacy! as! the! survival! source! of! the! firms! (Tewari! and! Dave,!
2012).! Accordingly,! when! firms! anticipate! a! legitimacy! threat,! they! act!more! responsibly!
through! enhancing! their! voluntary! reporting! (Perks! et! al.,! 2013).! However,! firms!will! use!
various!strategies!to!enhance!and!influence!their!voluntary!reporting;!for!instance,!they!will!













b]! Influence! legitimacy:! take! into! account! stockholders’! belief! that! the! firm! will!
react!to!their!benefit!and!is!not!concerned!about!the!impact!on!the!firm.!
c]! Dispositional! legitimacy:! this! type,! conversely,! deliberates! the! support! of! the!
constituencies! that! a! firm! receives! resulting! from! believing! that! it! has! good!
characteristics!like!being!trustworthy,!decent!and!wise.!
However,! concerning! Aldrich! and! Ruef! (2006),! this! type! of! legitimacy! theory! is! the! least!
common!type,!and!it!has!been!rejected!as!being!a!description!of!a!firm’s!degree!of!learning!
rather!than!being!one!of!legitimacy.!
2]! Moral! legitimacy:! is! described! as! when! the! firms’! practise! are! assessed! by!






a]! Consequential! legitimacy:! this! type! considers! a! firm’s! success! based! on! certain!
norms!of!that!firm.!




d]! Personal! legitimacy:! this! type! relates! to! the! personal! characteristics! of! firm!
leadership.!






continued! existence! to! the! society! (Gray! et! al.,! 1995;! Hooghiemstra,! 2000).! However,!
Jennings! and! Zandbergen! (1995)! provide! evidence! that! annual! report! users! such! as!
stakeholders,!and!social!pressure,!would!impact!the!level!at!which!sustainable!development!
activities! are! prevalent! among! firms.! Also,! previous! literature! evinces! increased! use! of!
voluntary! CSR! reporting! by!managers! as! a! tactic! to! protect! and!manage! their! legitimacy!
(Hutchings!and!Taylor,!2000;!Woodward!et!al.,!2001).!
Altogether,! these! discussions! imply! that! CSR! reporting! can! be! used! by! managers! as! a!
strategy! to! shield! themselves! by! impressing! stakeholders!with! the! fact! that! the! firms! are!
performing!socially!to!gain!approval!of!their!objectives!and!other!benefits,!which!eventually!
assures!their!continued!existence!(Neu!et!al.,!1998).!!















Impression! theory! is! considered! as! a! part! of! legitimacy! theory! (Perks! et! al.,! 2013).! As!
discussed!in!section!2.2.1! legitimacy!theory!assumes!that!a! firm!has!a!social!contract!with!
the!community!to!operate,!considering!legitimacy!as!the!survival!source!of!the!firms!(Tewari!
and!Dave,!2012).!Accordingly,! impression!theory,!as!Goffman! (1959)!discusses,! focuses!on!
how! people! in! situations! present! themselves! and! how! a! person! directs! the! impression!
others!build!about!him.! In!business,! this! theory! is!reflected!as!managing! impressions;! this!
means,! generally,! that! a! manager! is! trying! to! direct! the! impression! that! a! significant!
stakeholder!has!of!him!or!her!(Sornes!et!al.,!2010).!!
2.4.1.1!Impression!Theory!Perspectives!
As!clarified! later,! impression!management! in!business! is! about! the!efforts!of! someone! to!
direct!and! influence!his!or! her! image!with! significant! stakeholders.!The!ethics!behind! this!
theory!have!been!argued!under!two!types!(Sornes!et!al.,!2010):!
1]! Effective!self]revelation;!from!this!viewpoint,!impression!management!would!adopt!
the! strategy! of! being! transparent! –! that! is,! a! type! of! openness.! This! view! is!
considered! a! useful! adaptation! due! to! its! ability! to! produce! valuable! transparent!
information! for! the! end! users,! which! is! easier! to! provide! than! the! manipulated!
information.!
2]! Cynical! manipulation:! this! view! suggests! that! impression! management! aims! to!
increase! the! interests! of! the! manipulator! by! influencing! and! changing! others’!
perceptions! and! responses! using! tactics! of! abuse,! deception,! or! deviousness!
(Leonhardt,!2003).!
Nowadays,!firms!use!the!second!form!of!‘impression!management’!(cynical!manipulation)!to!




impression! of! the! firm’s! performance.! In! other! words,! the! firms! manage! the! content! of!
information! in! their! reports! with! the! intention! of! "distorting! readers’! perceptions! of!
corporate!achievements"! (Godfrey!et!al.,!2003,!p.!96).!However,! the!descriptive!section!of!








in! an! interesting! conflict! between! the! principals! and! the! agents.! Due! to! the! fact! that!
managers! have! broader! access! to! the! firms’! information! compared! to! the! owners! and!
stakeholders! (information! asymmetry! problem),! this! motivates! managers’! interests! to!
maximise! their! wealth! related! to! position,! compensation! and! job! security,! particularly! in!
that!stakeholders!are!not!able!to!control!and!monitor!the!managers’!activities!(Weir!et!al.,!
2002).!






earnings.! The! opportunistic! behaviour! of! managers! can! be! seen! clearly! through!
manipulating! earnings! regarding! maximising! their! wealth! and! interests.! Consequently,!
earnings! manipulation! would! mislead! and! conceal! a! firm’s! financial! performance! by!











their! interests! and! benefits,! they! try! to! validate! such! act! by! seeking! the! stakeholders’!
participation!in!such!activities.!They!achieve!this!by!enhancing!CSR!activities!and!reporting!in!
the! firm! to! attract! and! satisfy! stakeholders’! interests.! Accordingly,! this! study! argues! that!
managers! who! are! motivated! to! manage! earnings! will! boost! the! firm’s! voluntary! CSR!
activities!and!reporting.!!
Taken! together,! drawing! on! both! impression! theory! and! the! opportunistic! perspective! of!
agency! theory,! managers! who! manipulate! earnings! are! more! interested! in! reporting!
voluntary! firm!CSR!activities!as!a! sugar! cover! for! their!opportunistic!behaviour.!Thus,! this!
practice!is!considered!as!a!chance!for!the!managers!to!impress!the!stakeholders!with!their!




behaviour! after! mandate! CSR! reporting.! The! explanation! for! this! is! based! on! both!
impression!and!opportunistic!theories,!where!transferring!CSR!reporting!from!being!an!extra!
voluntary! task! distinguishes! managers! from! other! competitors! who! do! not! report! CSR!
voluntarily,! to!a!mandatory!task!that!all! firms’!managers!are! required!to!deliver!on!(Hong!
and!Andersen,!2011;!Kim!et!al.,!2012).!Specifically,!managers!lose!the!chance!to!impress!the!




voluntarily!as! a! sugar! cover! for! their! opportunistic! behaviour,! to! impress,! and! to! redirect!
stakeholders’!attention!to!other!practices!the!managers!would!prefer!that!they!focused!on!
it.! Conversely,! after! mandating! CSR! reporting! the! managers! might! lose! the! advantages!


























motivated! and! responsible! for! boosting! the! owners’! (the! principals)! profits,! which! is!
consistent!with!their!economic!interests!as!well!(Jensen!and!Meckling,!1976).!
The!efficiency!of!this!view!is!supported!by!the!notion!that!creating!and!maximising!wealth!
would!not!only! increase! the! shareholder's!profit!but!also! improve! the!economic! status!of!
the!country.!Accordingly,! the!best! conditions! to! boost! the!wealth! could!be!created! if! the!








regards! to! the! negative! impact! of! the! firms! on! the! society,! this! can! be! controlled! by!
governmental!regulations.!
A!more! recent! view! regarding!maximising! the! shareholder's! wealth! combines! this! desire!
with! the!benefits!of!becoming!engaged! in!CSR!practices!which,!as!Drucker! (1984)!argues,!
means! that! the!profitability!and! social! responsibility! could!be!compatible! if! the!managers!
could!convert!the!social!responsibility!problems!into!economic!opportunities.!
Altogether,!the!relation!between!CSR!and!firm!financial!performance!discussed!through!the!
negative! perspective! of! neoclassical! economic! theory! suggests! that! CSR! practices! add!
unnecessary! additional! costs! to! a! firm,! which! is! a! disadvantage! against! the! competitors!
(Friedman,!1970;!McWilliams!and!Siegel,!1997;!Jensen,!2002).!Agency!theory!supports!this!
by!manifesting! that! financial! resources! spent!on!CSR!practices!would!produce!managerial!




In! the! first!place,! it! is! important! to!address! the!meaning!of! the! term! ‘stakeholder’!before!
referring!to!stakeholder!theory.!The!term!‘stakeholder’!is!defined!as!“those!groups!without!




Generally,! the! list! of! stakeholders! consists! mainly! of! society,! shareowners,! suppliers,!
employees,! customers,! and! lenders.! Agle! and! Mitchell! (2008)! provide! a! classification! of!
stakeholders! depending! on! their!main! characteristics! –! these! are! power,! legitimacy,! and!
urgency.! The! power! aspect! appears! clearly! through! the! ability! of! the! stakeholder! to!
implement! unexpected! decisions! (Kamann,! 2007)! and! could! be! applicable! only! if! the!
stakeholder! were! supported! politically! and! socially! to! withdraw! the! firm's! resources.!
Regarding! legitimacy! and! urgency,! both! are! related! to! each! other.! Under! the! legitimacy!




thus,! they! can! increase! the! pressure! on! the! firms! regarding! their! urgent! demands,!
particularly! if! their! claims! are! classified! on! a! time]sensitive! basis! and! the! perceived!
importance!of!these!claims!(Mainardes!et!al.,!2012).!
2.5.2.2!Stakeholder!Theory!
Stakeholder! theory! underlines! that! a! firm! can! be! presented! as! a! set! of! interdependent!
relationships!through!stakeholders,!which! includes!not!only!shareholders!but!all!groups!or!
individuals!who!can! impact!or!be! influenced!by! the! firm's!practices! (Freeman,!1984).!This!
perspective!asserts!that!stakeholders’!satisfaction!is!the!main!factor!for!firm!success.!
Stakeholder!theory!is!presented!in!various!types!]!these!are!normative!stakeholder!theory,!
instrumental! stakeholder! theory,! and! descriptive! stakeholder! theory! (Crane! and!Marten,!
2010).!Descriptive!stakeholder! theory!aims!to!recognise!how!firms!deal!with!stakeholders’!
interests! and! how! they! consider! these! in! their! operations.! Under! this! type,! the! firm! is!
viewed! as! a! set! of! interests! which! at! times! can! be! competitive! and! at! other! times!
cooperative.!Instrumental!stakeholder!theory!indicates!that!managers!should!consider!and!
direct!their!attention!to!stakeholders'!relationships!to!maximise!shareholders’!value.!It!also!
helps! to! understand! whether! considering! the! stakeholders’! interests! would! maximise!
shareholders’!wealth!or!not! (Donaldson!and!Preston,!1995),!which! links!CSR!performance!





the! firms,! arguing! that! firms! should! be! accountable! for! both! parties! equally! (Heath! and!




their! CSR! practices! –! namely,! ethical! and! managerial! motives! (Deegan,! 2013).! The!
managerial!motive! level! indicates!that!the!firm!will! react!to!stakeholders!who!have!either!








hand,! such! type! of! extensive! reporting! would! provide! critical! information! to! meet!
stakeholders’!and!shareholders’!demand!and!also!affect!the!firm’s! future!profits!and!cash!
flows,! which! would! reduce! the! related! problem! of! information! asymmetry! and! agency!
problem! between! managers,! stakeholders,! and! shareholders! (Dhaliwal! et! al.,! 2011).!
Moreover,! under! this! theory,!Waddock! and!Graves! (1997)! posit! that! CSR! reporting! has! a!
positive!impact!on!the!firm,!whereby!it!would!attract!more!qualified!employees!(Greening!
and!Turban,!2000),!attract!more!social!responsible!customers!(Sen!and!Bhattacharya,!2001),!
and!gain!more! social! legitimacy! (Hawn!et!al.,! 2011).!These,! in! turn,!attract!higher! socially!
responsible! investors! (Kapstein,! 2001),! which! ultimately! affect! the! firm’s! financial!
performance.!!
2.5.2.3!Signalling!Theory!
Signalling! theory! demonstrates! the! motivation! behind! a! firm's! desire! to! reveal! CSR!
information! voluntarily! to! the! market! because! voluntary! reporting! is! considered! a!
competitive!advantage!for! firms! in!the!market.!This!type!of!private! information!about!the!
firm! and! its! prospects! is! not! available! unless! managers! (insiders)! reveal! it! to! the! public;!




market! (Spence,! 1973),! but! it! is! also! used! to! clarify! the! impact! of! firms’! business! on! the!
society! in! their! annual! reports! (Ross,! 1977).! Accordingly,! firms! signal! particular! CSR!











the!firm's! financial!status.! !Furthermore,! it! is! found!that!the!quality!of!reported!CSR!has!a!
stronger! impact! on! building! and! enhancing! the! firm’s! environmental! reputation! amongst!
executive!and!investor!stakeholder!groups!(Thorne!et!al.,!2014).!
Overall,! firms! would! enhance! future! performance! by! signalling! to! the! market! about! the!
firm’s! positivity! toward! sustainability! issues.! Accordingly,! firms! are! more! likely! to! spend!
financial! resources!on!CSR!activities!to!communicate!a!positive!private!vision!of!managers!
about! the! future! financial! performance! of! the! firm! to! stakeholders! or! increase! their!





the! neoclassical! economic! theory! and! agency! theory.!Moreover,! it! is! anticipated! that! the!
firm’s! future! performance! might! be! enhanced! after! mandated! CSR! reporting,! supporting!
stakeholder!and!signalling!theories,!where!firms!might!achieve!benefits!from!the!mandatory!
regulation! by! signalling! to! the! market! about! their! positivity! toward! sustainability! issues.!
Accordingly,! this! reporting! would! enhance! investors’! assessment! of! a! firm’s! future!
performance!or! risk!status;!or! it!might! lead!to!reduced!cost!of!capital! (Easley!and!O’Hara,!
2004),! or! even! improve! stock! price! (Grewal! et! al.,! 2018).! Employing! the! neoclassical!






First,! the! legitimacy! theory! clarifies! the! first! relationship! between! CSR]related! regulation!






Second,! in! the! context! of! mandating! CSR! reporting,! both! the! impression! and! the!
opportunistic!perspective!of!agency! theories!are!used! to!explain! the!association!between!
CSR! reporting! quality! and! earnings! management.! Managers! who! opportunistically!
manipulate!earnings!become!less!interested!in!using!CSR!reporting!as!a!strategy!to!impress!
stakeholders!and!conceal!their!manipulation!behaviour!(e.g.,!Kim!et!al.,!2012).!
Third,! based! on! four! theories! of! the! neoclassical! economic! theory,! agency! theory,!
stakeholder!and!signalling!the!impact!of!CSR]related!regulation!on!subsequent!performance!
are!explained.! ! Firstly,! the!neoclassical!economic! theory!and!agency! theory! indicates! that!
increasing! the! cost! because! of! engaging! firms! in! CSR! practices! would! harm! firms’!
profitability!(Grewal!et!al.,!2018)!also,!according!to!the!agency!theory,!managers!serve!their!
own! interests! rather! than!maximising! the! shareholders’! wealth! and! the! firm! profitability!
which!as!a!result!harm!the!firm!performance.!Secondly,!stakeholder!and!signalling!theories!
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I! examine!how!mandatory! reporting!of!CSR! influences! the!quality!of!CSR! reporting.!Using!
Ordinary!Least!Squares!(OLS)!regression!for!the!period!2009!to!2017.!The!empirical!analysis!
utilises! the!FTSE!All]share! firms! listed! in! the!UK!to! find! that!mandatory!CSR! reporting!has!
helped! to! enhance! CSR! reporting! quality! in! the! UK! significantly.! Also,! three! firm!
characteristics! enhance! the! quality! of! CSR! reporting! in! the! context! of! mandatory! CSR!
reporting;! these! are! corporate! governance! (CG),! international! listing,! and! firms! listed! in!
sensitive! industries.! In! an! additional! test! uses! high! and! low! CSR! reporting! scores! as! a!
substitute!dependent!variable,!I!find!that!mandatory!CSR!reporting!alters!the!behaviour!of!
providers! of! low! CSR! quality,! specifically! those! who! are! more! mature! and! listed! in!








has! been! found! that! CSR! reporting! is! a! communicating! channel! that! firms! use! to! present!
their! ethical! activities! to! stakeholders! (Halme! et! al.,! 2014)! which! enhances! the!
organisation’s! image! and! reputation! (Branco! and! Rodrigues,! 2006;! Bronn! and! Vidaver]








roles!of!CSR! reporting!and!assurance! (e.g.,!O’Dwyer,!2011;!Casey!and!Grenier,!2015);! and!
the!consequences!of!CSR!reporting!such!as!carbon!emission,!information!asymmetry,!firms’!
reputation,! tax! payments,! and! earnings! management! and! quality! (e.g.,! Kim! et! al.,! 2012;!
Barton!et!al.,!2015).!Conversely,!there!is!very!little!evidence!of!the!influence!of!mandatory!
CSR! reporting! regulations! on! the! quality! of! CSR! reporting! (Ioannou! and! Serafeim,! 2017;!
Chen!et!al.,! 2018).!The! reason! is! that!only!a! few! regions!–such!as!South!Africa,!Denmark,!
Malaysia,!China!and!the!UK!–!mandate!this!type!of!reporting.!!!
In!the!context!of!mandating!CSR!reporting,!this!study!focuses!on!the!UK!environment!as!one!
of! the! few! regions! to! have! enforced! a! regulation! requiring! CSR! reporting.! Moreover,!
depending! on! the! country]specific! context,! the! use! of! CSR! reporting!might! vary! between!
different!environments!and!regions!(e.g.,!Cahan!et!al.,!2016);!thus,!the!findings!of!this!study!





environment! within! firms’! operations! and! business! plans,! and! how! to! achieve! that.!
Following! this! announcement,! the! UK! government! has! taken! a! real! step! regarding!
Environmental,!Social,!and!Governmental!(ESG)!reporting,!that!encourages!firms!to!comply!
with! this! regulation! rather! than! simply! explaining! why! they! are! not! reporting! it.! These!





to! adopt! guidelines! to! enhance! their! reports’! credibility! and! comparability! (Ioannou! and!
Serafeim,! 2017).! It! is! also! found! that!mandatory! CSR! reporting! regulations! have! changed!






From! the! above,! two! aspects! can! be! concluded:! first,! CSR! reporting! can! be! used! as! a!
strategy! to! impress! stakeholders,! where! firms! perform! socially! to! gain! approval! for! their!
objectives!and!other!benefits!(Neu!et!al.,!1998).!Second,!when!firms!are!mandated!to!report!
about! their! CSR! activities,! they! will! feel! under! scrutiny! from! stakeholders! and! externals!
which! pushes! them! to! enhance! their! CSR! activities! to! legitimise! the! firm’s! practices! and!
avoid!any!governmental!penalties.!!
Later! findings! directed! scholars’! attention! to! the! role! of! the! new! regulation! in! firms’!
strategies! in! term! of! legitimising! themselves! by! enhancing! their! CSR! reporting! quality,! in!
addition! to! understanding! the! effect! of! firms’! characteristics! on! complying! with! this!
regulation! and! developing! the! quality! of! CSR! reporting! in! its! context.! These! two! primary!
aspects!are!the!main!aims!of!this!research.!In!particular,!this!study!sheds!light!on!whether!
moving!to!set!up!new!mandatory!regulations!affects!the!quality!of!CSR!reporting!in!the!UK!





2009! to! 2017.! From! this,! data! can! be! collected! for! the! periods! before]! and! after! the!
adoption!of! the!mandatory!CSR! reporting! regulation.!Hence,!OLS!analysis! is! conducted! to!
estimate!the!impact!of!mandating!CSR!reporting!regulations!on!CSR!reporting!quality.!!
While!the!prior!empirical!results!are!limited,!the!findings!of!this!study!based!on!legitimacy!
theory! enrich! the! literature! through! three! points.! First,! the! impact! of! mandating! CSR!
reporting!on!CSR!reporting!quality!is!strongly!positive,!and!the!new!regulation!has!helped!to!
enhance!CSR! reporting!quality! in! the!UK.!However,! this!effect! varies!across!different! firm!
characteristics.!Second,!the!reported!results!denote!that!in!a!mandatory!context,!the!quality!
of!CSR! reporting!provided!by!high]quality!CG!firms! is!higher!than!that!of! lower!quality!CG!
firms.!Moreover,! firms! listed! in!multi]international!markets!report!higher!CSR!quality!than!
that! reported! by! domestically! listed! firms.! ! In! the! same! context,! a! higher! quality! of! CSR!
reporting!is!delivered!by!higher]risk!industries’!firms!(sensitive!industries).!Third,!in!terms!of!





of!high]quality!CSR!reports!directly,!except! for!the! large!firms!where! it! is!a!motivation!for!
them!to!increase!their!reporting!quality!in!the!extreme,!similar!to!the!case!of!multinational!
listed!firms.!Moreover,!the!findings!imply!that!more!mature!firms!that!are!highly!leveraged!




mandatory! CSR! reporting! affects! firms”! to! complement! the! literature! that! evinces! the!
impact!of!voluntary!CSR!reporting.!These!findings!add!to!a!growing!body!of!literature!that!
studies!the!consequences!of!mandating!CSR! reporting.!One! such! research! stream! focused!
on!firm!value!and!market!responses!to!disclosure!(Grewal!et!al.,!2015;!Chen!et!al.,!2018),!
whereas! another! focuses! on! disclosure! activities! and! environmental! impacts! (Hung! et! al.,!
2015;!Ioannou!and!Serefeim,!2017).!This!study!provides!a!new!research!insight!by!examining!
the! impact! of!mandating! CSR! reporting! on! the! quality! of! CSR! report! itself!which! resulted!
from!firms’!sustainable!practices!as!presented!in!the!firms’!financial!reports!measured!after!
the! regulation.! This! research! stream! needs! to! be! explored! in! the! first! place! due! to! its!
importance! in! enhancing! our! understanding! about! the! firms’! behaviour! towards! such!
regulations,! this! to! be! carried! out! before! exploring! the! consequences! of! CSR]related!
regulation!on!other!streams.!In!specific,!this!thesis!investigates!the!firm!characteristics,!such!
as!firm!size,!debt!ratio,!firm!age,!firm!external!auditors,!firm!cross]listing,!firm!growth,!firm!








this! narrows! the! understanding! of! the! impact! of! these! regulations! on! the! quality! of! CSR!
reporting!in!general,!and!specifically!in!the!UK!environment!which!has!different!institutional!




reporting.! Also,!UK! institutional! investors! collect! private! social! information! to! assist! them!





firms! and! financial! industry! firms! compared! to! LSE!which!mandates! CSR! reporting! for! all!
listed! firms! in! the!main!market.! Also,! the! required! information! to! be! disclosed! vary! from!
region! to! another! between! requiring! ESG! reporting,! or! CSR! reporting! (which! includes!
environmental!and!social!information!according!to!Act!2006!(regulation!2013)).!Accordingly,!
this! study! contributes! to! the! literature! by! investigating! the! consequences! of! adopting!
regulation! of! CSR! reporting! and! the! intentions! behind! the! CSR! practices! in! a! firm,!which!
improves!stakeholder’s!decisions!towards!these!firms!in!the!UK!environment!and!shrinks!the!
lack! of! research! in! different! environments! which! limits! our! understanding! of! the!
consequences! of! this! regulation! on! the! firms.! Second,! this! study! is! distinguished! by! the!
wider! audience! target! which! is! mainly! the! stakeholders! and! public! users! in! addition! to!
stockholders!compared!to!the!financial!reporting!audience!target!that!is!stockholders!only.!!
The! remainder! of! this! chapter! is! organised! as! follows.! Section! 3.2! presents! the! related!
literature!of!CSR!reporting!starting!with!related!definitions!and!overview!of!CSR!reporting!
including! the!determinants!and!measures!of!CSR.!This! review,! furthermore,!demonstrates!














CSR! reporting! as! summarised! in! table! 3.1! (Brammer! and! Pavelin,! 2008;! Branco! and!
Redrigues,! 2008;! Wang! et! al.,! 2008;! Reverte,! 2009;! Chih,! 2010;! Chiu! and! Wang,! 2015;!
Christensen,!2016;!Ioannou!and!Serafeim,!2017).!!
Generally,!these!factors!could!be!summarised!into!eight!main!characteristics!(e.g.,!firm!size,!
industry! sensitivity,! the! firm’s! international! listing,! auditor! type,! firm! age,! profitability,!
leverage!and!corporate!governance).!
3.2.1.1!Firm!Characteristics!




Reverte! 2009).! Thus,! stakeholders! scrutinise! large! firms! regarding! their! environmental!
impact!(Reverte,!2009).!!
Being! classed! as! a! sensitive! industry! is! another! effective! factor! that! influences! CSR!
reporting.! Sensitive! industries! as! identified! by! Branco! and! Redrigues! (2008)11! include! all!
sectors! that!may! have! a! direct! negative! impact! on! the! environment,! such! as! the! oil! and!
chemical!sectors.!Such!firms!with!high]risk!impact!on!the!environment!are!subject!to!higher!
pressure! from!stakeholders! compared! to! less! risky! firms.!Due! to! that,! sensitive! industries!
















Moving! to! the! auditor! type! factor,!Wang! et! al.! (2008)! attest! that! firms! that! use! the! Big4!
auditors!may!have!stronger!motivation!to!report!extensive!information!about!CSR!and!apply!
more! reporting!standards!to!protect!their!reputation.!This,!however,! is!manifested!by!the!
restricted!procedures!which!Big4!audit! firms!apply! to!avoid! legal! claims!and!enhance! the!
audited!firm’s!reputation!(DeAngelo,!1981).!Moreover,!Chen!et!al.!(2016,!p.!53)!state!that!“a!
commitment! to! higher! financial! reporting! quality! has! the! potential! to! bring! positive!
externality! to! firms’! nonfinancial! disclosures! and! ultimately! affects! the! issuance! of! CSR!
reports.”!
Another! characteristic! is! the! firm!age.!Christensen! (2016)!provides!evidence! that! firm!age!
has! a! positive! relationship! with! CSR! reporting.! It! is! shown! that! firms’! CSR! practices! and!
financial! reporting! act! could! be! affected! by! the! different! development! levels! across! the!
firm’s!life!cycle.!The!underlying!logic!is!that!the!longer!a!firm!has!been!operating,!the!greater!
its! visibility! to! stakeholders! and! scrutiny,! which! increases! the! pressure! on! the! firm! to!
disclose!and!practice!more!CSR!activities.!!
Several!studies!explore!two!additional!main!factors!to!capture!a! firm’s! financial! resources!
availability,!firm’s!profitability!and!firm’s!leverage!(Brammer!and!Pavelin,!2008;!Branco!and!
Redrigues,!2008;!Wang!et!al.,!2008;!Reverte,!2009;!Chiu!and!Wang,!2015).!!In!the!context!of!





activities! (Ullmann,! 1985;! Roberts,! 1992).! Also,! the! literature! documents! an! insignificant!




and!Branco!and!Redrigues! (2008)!document!a!negative! sign! for! the! leverage!arguing! that!
highly! leveraged! firms! are! more! likely! to! direct! their! financial! resources! to! enhance! the!





could!be! that! creditor! shareholder!will! apply! less!pressure! to! restrict!managers’!decisions!





One! of! the! main! factors! studied! in! the! literature! of! CSR! determinants! is! the! corporate!
governance! (CG)! characteristic! (e.g.,! Flammer!and!Luo,! 2017;! Liu!and!Zhang,!2017)! for! its!
role!in!improving!CSR!reporting!quality!(Jo!and!Harjoto,!2012).!Based!on!legitimacy!theory,!




has! studied! the! association! between! CSR! reporting! and! CG,! and! most! of! the! literature!
evinces! the! positive! impact! of! CG! on! practicing! CSR! (Jamali! et! al.,! 2008;! Jo! and! Harjoto,!
2011,!2012;!Jizi!and!Salama;!2014;!Hashim!et!al.,!2015;!Shin!et!al.,!2015;!Beeks!et!al.,!2016;!
Shahzad!et!al.,!2016;!Flammer!and!Luo,!2017;!Liu!and!Zhang,!2017).!From!this,!it!is!clear!that!
CG!and!CSR!work! in!parallel!under! the! same!umbrella,! in!addition! to! the! fact!–!as! Jo!and!
Harjoto!(2012)!argue!–!that!CG!improves!CSR!practices!in!firms.!
Finally,! less! common! factors! (determinants)! are! introduced! in! the! literature;! most! are!
external!rather!than!internal!determinants,!such!as!media!exposure!(Branco!and!Redrigues,!
2008;! Reverte,! 2009;! Chiu! and!Wang,! 2015),! consumer! proximity! (Branco! and! Redrigues,!






























































































































































































































































































































































































mandated!CSR! reporting!until!now,!and!for!those!that!do,!the! regulation! is!not!very! clear!
about! the! exact! required! information! and! the! form! of! the! reporting! that! firms! need! to!
apply.! For! instance,! Ioannou! and! Serafeim! (2017)! examine! the! impact! of!mandatory! CSR!










predict! unfavourable! stakeholder! reactions! around! mandatory! reporting! of! CSR!
performance.!!






improvement! in! the! spending! associated! with! CSR! practices! (specifically! environmental!
protection!spending).!Also,!they!observe!a!decrease!in!the!firm’s!profitability!after!enforcing!







or! appropriate! with! the! context! (such! as! norms,! beliefs,! and! values)! of! some! social!
systems.12! This! approach! posits! that! CSR! reporting! is! a! method! to! legitimise! a! firm’s!
continued! existence! to! the! society! (Gray! et! al.,! 1995;! Hooghiemstra,! 2000).! However,!
Jennings! and! Zandbergen! (1995)! document! that! the! externals’! (e.g.,! stakeholders! and!
society)! pressure! influences! the! levels! at! which! sustainable! development! activities! are!




Overall,! it! can!be!posited! that!CSR! reporting! can!be!used!by! firms!as!a! strategy! to! shield!
themselves! from! negative! perceptions! of! stakeholders.! Instead,! they! impress! their!
stakeholders! by! showing! they! are! performing! socially.! ! This! approval! ensures! their!
continued!existence.! (Neu!et!al.,!1998).!Nevertheless,!when!firms!are!mandated!to!report!
about! their! CSR! activities,! they! will! feel! under! scrutiny! from! stakeholders! and! externals!
which! pushes! them! to! enhance! their! CSR! activities! to! legitimise! the! firm’s! practices! and!
avoid!any!governmental!penalties.!!
Therefore,! this! study! sheds! light! on! whether! moving! to! set! new! mandatory! regulations!
affects!the!quality!of!CSR!reporting!in!the!UK!and,!by!extension,!the!factors!of!size,!leverage,!
firm!age,!auditing,!listing,!growth,!industry!sensitivity,!and!profitability!effect!on!the!quality!
of! CSR! reporting! in! terms! of! the! new! regulations.! In! the!UK,! as! discussed! later,! the! new!
regulations!require!firms!to!only!report!about!their!CSR!practices;!failure!to!do!so!incurs!a!
penalty! for! not! complying! with! these! regulations! (Act! 2006/414c).! Accordingly,! the! first!
hypothesis!of!this!study!is!stated!as!follow:!
First(Hypothesis:!CSR!reporting!regulation!will!improve!the!quality!of!CSR!reporting.!









by! another! variable”.! Accordingly,! for! more! understanding! of! the! impact! of! the! new!
regulations!on!the!quality!of!CSR!reporting,!and!the!factors!which!may!enhance!or!diminish!
this! impact,! this! study! develops! sub]hypotheses! to! capture! the! influence! of! the! most!
common! factors! used! in! the! literature! (size,! leverage,! firm! age,! auditing,! listing,! growth,!





2012;! Jizi! and! Salama,! 2014;!Young! and! Thyil,! 2014;!Shin! et! al.,! 2015;!Beeks! et! al.,! 2016;!
Shahzad!et!al.,!2016;!Flammer!and!Luo,!2017;!Liu!and!Zhang,!2017);!however,!a!considerable!




Liu! and! Zhang! (2017,! p.! 1076)! state! that! “Corporate! governance! refers! to! the! extensive!
relationships! between! the! enterprise! and! stakeholders! or! between! the! enterprise! and!
society.!High!levels!of!corporate!governance!could!safeguard!stakeholders'!rights!and!ensure!
social! responsibility”.! !Meanwhile,! Jo!and!Harjoto! (2012)!document! that!CG!and!CSR!have!
similar!core!content!but!CG! improves!CSR!reporting!quality.!Thus,!managers!could!employ!
this! type! of! effect! as! a! tool! to! send! positive! signals! to! the! market! to! enhance! their!
performance! and! legitimise! their! existence! (Mathews,! 1995).! Altogether,! based! on!
legitimacy!theory,!the!first!sub]hypothesis!is:(
First( Sub8hypothesis:! The! effect! of! regulation! on! CSR! reporting! quality!will! be! greater! for!
highNquality!CG!firms.!
3.2.3.2!Interaction!Effect!with!Firm!Age!
A! firm’s! CSR! practices! and! financial! reporting! could! be! affected! by! the! different!
development!levels!of!the!firm’s!life!cycle!(Kim!et!al.,!2012).!Moreover,!a!firm’s!age!reflects!






they! are! more! visible! to! the! public! and! under! higher! pressure! from! stakeholders! and!
analysts.! Therefore,! they! have! incentives! to! protect! their! reputation! through! higher! CSR!





Where! the! CSR! practices! offer! benefits! for! stakeholders,! employees,! and! the! firm’s!
reputation!and!performance!(Servaes!and!Tamayo,!2013),!it!is!found,!in!general,!that!these!
practices!are! closely!and!positively!associated!with! firm!size! (Brammer!and!Pavelin,!2008;!
Branco! and! Rodrigues,! 2008;! Reverte,! 2009).! In! particular,! different! sized! firms! behave!
differently!under!such!a!relationship.!For!instance,!larger!firms!are!likely!to!report!and!act!in!
a! more! socially! responsible! manner! compared! to! smaller! firms! in! order! to! legitimise!
themselves!(Reverte!2009).!Arguably,! this! is! related!to!the!fact!that! larger! firms!are!more!
liable!to!scrutiny!from!stakeholders!where!they!are!more!visible!to!the!public!(Wang!et!al.,!




firms! are,! then! under! the! mandatory! regulation,! they! are! in! a! sensitive!
political/governmental!position,!which! in! turn!would! increase! the!political! cost! risk!of!not!
complying!with!these!regulations!(Watts!and!Zimmerman,!1978).!Accordingly,!the!third!sub]
hypothesis!of!this!study!is!stated!as!follows:!
Third( Sub8hypothesis:! The!effect! of! regulation!on!CSR! reporting!quality!will!be!greater! for!
larger!firms.!!
3.2.3.4!Interaction!Effect!with!Firm!Profitability!
In! the! context! of! agency! theory! literature! evinces! the! positive! relationship! between! CSR!
reporting! and! profitability! of! the! firm,!where! as!much! as! the! firm! has! a! surplus! in! their!









on!enhancing! their!earnings! than! spending!on!CSR!and!environmental!activities! (Ullmann,!
1985;!Roberts,!1992).!However,!Neu!et!al.!(1998)!argue!that!the!relationship!between!CSR!
practices! and! profitability! would! vary! between! positive! and! negative.! Also,! the! literature!






financial! resources! towards! CSR! activities! due! to! the! additional! required! cost! (Hull! and!
Rothenberg,!2008).!Also,!Purushothaman!et!al.!(2000)!emphasis!that!highly!leveraged!firms!

















Fifth( Sub8hypothesis:! There! is! an! effect! of! regulation! on! CSR! reporting! quality! for! higher!
leveraged!firms.!
3.2.3.6!Interaction!Effect!with!Auditor!Type!(BIG4)!
Large! auditing! (Big4)! accounting! firms! perform! stricter! audit! procedures! to! avoid! legal!
claims,! increase! the!goodwill,! and!enhance! the! firms’! internal! control! systems! (DeAngelo,!
1981).!Accordingly,!as!Wang!et!al.! (2008)!suggest,! firms!that!hold!Big4!auditors!may!have!
stronger!motivation! to! report! extensive! information! about! CSR! and! imply!more! reporting!
standards!to!protect!their!reputation.!!
Moreover,! it! is! found! that! Big4! auditing! firms! encourage! their! clients! to! enhance! their!
reporting! level! which! in! turn! sends! positive! signals! to! the! market! regarding! the! firm’s!
performance! (Joshi! and! Said,! 2012).! Thus,! the! literature! provides! evidence,! based! on!
signalling!theory,!that!firms!provide!higher!levels!of!CSR!reporting!when!the!financial!auditor!
is! one! of! the! Big4! (Fernandez]Feijoo! et! al.,! 2018).! The! sixth! sub]hypothesis! is! therefore!
proposed:!
Sixth( Sub8hypothesis:! The!effect!of! regulation!on!CSR! reporting!quality!will! be!greater! for!
Big4Naudited!firms.!
3.2.3.7!Interaction!Effect!with!Firm!CrossNlisting!




Relatedly,! evidence! shows! that! international! listing! firms! have! a! strong! motivation! to!
increase! their! CSR! performance! in! terms! of! enhancing! their! reputation! (Boubakri! et! al.,!
2016)!as!a!mechanism!against!the!external!scrutiny!and!pressure!of!stakeholders! (Lang!et!
al.,!2003;!El!Ghoul!et!al.,!2011),!and!to!mitigate!market!litigation!risks!and!fines!(Hong!and!









This! suggestion!might! be! derived! from! two! views;! either! the!managers! desire! to! impress!
stakeholders! for! self]interests! such! as! to! protect! their! positions! (the! opportunistic!
perspective!of!legitimacy!theory),!or!to!increase!the!stakeholders’!wealth!and!enhance!the!
firm’s! performance! in! front! of! investors! and! analysts! (“doing! well! by! doing! good”!








the! environment! such! as! water! consumption! or! emission! still! have! a! high! level! of! CSR!
reporting,! but! this! type! of! reporting! requires! little! additional! reporting! cost! to! satisfy!
stakeholders,!contrary!to!the!case!of!the!sensitive!industries.!As!a!result,!sensitive!industries!
report!more!CSR! information!compared! to! other! industries’! counterparts! due! to! the!high!






The! research!approach! is!a! strategy!employed!by! the! researcher! to!develop! the! study.! In!
general,! there!are! two!methods! in! the! research!methodology:! the!deductive!method!and!
inductive! method.! The! deductive! method! mainly! is! built! on! starting! the! research! with!
developing! theories! and! hypotheses! then!moving! to! collect! the! required! data! to! test! the!
hypotheses.!Conversely,!the!inductive!method!starts!with!extracting!the!data!then!analyses!
it! to! develop! hypotheses! and! find! a! proper! theory! (Saunders! et! al.,! 2009).! In! this! study,!
mainly!the!inductive!approach!is!adapted!to!conduct!the!primary!data!of!this!research!(the!






quantitative! and! qualitative! forms.! The! quantitative! type! focuses! on! numbers,! but! the!
qualitative!type!focuses!on!the!words!or!the!narrative!type!of!data!(Bryman!and!Bell,!2011).!
This! research! uses! the! quantitative! method! to! collect! the! required! data! to! test! the!
developed!hypotheses.!
3.4!Data!and!Sampling!
The! study! gathers! a! sample! consisting! of! 402! FTSE! All]share! firms! listed! on! LSE! which!




financial! institutions! (banks,! insurance,! and! investment)! (SIC! 6000]6799)14! and! utility!
industries! (SIC! 4400]4999)! are! excluded.! Later! literature! enlightens! that! this! exclusion!
enhances!the!comparability!of!the!results!among!the!sample,!where!the!mentioned!sectors!
operate! in! highly! regulated! industries!which!differ!with! their!accounting! rules! to! those! in!
other!industries.!Thus,!this!treatment!reduces!the!initial!sample!from!3390!observations!to!
2395!observations.!Also,!excluding!the!missing!values!reduces!the!sample!to!reach!the!final!




the! control! variables,! in! addition! to! the! SIC! codes,! were! obtained! from! the!DataStream!































industry! to! make! sure! that! each! firm! is! assessed! based! on! relevant! data! related! to! its!
specific!industry!and!weights!each!item!in!the!score!by!its!importance!(Gutsche!et!al.,!2017).!
However,! the!ESG!Bloomberg! score! includes!the!following!headings!for!the!environmental!
dimension;! CO2! emissions,! energy! consumption,! water! use,! and! total! waste.! The! social!
dimension!items!are!number!of!employees,!contract!type!and!turnover,!community!service!
spending,!and!human!rights.!The!last!dimension!is!corporate!governance,!which!consists!of!
information! about! board! structure,! board! independence,! board! executives! and! diversity,!
board! committees,! audit! committee,! compensation! committee,! and! others! (Bloomberg!
database).!
The!new!regulations!mandating!CSR!reporting!in!the!UK!requires!the!firms!to!report!about:!
the! impact! of! firm’s! business! on! the! environment,! the! company’s! employees,! and! social,!





















The! purpose! of! this! study! is! to! determine! the! effect! of! the! new! regulations! Act! 2006!
(regulation!2013)!of!mandating!CSR! reporting!on! the!quality!of!CSR! reporting! in!FTSE!All]







Secondly,! in! order! to! examine! the! sub]hypotheses! of! this! study! which! investigate! the!













Variable! Definition! Measurement! Expected!
Sign!





Reg(i,t! Indicates! the! new! regulation!
of!Act!2006!(Regulation!2013).!
A!dummy!variable!equal!zero!if!the!
year! before! 2013! and! one!
otherwise.!
+!
CG(i,t!!! Indicates! the! corporate!
governance! score! at! the! end!
of!the!year.!
Corporate! governance! net! score!
ranges!from!0!to!100.!
+!
Age(i,t( Indicates!the!firm!age.!! The! natural! logarithm! of! the!
number! of! the! firms’! listing! year!
(BDATE)!plus!one.!
+!
Size(i,t( Indicates!the!size!of!the!firm.! The! natural! logarithm! of! the!
market! value! of! equity!
(MVE_WC08001)! of! firm! i,!
measured!at!the!end!of!year!t.!
+!
ROA(i,t( Indicates! the! profitability! of!
the! firm! by! Return! on! Assets!
ratio.!









BigN(i,t( Indicates! the! auditor! type! of!
the!firm!(Big!4!or!not).!




Listing(i,t( Indicates! the! cross]listing!
status!of!the!firm.!
An! indicator! variable! equal! to! one!
when!a!firm!is!listed!in!one!or!more!







and! gas,! chemicals,! construction!
and!building!materials,!forestry!and!
paper,! steel! and! other! metals,!
electricity,! gas! distribution! and!
water”.!!









This! section! first! presents! the! industry! and! time! distributions! over! the! nine]year! sample!
period,!followed!by!the!descriptive!statistics!and!correlation!matrix!of!all!variables!included!
in! the! study.! Next,! OLS! regression! tests! the! impact! of! mandating! CSR! reporting! on! CSR!
reporting! quality! for! the! whole! sample! followed! by! the! mean! difference! of! variables!
between!CSR!reporting!quality!before!and!after!the!new!regulation.!This!study!conducts!a!






the!CSR!reporting!quality!sample!during!2009]2017.!Seven!main! industries!are! included! in!
this!study!with!a!net!number!of!266!firms.!The!Manufacturing!and!Service!industries!are!the!
largest!populations!of!CSR!reports!with!38.46%!and!19.3%,!respectively,!of!the!sample!firms.!
The!Wholesale! Trade! and! Transportation! and! Public! Utilities! industries! both! provide! the!
lowest!CSR!reports!with!3.34%!and!4.64%,!respectively,!of!the!sample!firms.!Table!3.3!Panel!
B!presents!the!time!distribution!of!the!CSR!reporting!quality!sample!over!the!study!period.!




Panel!A:!Industry!Distribution! ! ! !
Industry!Type! Freq.! Per!cent! Cum.!
Mining! 158! 11.47! 11.47!
Construction! 101! 7.33! 18.8!
Manufacturing! 530! 38.46! 57.26!
Transportation!&!Public!Utilities! 64! 4.64! 61.9!
Wholesale!Trade! 46! 3.34! 65.24!
Retail!Trade! 213! 15.46! 80.7!
Services! 266! 19.3! 100!







Year! Freq.! Per!cent! Cum.!
2009! 20! 1.45! 1.45!
2010! 161! 11.68! 13.13!
2011! 170! 12.34! 25.47!
2012! 178! 12.92! 38.39!
2013! 185! 13.43! 51.81!
2014! 205! 14.88! 66.69!
2015! 217! 15.75! 82.44!
2016! 208! 15.09! 97.53!
2017! 34! 2.47! 100!




for! all! of! the! sample! firm]year! observations,! thus! showing! a! relatively! low!CSR! reporting!
quality!of!FTSE!All]share!firms!in!the!UK.!However,!firms’!score!of!reporting!CG!is!about!56!
on! average! out! of! a! full! score! of! 100,!which! is! considered! higher! than! the! CSR! reporting!
score.!Regarding!firms’!size,!the!mean!firm!size!score!is!14.315!(equivalent!to!approximately!
£4,697!million!market! value! of! equity)! with! a!median! score! of! 14.083.! ! On! average,! the!
sample!firms!are!more!profitable!with!0.2%!than!their!peers!in!the!same!industry,!and!the!
average! level!of! firm!debt! is! about!22%.!Moreover,! about!72%!on!average!of! the! sample!





! CSR_Score! CG! Age! Size! ROA! Lev! BigN! List! Ind.Sens!
Mean! 30.472! 56.674! 32.365! 14.315! 0.002! 0.220! 0.723! 0.957! 0.188!
Median! 29.000! 57.000! 3.367! 14.083! 0.001! 0.212! 1.000! 1.000! 0.000!
SD! 11.259! 6.940! 16.685! 1.433! 0.003! 0.169! 0.448! 0.203! 0.391!
Min! 11.000! 39.000! 2.000! 10.496! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000! 0.000!
Max! 65.000! 77.000! 54.000! 18.127! 0.029! 1.014! 1.000! 1.000! 1.000!








be! normal! in! the! context! of! this! study.! A! Huber/White! estimator! and! Newey]West!
procedure! are! used! to! make! sure! that! the! model! is! free! of! auto]correlation! and!





The! pairwise! Pearson! correlation! matrix! shows! three! results! worth! noting.! Firstly,! CSR!












! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9!
1.!CSR_Score! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
2.!CG! 0.678*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
3.!Age! 0.110*! 0.213*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! !
4.!Size! 0.567*! 0.559*! 0.116*! 1! ! ! ! ! !
5.!ROA! ]0.290*! ]0.242*! ]0.135*! ]0.507*! 1! ! ! ! !
6.!Lev! 0.077*! 0.052*! ]0.250*! 0.127*! ]0.156*! 1! ! ! !
7.!BigN! L0.010! 0.100*! ]0.060*! 0.135*! ]0.112*! 0.045*! 1! ! !
8.!List! 0.083*! 0.102*! ]0.090*! 0.285*! ]0.151*! 0.021! 0.067*! 1! !








this! study! runs! OLS! regression! using! the! full! sample.! Table! 3.6! reports! the! multivariate!













to! CSR! reporting! quality.! These! results! indicate! that! mature! firms! with! high! market!
capitalisation!and!higher!debt! ratio! that!would! be! listed! in!multiple! international!markets!
and! classified! under! sensitive! industries! have! a! tendency! to! engage! in! CSR! practices! and!
offer! higher! quality! CSR! reporting.! However,! profitability! and! external! auditor! type!were!
found!to!be!insignificant.!
As!discussed!earlier,!in!2013,!the!Companies!Act!2006/414c!required!firms!to!report!about!
their! CSR! practices! and! their! business! impact! on! the! society! and! the! environment.! To!



















































This! study! develops! eight! sub]hypotheses! to! capture! the! influence! of! adopting! the! new!
regulations!on!the!quality!of!CSR!reporting,!and!the!factors!which!may!enhance!or!diminish!
this!impact.!Common!factors!used!in!the!literature!are!CG!(Jo!and!Harjoto,!2012),!firm!age!
(Christensen,! 2016),! firm! size,! profitability,! debt! ratio! (Ioannou! and! Serafeim,! 2017),!
external!auditor!type!(Wang!et!al.,!2012),!international!listing!(Reverte,!2009),!and!industry!
sensitivity! (Brammer!and!Pavelin,!2008)!which!are! found! to!be!effective!on!CSR! reporting!
quality.!








the! interaction! term! (Reg*CG)!0.121!and! significant!at! the!1%! level! (t!=!2.65)! is! reported,!
which!indicates!that!the!effect!of!adopting!the!new!regulations!on!CSR!reporting!quality!is!
stronger!in!CG!firms,!which!is!consistent!with!sub]hypothesis!1.!!
According! to! the! interaction! term! (Reg*List),! the! positive! coefficient! 2.543! is! statistically!
significant!at!the!1%!level!(t!=!2.21),!which!indicates!that!listing!firms!in!multi]international!
markets!would!strengthen!the!relationship!between!adopting!CSR!new!regulation!and!CSR!




1%! level! (t!=! 2.31).! ! This! result! supports! this! study’s! eighth! sub]hypothesis! that! sensitive!



















































by!estimating!a! lagged!values!of! independent!variables! (Christensen;!Dhaliwal,!2011).!The!
results!are!consistent!with!OLS!results!reported!earlier!as!table!3.9!presents.!Some!variables!
have!either!more! or! less! significant! level,!but!direction!and! significance! stayed! the! same.!
Thus,!endogeneity!does!not!affect! these! study! findings! (e.g.,!Brammer!and!Pavelin,!2008;!
Branco! and! Redrigues,! 2008;! Wang! et! al.,! 2008;! Reverte,! 2009;! Chiu! and! Wang,! 2015;!
Ioannou!and!Serafeim,!2017;!Chen!et!al.,!2018).!
Table!3.9!



























score! of! CSR! reporting! quality! with! high! and! low! CSR! reporting! scores! as! a! substitute!
dependent!variable.!However,!following!Schleicher!et!al.!(2007),!the!main!sample!is!divided!







CSR! reporting! quality! covering! all! independent! and! control! variables! used! in! the! original!
tests.!This!study!uses!OLS!regression!to!run!the!first,!third,!and!fourth!models,!and!a!logistic!
test!for!the!fifth!model.!!
The! result! of! model! 3! (high! CSR)! indicates! an! insignificant! impact! of! adopting! the! new!
regulation!on!high!CSR!reporting!quality!(CSR!score).!The!explanation!for!this!could!be!that!
firms! that! used! to! report! a! high]quality! CSR! would! keep! reporting! the! same! way! after!
mandating! this! type! of! reporting.! In! other! words,! firms! that! voluntarily! consider! CSR!
practices! and! report! them! at! a! high! standard! will! not! be! affected! in! mandating! CSR!
reporting!since!it!might!be!disclosing!more!information!than!required.!!
The! coefficient! on! the!Regulation! variable! of!model! 4! (low!CSR)! is! 8.851! at! 1%! level! (t! =!
5.13).!However,! this! indicates!a!significant!positive! impact!of!adopting!the!new!regulation!
on! low! CSR! reporting! quality.! That! means! that! mandating! CSR! reporting! enhances! CSR!
reporting!quality!for!the!firms!with!low!CSR!reporting.!!
In! terms! of! model! 5! (logistic! model),! an! insignificant! coefficient! 0.208! (t! =! 1.37)! on! the!
Regulation!is!presented,!which!supports!model!3’s!empirical!findings!(high]CSR!sub]sample!
findings).!Results!report!that!the!adoption!of!the!new!regulation!has!no!significant!impact!


















! Coef.! t]Test! Coef.! t]Test! Coef.! t]Test! Coef.! z]Test! !
Regulations! 1.169! 4.02***! 7.635! 1.270! 8.851! 5.130***! ]0.208! ]1.370! !
CG! 0.199! 6.54***! 0.216! 4.320***! 0.089! 2.490**! 0.137! 7.320***! !
Age! 4.352! 4.14***! ]3.175! ]1.240! 0.811! 1.540! 0.734! 4.400***! !
Size! 2.214! 9.56***! 1.312! 1.690*! 0.639! 2.620***! 0.373! 3.410***! !
ROA! 17.365! 0.26! ]23.765! ]0.210! 137.361! 1.770*! 0.704! 0.020! !
Lev! 5.592! 3.47***! 0.244! 0.060! 2.693! 1.790*! 0.556! 0.890! !
BigN! ]0.315! ]0.43! ]0.764! ]0.720! ]0.817! ]1.140! ]0.332! ]1.300! !
List! 6.412! 3.27***! 7.918! 1.500! 0.362! 0.270! 0.559! 0.850! !
Ind.Sens! 5.745! 4.06***! 5.062! 1.630! ]0.851! ]0.790! 0.601! 2.010**! !
_cons! ]31.912! ]6.64! 1.639! 0.140! ]0.769! ]0.170! ]15.716! ]9.120! !
N!(firm]years)! 1378! ! 684! ! 694! !! 1378! ! !
R]squared! 0.179! ! 0.190! ! 0.310! !! 0.240! ! !
Year!effect! Yes! ! Yes! !! Yes! !! Yes! ! !
Notes:!*,!**,!and!***!represent!significance!at!10%,!5%,!and!1%!levels,!respectively.!High!(Low)!CSR!is!the!net!score!divided!
using!a!dummy!variable!equal!1!(0)! if!upper!(lower)!quantile.!High_Low!CSR! is! the! logit!model!where!High]Low!CSR! is! a!











Table!3.11!presents! the! results! from!running!a! cross]sectional!data! regression! testing! the!
original! relation! in! model! 2! using! alternative! sub]samples! of! high! and! low! CSR! quality!
reporting!net!score.!The!result!of!testing!model!3!indicates!that!the!coefficient!of!interaction!




In! contrast! with! this! study’s! predictions! for! the! rest! of! the! sub]hypotheses,! table! 3.11!
indicates!that!none!of! the! interaction! terms!of! CG,! firm!age,!size,!profitability,!debt! ratio,!






CSR! reporting! quality.! According! to! the! interaction! term! (Regulation*Age),! the! negative!




10%! level! (t! =! ]1.97);! thus! the! debt! ratio! of! firms! would! weaken! the! relation! between!
adopting!CSR!new!regulation!and!low!CSR!reporting!quality.!In!line!with!prior!literature!(Hull!
and!Rothenberg,!2008),!the!explanation!could!be!that!highly!leveraged!firms!are!less!likely!








using!a! logistic!model.!Results!of!the! interaction! terms!are! in! line!with!the!OLS!regression!
results!of!model!3!and!model!4,!and!report!a!positive!coefficient!1.77!of!the!interaction!term!
(Regulation*Size)! at! the! 5%! level! (t! =! 2.010),! and! a! positive! coefficient! 0.87! of! the!
interaction!term!(Regulation*List)!at!the!1%!level!(t!=!2.760).!These!results!indicate!that!the!






















! Coef.! t]Test! Coef.! t]Test! Coef.! t]Test! Coef.! z]Test!
Regulation! 7.352! 1.980*! 11.928! 1.810*! 3.354! 0.680! ]3.924! 1.400!
CG! 0.157! 3.990***! 0.184! 3.440***! 0.033! 0.730! 0.104! 4.670***!
Age! 4.236! 2.100**! ]2.823! ]1.020! 0.607! 0.830! 0.702! 3.150***!
Size! 1.401! 2.600***! 1.756! 2.010***! 0.458! 1.390! 0.432! 3.460***!
ROA! 20.997! 0.260! ]28.882! ]0.250! 157.486! 1.790*! 9.394! 0.250!
Leverage! 4.514! 1.630! ]0.106! ]0.020! 1.969! 1.090! ]0.286! 0.370!
BigN! ]0.582! ]0.500! ]1.367! ]1.080! 0.851! 1.040! ]0.277! 0.980!
List! 9.373! 5.960***! 7.524! 1.580! 1.825! 1.030! 0.401! 0.580!
Ind_Sens! 4.387! 2.060**! 2.894! 0.850! ]1.246! ]0.930! 0.419! 1.180!
Regulation!*CG! 0.121! 2.650***! ]0.716! ]1.520! 0.139! 0.470! ]0.147! 1.110!
Regulation!*Age! ]0.489! ]0.950! 1.140! 1.290! ]2.477! L3.940***! ]0.169! 0.510!
Regulation!*Size! ]0.176! ]0.550! ]1.241! ]0.410! 1.394! 0.840! 1.776! 2.010**!
Regulation!*ROA! 18.317! 0.230! ]0.088! ]0.100! 0.156! 0.300! 0.129! 0.500!
Regulation!*Lev! ]0.838! ]0.500! ]1.588! ]0.750! ]2.562! L1.970*! 0.337! 0.820!
Regulation!*Big! ]0.422! ]0.700! 24.591! 0.100! ]27.427! ]0.350! ]65.854! 0.810!
Regulation!*List! 2.543! 2.210**! 0.132! 1.790*! 0.131! 2.540***! 0.087! 2.760***!
Regulation!*!Ind_Sens! 2.001! 2.310**! 0.980! 0.800! 0.332! 0.310! 0.290! 0.640!
_cons! ]28.760! ]3.260! ]3.434! ]0.260! 2.989! 0.530! ]14.342! 7.060!
N!(firm]years)! 1378! ! 684! ! 694! !! 1378! !
R]squared! 0.272! ! 0.212! ! 0.341! !! 0.250! !




























and!valuations,!which! in!turn!guide!the!firm’s! investment!decisions,! the!firm’s! investment!
decisions! affect! the! stock! price! and! return,! and! the! stock! price! feedback! into! the! firm’s!
investment!choices!(e.g.,!Gao,!2010).!In!other!words,!when!investors!decide!where!to!invest!
their!money,!then!they!will!direct!employees!to!decide!where!to!work,!and!as!consequence!
policymakers! and! regulators!will! decide!what! to! regulate,! thus! they! finally!will! direct! the!
consumers! to! decide!what! items! to! purchase! (Eccles! and! Krzus! 2010)!which! presents! the!
importance!of!the!study!results.!
However,!the!positive!impact!of!regulation!on!CSR!reporting!quality!varies!across!different!
firm! characteristics! of! CG,! firm! age,! firm! size,! firm]debt! ratio,! listing! firm! in! multi]
international!markets,!and!the!sensitivity!of!the!industry!under!which!the!firm!is!classified.!
Particularly,! the! impact! of!mandatory! regulation!will! be! greater! for! firms!with! high!MVE,!
firms! listed! in!multi]international!markets,!high!CG!quality! firms,!older! firms,! firms!have!a!
high! debt! ratio! and! are! classified! as! sensitive! industries! that! impose! a! high! risk! on! the!
environment.!
Second,! the! relation! between! mandatory! regulation! and! CSR! reporting! quality! could! be!
affected!by! individual! firm!characteristics.!However,! the! reported! results!denote! that! in!a!
mandatory!context,!the!quality!of!CSR!reporting!provided!by!high]quality!CG!firms!is!higher!
than! that! of! lower]quality! CG! firms.!Moreover,! firms! listed! in!multi]international!markets!
report! higher! CSR! quality! than! that! reported! by! domestically! listed! firms,! which! mainly!





In! the! same! context,! a! higher! quality! of! CSR! report! is! delivered! by! higher! risk! industries’!
firms!(sensitive!industries),!as!a!result!of!legitimacy!perspective!where!sensitive!industries’!
firms! would! disclose! higher! CSR! quality! reports! compared! to! their! other! industries!
counterparts!due! to! the!high!pressure! they!are!exposed! to! from!stakeholders! (Gao!et!al.,!
2005;!Brammer!and!Pavelin,!2008;!Reverte,!2009).!
Third,! regarding! the! influence! of! mandatory! regulation! on! high! CSR! reporting! quality!
compared!to!low!CSR!reporting!quality,!the!conclusions!reached!by!this!study!are!consistent!
with!legitimacy!theory!and!indicate!that!mandatory!regulation!affects!providers!of!low!CSR!
reporting! quality! but! not! providers! of! high]quality! CSR! reports.! Hence,! the! mandatory!
regulation! enhances! the! low! quality! of! CSR! reports.! In! specific,! the! results! indicate! that!
mandatory! regulation! does! not! influence! producers! of! high]quality! CSR! report! directly,!
except! in! the! case! of! the! large! firms!where! it! is! a!motivation! for! them! to! increase! their!
reporting!quality!to!extreme!levels.!Similarly,!multinational!listed!firms!are!motivated!after!
the!mandatory! regulation! to! enhance! their! high! CSR! reporting! quality.! Regarding! the! low!
CSR! reporting!quality,! the! findings! imply! that!older! firms,!which!are!highly! leveraged!and!





between! firms!and! stakeholders! in! the!annual! report!CSR]section! (FASB! 2013,! FRC! 2013).!
Also,! the! findings! increase! firms’! reporting! quality! of! financial! reporting,! enhance! firms’!
environmental!and!social!roles!to!make!them!more!loyal!to!sustainability!issues.!This!study!
also! extends! accounting! literature! about! mandatory! CSR! reporting,! where! few! countries!
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I! explore! the! impact! of! mandating! corporate! social! responsibility! reporting! on! earnings!
quality!through!real!earnings!management!(REM)!and!accrual!earnings!management!(AEM).!
The!empirical!analysis!uses!the!UK's!FTSE!All]Share!data!set!for!the!period!2009!to!2017!and!
employs! the!OLS!model.! I!document! two!main! findings:! first,! I! find!a!positive! relationship!
between! voluntary! CSR! reporting! and! REM,! indicating! that! managers! will! report! CSR! to!
cover!their!earnings!manipulation!practices.!Second,!I!find!that!mandating!CSR!reporting!has!









Financial! statements’! accounting! numbers! should! present! a! genuine! picture! of! the! firm’s!
financial!position!and!stock!in!the!current!year.!However,!for!short]term!personal!benefits!
and!opportunistic! incentives,!managers!might! intentionally!manipulate!some!of!the!year’s!
accounting! results! (Healy! and!Wahlen,! 1999).! As! the! literature! documents,!managers! are!
mainly!motivated!to!engage!in!earnings!management!activities!to!manage!reported!earnings!
either!within!the!boundaries!of!the!Generally!Accepted!Accounting!Principles!(GAAP),!where!
adjustments! of! the! financial! recording! are! done! at! the! end! of! the! year! (accrual! earnings!








of!narrative!disclosure!has!also! received!considerable!attention! in! the! literature! (Gao!and!
Zhang,! 2015)! due! to! the! documented! fact! that! CSR! firms! react! differently! in! terms! of!
earnings!management!than!non]CSR!firms!do!(e.g.,!Dhaliwal!et!al.,!2012;!Kim!et!al.,!2012).!
This! study! discusses! the! relationship! between! corporate! social! responsibility! reporting!
practice! and! the! opportunistic! behaviour! of! earnings! management! under! two! common!
types!(accrual!and!real!activities)!in!the!context!of!mandating!CSR!reporting!in!the!UK.!The!
study! focuses! on! the! UK! environment! as! one! of! the! few! regions! to! have! enforced! a!
regulation!requiring!reporting!of!CSR.!Moreover,!depending!on!the!country]specific!context,!
the! use! of! CSR! reporting! might! vary! between! different! environments! and! regions! (e.g.,!
Cahan!et!al.,!2016);!thus,!the!findings!from!this!study!would!suggest!the!existence!of!a!new!
important!institutional!environment.!
Prior! literature! documents! studies! about! the! relationship! between! CSR! reporting! and!




that! firms!with!better!CSR!disclosure!are! less! likely!to!engage!in!aggressive!(opportunistic)!




of!CSR! reporting!as!a! strategy!used! to!avoid!negative! response!of! the! stakeholder!groups!
against! the!managers’! earnings!management! practices.! Second,! they! help! researchers! to!
understand! the! effect! of! the! new! regulation! on! restricting! managers’! opportunistic!





To! achieve! the! main! aims,! a! sample! consisting! of! 402! FTSE! All]share! firms! listed! on! the!
London!Stock!Exchange!(LSE)!which! includes!Main!Market! from!2009!to!2017! is!gathered.!
From! this,!data! for!both,! the!period!before!and! after! the!adoption! of! the!mandatory!CSR!
reporting! regulation! can! be! collected.! Hence,! OLS! analysis! is! conducted! to! estimate! the!
impact!of!mandating!CSR!reporting!regulation!on!EM!quality.!!
While! the! prior! empirical! results! are! limited,! the! findings! of! this! study! enrich! literature!
through!three!points.!Firstly,! they!evince!the!existence!of!REM!practice!before!mandating!
CSR! reporting! specifically! through! sales! manipulation,! which! supports! the! notion! that!
managers! will! report! CSR! to! cover! their! earnings! manipulation! practices.! This! evidence!
endorses! the! highlighted! directional! trend! by! Prior! et! al.! (2008)! and! Choi! et! al.! (2013).!
Secondly,! the! reported! results! denote! that! in! a!mandatory! context! of! CSR! reporting,! the!
REM!practices!become!more! restricted,!and!decrease,!due! to! the! fact! that!managers! lose!
competitive! advantage! of! using! CSR! voluntary! reporting! as! a! shield! to! cover! earnings!
management!practices,!which! is!consistent!with!Hong!and!Andersen!(2011)!and!Kim!et!al.!






mandatory! CSR! reporting! affects! firms”! to! complement! the! literature! that! evinces! the!
impact!of!voluntary!CSR!reporting.!These!findings!add!to!a!growing!body!of!literature!that!
studies!the!consequences!of!mandating!CSR! reporting.!One! such! research! stream! focused!
on!firm!value!and!market!responses!to!disclosure!(Grewal!et!al.,!2015;!Chen!et!al.,!2018),!
whereas! another! focuses! on! disclosure! activities! and! environmental! impacts! (Hung! et! al.,!
2015;!Ioannou!and!Serefeim,!2017).!This!study!provides!a!new!research!insight!by!examining!
the!impact!of!mandating!CSR!reporting!on!the!quality!of!EM.!!
However,! to!date,!only! limited! literature! focuses!on!mandatory!CSR! reporting!because! of!





Consequently,! this! narrows! the! understanding! of! the! impact! of! these! regulations! on! the!
quality! of! EM! in! general,! and! specifically! in! the! UK! environment! which! has! different!
institutional! characteristics! and! capital! market! aspects! than! other! environments! that!
mandate!CSR!reporting.!Also,!UK!institutional!investors!collect!private!social!information!to!





firms! and! financial! industry! firms! compared! to! LSE!which!mandates! CSR! reporting! for! all!
listed! firms! in! the!main!market.! Also,! the! required! information! to! be! disclosed! vary! from!
region! to! another! between! requiring! ESG! reporting,! or! CSR! reporting! (which! includes!
environmental!and!social!information!according!to!Act!2006!(regulation!2013)).!Accordingly,!
this! study!contributes! to! the! literature!by! investigating! the!consequences!of!adopting! the!
regulation! of! CSR! reporting! and! the! intentions! behind! the! CSR! practices! in! a! firm,! how! it!
influences! the!harmful!practice!of!earnings!management! in! the! firms,!and! to!what!extent!
does!this!regulation!restricts!such!type!of!practices!in!the!firms.!Consequently,!this!finding!
improves!stakeholder’s!decisions!towards!these!firms!in!the!UK!environment!and!shrinks!the!
lack! of! research! in! different! environments! which! limits! our! understanding! of! the!
consequences!of!this!regulation!on!the!firms.!
In! more! details,! the! findings! provide! unique! evidence! on! the! impact! of! mandated! CSR!





is! limitedly! used! in! the! literature! of! CSR! although! it! is! explaining! the! logic! behind! the!
overinvestment!in!such!practices.!!
While!several!studies!endeavour!to!investigate!the!relationship!between!CSR!reporting!and!






inconsistent! evidence! that! restricts! our! understanding! of! this! association.! Specifically,!
almost!no!evidence!provided!in!the!literature!regarding!the!mandatory!CSR!reporting!impact!
on! the! earnings! quality! either! in! the! UK! or! other! countries! adopts! the! same! regulation.!
Accordingly,!this!study!contributes!to!the!literature!through!(i)!introducing!new!evidence!of!
research! about! the! influence! of! mandating! CSR! reporting! on! utilising! CSR! practices! as! a!




The! remainder! of! this! chapter! is! structured! as! follows.! Section! 4.2! reviews! the! related!









stakeholders! whereby,! through! its! financial! reporting,! the! firm! can! distinguish! its! good!
performance!from!that!of!other!poor!financial!performance!firms,!which!in!turn!facilities!the!
decision]making! process! of! the! shareholders! (Healy! and! Wahlen,! 1999).! However,!
optimising!earnings!either!by!up]warding!or!down]warding!income!is!considered!an!exercise!
of! earnings! management! where! managers! manipulate! earnings! computation! for! their!
discretion!(Watts!and!Zimmerman,!1978).!!
According!to!Davidson!et!al.!(1987,!p.!92),!earnings!management!is!defined!as:!
“…a! process! of! taking! deliberate! steps! within! the! constraints! of! generally!





Xu!et!al.! (2007,!p.!3),! in!particular,!distinguish!between! the!general!definition!of!earnings!
management! and! the! accrual! earnings! management! (AEM)! by! defining! accrual! earnings!
management!as!follows:!
“…accrual! earnings! management! occurs! when! management! manipulates!
reported!earnings!by!exploiting!the!accounting!discretion!allowed!under!GAAP.!In!
contrast,! real! earnings! management! involves! management! attempts! to! alter!








Xu! et! al.’s! (2007)! definition! clarifies! that! accrual! earnings! management! occurs! when!
managers!utilise!the!way!accounting!choices!and!standards!are!employed!in!recording!firms’!
transactions!to!control!their!reported!earnings,!in!line!with!the!boundaries!of!GAAP.!On!the!
other! hand,! Roychowdhury’s! (2006)! definition! suggests! that! real! earnings! management!
alters! the! structure! or! the! time! of! the! firm’s! real! transactions,! thus,! harming! the! firm’s!
future!value!by!enforcing!a!new!real!cost.!Accrual!earnings!management!discretion!could!be!
limited! by! applying!more! restricted! accounting! standards,! but! real! earnings!management!
practices!cannot!be!restricted!in!the!same!way!(Ewert!and!Wagenhofer,!2005).!
4.2.2!Activities!and!Measurements!of!Earnings!Management!
!As!defined!above,!earnings!management! is! classified! into! two!common! types;! real]based!
earnings! management! and! accrual]based! earnings! management! (e.g.,! Ewert! and!













analysts! forecast! is! met.! The! second! is! decreasing! earnings! to! reserve! them! for! a! later!
period!to!easily!achieve!future!income!targets!(Levitt,!1998;!Nelson!et!al.,!2002).!!
In!order!to! capture!AEM,! literature!presents!two!methods!to!measure! it;!specific!accruals!
method! with! the! main! focus! on! specific! accruals! such! as! ‘bad! debt! provision’! (e.g.,!
McNichols!and!Wilson,!1988),! and! the!aggregate!accrual!model!which! focuses!on!a! firm’s!
total!accruals! (e.g.,! Jones,!1991;!Dechow!et!al.,!1995).!The!mainstream!literature!employs!
the!aggregate!accrual!method,!specifically!the!Jones!model!or!modified!Jones!model!using!a!
cross]sectional! regression! to! discriminate! total! accruals! into! discretionary! and! non]
discretionary!accruals! (Dechow!et!al.,! 1995).! These!models!are! preferred! to! capture!AEM!
practice! due! to! their! superior! specification! and! less! restrictive! data! requirements,! thus!
providing! a! powerful! and! comprehensive! test! for! the! AEM! (e.g.,! Dechow! et! al.,! 1995;!
DeFond!and!Subramanyam,!1998).!
Further,!following!Roychowdhury!(2006)!and!Gunny!(2010),!REM!activities!can!be!classified!
into! three! types.! The! first! is! sales!manipulation,!which! increases! sales! during! the! current!





reduces! the! research!and!development! (R&D)!discretionary!expenses,! reduces! the! selling,!
general! and! administrative! (SG&A)! and! reduces! the! discretionary! expenses! to! improve!
reported!earnings,!but!as!a!consequence,!this!reduction!would!harm!the!future!cash!flow.!
The! last! type! is! production! manipulation;! managers! can! increase! the! earnings! by!
overproducing! inventory!at!any! time!of! the!year! to! decrease! reported!cost! of!goods! sold!






main! reasons;! first,! she! states! that! “ex]post! aggressive! accounting! choices! concerning!
accruals!are!at!higher!risk!for!Securities!and!Exchange!Commission!(SEC)!scrutiny!and!class!
action! litigation”.! Second,! “the! firm!may! have! limited! flexibility! to!manage! accruals”.! For!
example,!AEM! is! controlled!by! the! firm’s!business!operations!and!accrual!manipulation! in!
later!years!and!must!occur!at!the!end!of!the!financial!year;!hence,!managers!cannot!decide!
accurately!which!accounting!treatments!the!auditor!will!authorise!at!that!time.!
Within! the! boundaries! of! GAAP,! however,! another! less! common! type! of! earnings!
management! is! introduced! in! the! literature! –! classification! shifting.! Under! this! activity,!
managers!manipulate! core!earnings! through! relocating! specific! revenues,! gains,!expenses,!
or!losses!to!different!line!items!in!the!income!statement!(e.g.,!McVay,!2006;!Athanasakou!et!
al.,! 2009;! Zalata! and! Roberts,! 2017).! Hence,! associating! the! incentives! behind! earnings!
management!with!other!aspects!(e.g.,!executive!compensation,!accounting!standards,!audit!
quality,! analysts’! forecast,! corporate! governance)! can! determine! the! type! of! earnings!
management! activity!which!managers!would! apply! (e.g.,! Roychowdhury,! 2006;! Chi! et! al.,!
2011;!Zang,!2012).!
Other! less]used! classifications! of! earnings! management! are! introduced! in! the! literature;!
these! include! big! bath! (Scott,! 1997),! earnings! smoothing,! earnings! losses! and! decrease!
avoidance! (Chih! et! al.,! 2008),! cookie! jar! reserves,! materiality,! and! revenue! recognition!
(Levitt,!1998).!
Following!the!majority!of!literature!(e.g.,!Roychowdhury,!2006;!Prior!et!al.,!2008;!Kim!et!al.,!
2012;! Martı´nez]Ferrero! et! al.,! 2014),! this! study! uses! the! two! most! common! types! of!
earnings! management! to! capture! the! effect! of! CSR! reporting! on! earnings! management;!
namely,! REM! and! AEM.! To! measure! REM! practice,! Roychowdhury! (2006)! presents! three!
main! models! –! sales! manipulation,! production! manipulation,! and! discretionary! expenses!
manipulation.! However,!Gunny! (2010)! uses! an! additional! but! less! common!model! of! the!
timing!of!asset!sales!which!is!not!used!in!this!study.!
4.2.3!Motivations!of!Earnings!Management!





The!first! type! is! the!capital!market! incentive.!The!two!major!examples!of!this!type!are:! (i)!
Earnings!benchmarks!which!aim!to!meet!or!beat! important!earnings!benchmarks,!such!as!
avoid! earnings! decrease! (Burgstahler! and! Dichev,! 1997)! or! report! positive! profit!
(Roychowdhury,!2006);!but,!as!Degeorge!et!al.!(1999)!document,!once!the!managers!reach!
the!desired!profitability!they!attempt!to!encounter!other!benchmarks!such!as!meeting!the!
analysts’! forecast! (Dechow! et! al.,! 2003;! Graham! et! al.,! 2005).! (ii)! Manipulating! earnings!
upwards!around!specific!stock!market!situations,!such!as!an! initial!public!offering!(IPO)!to!
boost!the!IPO!stock!price!which!misleads!investors’!decision]making!process!(Morsfield!and!
Tan,! 2006).! Another! example! is! seasoned! equity! offering! (SEO)! (Lee! and!Masulis,! 2009),!
which! proved! that! practising! earnings! management! during! the! offering! year! negatively!
affected!the!subsequent!stock!market!performance!(Rangan,!1998).!!
The! second! motivation! is! contracting! incentives;! there! are! two! types:! (i)! Managers’!
compensation! contracts,! where! managers! are! motivated! to! manage! earnings! upward! to!
meet! compensation! targets! that!are!based! on! their!performance! (Efendi!et!al.,! 2014).! (ii)!
Lending!contracts!which!motivate!firms’!managers!to!utilise!earnings!practices!to!avoid!debt!
covenant! violations,! for! the! high! cost! it! causes! to! the! firm! and! in! turn! to! the!manager’s!
interests!(Watts!and!Zimmerman,!1986;!Sweeney,!1994;!Franz!et!al.,!2014).!
The!third!type!of!motivation,!political!cost!and!regulatory! incentives,!appears!when!firms’!




Although! the! literature! documents! studies! about! the! relationship! between!CSR! reporting!









some! previous! researchers! who! shed! light! on! the! positive! association! between! CSR!
reporting!quality!and!earnings!management!under!two!types,!REM!and!AEM.!!
Liu! et! al.! (2017)! examine! the! firm’s! practice! of! REM! and! AEM! activities! through! its! CSR!
activities!in!the!context!of!family!ownership!based!on!the!agency!theory.!Using!the!S&P!500!
company!sample17,!they!find!no!relationship!between!earnings!management!practices!and!
CSR! activities! among! their! sample,! but! the! relations! appear! only! in! the! context! of! family!
ownership!and!involvement!in!the!firm’s!management.!!In!a!cross]country!study,!Martı´nez]
Ferrero! et! al.! (2016)! investigate! the! relationship! between! CSR! disclosure! and! the! cost! of!
AEM!practices.!They!mainly!determined!the!effect!of!AEM!and!CSR!disclosure!practices!on!
the!cost!of!capital!and!corporate!reputation,!particularly!when!CSR!disclosure!practices!are!
carried!out! strategically! to!avoid!negative! response!of! the! stakeholder!groups!against! the!









association! between! qualitative! and! quantitative! CSR! disclosure! proxies! and! earnings!
management!quality.!They!employ!two!proxies! for!earnings!management,! the!AEM,!and!a!













Their! study! is! applied! on! US! firms! and! documents! a! negative! relation! between! CSR!
disclosure!score!and!earnings!smoothness;!that!means!CSR!firms!reduce!or!avoid!earnings!




of! the! business! group! affiliation! and! ownership! structure! of! firms.! They! argue! that!
managerial! opportunism! drives! managers’! incentives! to! engage! in! CSR! disclosure,! which!
weakens!as!the!portion!of!shares!held!by!institutional!investors’!increases.!Moreover,!they!
found! two!different! results! to! clarify! this! relation;! first,! that! the!correlation!between!CSR!
disclosure! and! AEM! is! negative!when! all! firms! are! considered.! Second,! the! former! result!






They!cover! two! types!of!earnings!management;!accrual!and! real!activities.!However,! they!
show! that! firms!which! disclose! CSR! are! less! likely! to! engage! in! aggressive! (opportunistic)!
earnings!management!through!discretionary!accruals!and/or!real!activities!manipulation.!In!
line! with! stakeholder! theory,! the! results! support! the! notion! that! CSR! disclosures! are!
motivated!by!managers’!incentives!to!be!honest,!trustworthy,!and!ethical,!which!reflects!on!
firms!by!them!becoming!more!conservative!in!their!accounting!and!operating!decisions!to!
provide! more! transparent! financial! information.! Similarly,! Hong! and! Andersen! (2011)!
conduct!a!study!among!US!firms!to!examine!whether!more!CSR!disclosure!will!have!higher!
or!lower!earnings!management!quality.!Their!findings!are!consistent!with!the!literature!and!








that! the! relationship! between! corporate! environmental! disclosure! (CED)! and! AEM! is!
insignificant! in! regulated!and! unregulated! industries.! In! their! study,! they!analyse! the!CED!
through! the! waste,! water,! climate! change! (and! energy! use),! and! the! European! Union!
emissions!trading!scheme!as!a!branch!of!CSR!disclosure.!!
Further!significant!international!evidence!about!the!relation!of!CSR!disclosure!and!earnings!
management! is! provided! by! Chih! et! al.! (2008).! They! conduct! a! study! of! 46! countries! to!
investigate! whether! CSR! disclosure! has! a! positive! or! negative! effect! on! the! quality! of!
publicly!announced!financial!information!and!whether!CSR!disclosure!mitigates!or!increases!
the!extent!of!earnings!management.!They!examine!three!types!of!EM!(earnings!smoothing,!
earnings! aggressiveness,! and! earnings! losses! and! decreases! avoidance),! providing!
inconsistent!results!depending!on!which!proxy!of!earnings!management!practice!they!test.!
They! conclude! that! firms!with!more! commitment! to! CSR! disclosure! are!more! likely! to! be!
aggressive! in! AEM! but! are! less! interested! in! engaging! in! earnings! loss! avoidance! and!
earnings!smoothing.!These!results!are!driven!by!opportunistic!theory.!
Moreover,!Prior!et!al.! (2008)! investigate! the! strategic!use!of!CSR!disclosure!as!a! shield! in!
firms! to! cover! earnings! management! practices,! using! an! across]country! sample! from! 26!
multi]national!countries.!On!the!grounds!of!agency!theory,! they!document!that! firms!with!
higher!CSR!disclosure!are!more!likely!to!practice!AEM.!!One!of!the!most!significant!studies!to!
observe! the! strategical! use! of! charitable! plans! in! the! firms! to! cover! up! the! earnings!
management! practices! through! earnings! upward! results! from!manipulating! the! charitable!








































































































































































































































































































































opportunistic! intentions! of! practising! and! reporting! CSR! to! reflect! and! reporting! CSR! to!
mislead!stakeholders!about!the!firm’s!performance.!The!authors!concluded!that!managers!
would! engage! in! CSR! reporting! to! cover! up! their! misconduct! and! impress! stakeholders!
(Hemingway! and! Maclagan! 2004;! Prior! et! al.,! 2008).! In! this! context,! Goffman! (1959)!









However,! the! descriptive! section! of! the! annual! reports! (including! CSR! reporting)! is! now!
longer,!more!complex,!and!more! important! compared! to! the!case! in!previous!years.!As!a!
result,! a! firm’s! chances! to! impress! stakeholders! are! increased! by! adding! more! detailed!
information!about!the!firm!in!the!best!possible!light,!which!elicits!the!desired!reaction!from!
stakeholders.! More! specifically,! when! firms! are! mandated! to! report! about! their! CSR!
activities,!they!will!feel!under!scrutiny!from!stakeholders!and!externals,!which!pushes!them!
to! enhance! their! CSR! activities! to! impress! these! parties! and! avoid! any! governmental!
penalties!and!at!the!same!time!they!may! lose!the!advantages!of!reporting!CSR!voluntary.!
Hence,!this!study!investigates!the!mandatory!reporting!type!and!the!voluntary!type.!
From! the! view! of! impression! theory! and! opportunistic! perspective! of! agency! theory,! the!
suggested! relation!between!CSR! reporting!and!earnings!management! is!a!positive!and!an!
essential!one.!The! importance!of!this!relationship! is!explained!through! its!negative!impact!
for!shareholders,!communities,!job!security,!employees,!and!managers’!reputation!as!Zahra!
et! al.! (2005)! document.! The! same! study! clarifies! that! managers! are! likely! to! behave!
defensively! to! protect! their! reputation! and! job! positions! against! stakeholders’! and!
stockholders’! reactions! to! their! practices! of! earnings! management,! which! in! turn!
incentivises! the!managers! to! seek! stakeholders’! support! to! reduce! the! negative! effect! of!
earnings!management! practices.! Fombrun! et! al.! (2000,! cited! in! Prior! et! al.,! 2008,! p.! 161)!
explain!the!consequences!of!managers’!defensive!behaviour,!!!
“The! consequence! is! that! the! manager! is! under! the! threat! of! rogue! behaviour! by!











On! the! other! hand,! engaging! in! CSR! practices! such! as! environmental! issues,! employees’!
relationships,!human! rights,! and! social! and!community! issues! is! a!privilege.! In!addition! to!
impressing! stakeholders! and! enhancing! their! satisfaction,! it! helps! to! maintain! a! positive!
image!for!the!firm,!which!increases!legitimacy!among!the!community,!and!in!turn!influences!
the! firm’s! reputation! (Orlitzky! et! al.,! 2003).! Consequently,! the! good! reputation! of! a! firm!
enhances! the! regulatory! treatment,! improves! suppliers’! connections! and! trust,! and!
decreases!the!scrutiny!of!investors!(Prior!et!al.,!2008).!Overall,!practising!and!reporting!CSR!





later! discussed! literature! about! the! CSR! reporting! association!with! earnings!management!
and!the!motivations!behind!such!a!relation,!it!is!highlighted!that!voluntary!CSR!reporting!can!
be! used! to! gain! support! from! stakeholders! and,! consequently,! offers! the! possibility! for!
entrenchment! to! those! managers! that! exercise! earnings! management! practices! and! to!
conceal! their! practices! consequences.! Therefore,! this! study! hypothesises! that! when!
managers! deceive! stakeholders! about! the! firm’s! actual! financial! status! seeking! personal!
interests! and! benefits,! they! would! like! to! validate! such! act! by! seeking! the! stakeholders’!




First(Hypothesis:! There! is!a!positive! relationship!between!CSR! reporting!quality!and! firms’!
earnings!management!practice.!
On!the!other!hand,! if! the!CSR!reporting!method! is!changed!from!voluntary!to!mandatory,!
employing! the! same! theories,! the! benefits! of! investing! in! CSR! practices! would! be! less!
attractive!to!opportunistic!managers.!Hence,!they!might!be!driven!to!other!methods!rather!
than! mandatory! CSR! practices! to! distinguish! themselves! and! impress! and! attract!




we! might! not! recognise! any! positive! relation! between! mandatory! CSR! and! earnings!
management.!However,!this!suggestion!leads!to!the!following!hypothesis:!












CSR! reporting! in! the! UK! in! the! year! of! 2013.! One! additional! year! (2009)! is! added! to! the!
period!for!the!requirements!of!running!the!regression!(REM!equations’!requirements).!!
Following!prior! literature!(e.g.,!Gunny,!2010;!Sun!et!al.,!2010;!Kim!et!al.,!2012;!Liu,!2017),!
firms!of! financial! institutions,!banks,!communication!(SIC!6000]6799)18,! transportation!and!

























Firm]year! observations! FTSE! All]share! firms! listed! on! the! London!















component! in! these! dimensions.19! Bloomberg! adjusts! ESG! score! consistently! with! each!
industry!to!ensure!that!each!firm! is!assessed!based!on!relevant!data!related!to! its!specific!
industry,! and! weights! each! item! in! the! score! by! its! importance! (Gutsche! et! al.,! 2017).!
However,! ESG! Bloomberg! score! includes! the! following! headings! for! the! environmental!
























mandates! the! reporting! of! CSR! on! the! quality! of! CSR! reporting.! To! measure! the! new!


























The! first! measure! of! REM! activities! is! the! AbNCFO,! where! firms! can! manage! earnings! by!
employing! sales! price! discounts! or! offering! more! flexible! credit! conditions! to! clients! to!
increase!sales!revenues.!Still,!this!increase!in!sales!volume!is!temporary,!and!once!the!firm!
returns!to!the!original!sales!prices,!earnings!are!going!to!disappear!(Roychowdhury,!2006).!
Accordingly,! sales]based! earnings! management! may! lead! to! a! decrease! in! the! period!
operating!cash!flow.!!
To!capture!REM!through!Ab_CFO,!this!study!follows!models!implemented!in!the!studies!of!
Roychowdhury! (2006),! Cohen! et! al.! (2008),! Badertscher! (2011)! and! Cohen! and! Zarowin!
(2010).! First,! the! actual! cash! flows! from!operations! are! generated! as! a! linear! function! of!
sales! revenue! and! change! in! revenue! in! the! current! year.! It! is! worth!mentioning! that! all!
variables!are!deflated!by!lagged!total!assets,!consistent!with!later!studies21.!!




20! Following! Cohen! and! Zarowin! (2010)! and! Zang! (2012)!Ab_PROD! and!Ab_CFO! are! not! combined! because!
adding!these!two!amounts!leads!to!double!counting!REM.!








t! for! firm! ἱ;!SRi,t! is! the!sales!revenue!during!period!t! for! firm! ἱ;!ΔSRi,t!=!SRi,t! ]!SRi,tN1;! ἱ! is! the!
firm;!and!!",#!is!the!error!term.!
The!second!step! is! to!estimate!the!normal!cash! flow!from!operations!(NormalNCFOi,t).!The!
researcher!uses!the!estimated!coefficients!α0,!β1,!β2,!and!β3!from!equation!(4.1)!for!each!year!
and!industry!as!follows:!
NormalNCFOi,t!=!â0!+ 1*(1/TAi,tN1)+! 2*(SRi,t/TAi,tN1)+! 3*(ΔSRi,t/TAi,tN1),!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.2)!
Finally,!this!study!calculates!the!abnormal!level!of!cash!flows!from!operations!(Ab_CFOi,t)!for!
every! firm! as! actual! cash! flows! from! operations! (CFOi,t/TAi,tN1)! ! minus! the! prediction! of!
(NormalNCFOi,t)!from!equation!(4.2)!as!follows:!
Ab_CFOi,t=!(CFOi,t!/!TAi,tN1!)!N!(NormalNCFOi,t).!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.3)!
If! firms!manage!earnings!by!boosting!sales,!Ab_CFO! is!expected!to!be!negative;! therefore,!
the! researcher! multiplies! the! abnormal! cash! flows! by! (]1)! so! that! higher! values! indicate!
more!REM!to!produce!the!variable!Ab_CFO.!
4.5.2.1.2!The!Abnormal!Level!of!Dictionary!Expenses!
Managing! earnings! through! delaying! some! expenses! like! R&D,! advertisement,! and!
education!–!which!are!measured!as!an!abnormal!level!of!selling,!general!and!administrative!
expenses! (SG&A)! –! is! the! second! method! of! REM;! namely,! the! abnormal! level! of!
discretionary! expenses! (Ab_DISC)! (Graham! et! al.,! 2005).! If!managers! reduce! or! delay! the!
spending! in! SG&A!expenses! to! achieve! some! earnings! targets! in! the! current! period,! then!
Ab_DISC!will!be!negative.!
To!derive!the!normal!level!of!dictionary!expenses!associated!with!REM!cross]sectionally!for!
each! industry! and! year,! this! study! draws! from! Roychowdhury’s! (2006)! model22,! by!
estimating! the! actual! dictionary! expenses! from! operations! (Normal_DISC)! as! a! linear!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!













Using! the! generated! coefficients! from! equation! (4.4)! this! study! computes! the! normal!
dictionary! expenses! from! operations! and! then! finds! the! difference! between! the! actual!













where!PRODi,t! is! the! sum!of! the!cost!of!goods! sold! in!year! ! for! firm! ἱ! and! the!change! in!
inventory!from!t]1!to!t;!TAi,tN1!is!the!lagged!total!assets!in!firm]year;!SRi,t!is!the!sales!revenue!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23! As! long! as! SG&A! expenses! are! available,! advertising! expenses! and! R&D! are! set! to! zero! if! they! are! not!
available!in!the!Datastream!database.!












Following! Cohen! and! Zarowin! (2010)! and! Zang! (2012),! two! combined! REM! measures!
including! the! three! individual! proxies! of! REM! (abnormal! cash! flows! from! operations,!
abnormal!discretionary!expenses,!and!abnormal!production!costs)!have!been!developed!to!
capture!the!total!effect!of!REM.!
REM_1! is! the! first! measure! which! aggregated! abnormal! discretionary! expenses! and!
abnormal! production! cost! as! one!measure! after! being!multiplied! by! negative! one,! as! the!
following:!!
REM_1!=!Ab_DISC*(N1)!+!Ab_PROD.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!((4.7)!











discretionary! accruals! as! a! proxy! for! earnings!management,! similarly,! this! study! uses! the!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!













(Total! ACCi,t/TAi,tN1)=! α0+β1*(1/TAi,tN1)+β2! *((ΔSRi,t! NΔARi,t)/TAi,tN1)! +β3! (PPEi,t/! TAi,tN1)+! β4! *!
ROAi,t+!",#!,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.9)!
where!Total! ACCi,t! is! the! total! accruals! calculated! as! the! differences! between! net! income!




The! coefficients! estimates! from! equation! (4.9)! are! used! to! estimate! normal! accruals!
(Normal_Acci,t)!for!UK!FTSE!All]share!firms!as!follows:!





the! change! in! sales! revenue! before! estimating! equation! (4.10),! where! the! measure! of!
discretionary! accruals! is! the! difference! between! total! accruals! and! the! fitted! normal!
accruals,!defined!as!!
DISC_Acci,t!=!(Total_ACCi,t/TAi,tN1)!N!!Normal_ACCi,t!.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4.11)!
However,! this! study! employs! unsigned! abnormal! accruals! (absolute! value! of! abnormal!
accruals)! as! a! proxy! for! upward! or! downward! AEM,! as! the! managers! might! have! a!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!












the! new! regulations! of! Act! 2006! (Regulation! 2013)! which! mandates! CSR! reporting.! To!
capture!the!relation,!this!study!draws!from!Kim!et!al.! (2012)!by!using!the!basic!set!of!OLS!
regression!models!they!developed.! ! It! then!enhances!these!models!to!fit!with!this!study’s!









Secondly,! in! order! to! examine! the! second! hypothesis! of! ‘The! relationship! between! CSR!













Variable! Definition! Measurement! Expected!
Sign!
REM! Indicates! the! real! earnings!
management!proxies.!








estimated! using! modified! Jones!
models.!
?!
CSR_Scorei,t! Indicates! CSR! reporting! quality!
score!at!the!end!of!the!year.!
Reporting! net! score! ranges! from!
0!to!100.!
+!
Reg(i,t( Indicates! the!new! regulation!of!
Act!2006!(Regulation!2013).!
A! dummy! variable! equal! zero! if!
the! year! before! 2013! and! one!
otherwise.!
+!
Size(i,t81! Indicates! the!size!of! the! firm!at!
the!beginning!of!the!year.!
The! natural! logarithm! of! the!
market! value! of! equity!











the! firm! audited! by! one! of! the!
Big4! auditing! firms! and! zero!
otherwise.!
+!
Lev(i,t81( Indicates! the! leverage! (debt)!of!
the!firm!at!the!beginning!of!the!
year.!
The! total! debt! scaled! by! total!
assets!of!firm!i!at!year!t.!
?!
Age(i,t( Indicates!the!firm!age.!! The! natural! logarithm! of! the!






when! a! firm! is! listed! in! one! or!
more! international! markets! and!
zero!otherwise.!
+!
R&DI(i,t( Indicates! research! and!
development! intensity!
expenditure! at! the! end! of! the!
year.!
R&D! expenses! (WC01201)! scaled!









The! net! income! before!
extraordinary! items! scaled! by!
total! assets! minus! median! of!
ROA.!
?!
CG(i,t!!( Indicates! the! corporate!
governance!score!at! the!end!of!
the!year.!
Corporate! governance! net! score!
ranges!from!0!to!100.!
+!
Ind.Sens(i,t!!( Indicates! the! sensitivity! of! the!
industry! which! a! firm! is!
classified! under.! Sensitive!
industries! are:! “mining,! oil! and!
gas,!chemicals,!construction!and!
building!materials,! forestry! and!
paper,! steel! and! other! metals,!





when! a! firm! is! classified! as! a!






Prior! literature! employed! various! control! variables! which! would! affect! the! relationship!
between! CSR! reporting! and! earnings! management! resulting! in! a! problem! of! correlated!
omitted!variables.!To!avoid! that,! the! following!control! variables!are! included! in! this! study!
following!Roychowdhury!(2006);!Prior!et!al.!(2008);!and!Kim!et!al.!(2012):!
Size! (LnMVEI,tN1):! McWilliams! and! Siegel! (2000)! and! Prior! et! al.! (2008)! argue! that! CSR!
reporting! and! size! of! firm! are! associated,! considering! the! firm! size! as! a! widely! used!
determinant! for! CSR! reporting;! however,! the! sign! of! this! association! varies! across! the!
literature!between!a!negative!relation!(Hong!and!Anderson,!2011;!Kim!et!al.,!2012;!Liu!et!al.,!
2017)!and!a!positive!relation!(Chih!et!al.,!2008;!Prior!et!al.,!2008;!Sun!et!al.,!2010;!Choi!et!al.,!
2013;! Cho! and! Chun,! 2016;! Martı´nez]Ferrero! et! al.,! 2016;! Rezaee! and! Tuo,! 2017).!
Furthermore,!the!size!of!the!firm!would!explain!the!variation!of!earnings!management!level!
(Roychowdhury,!2006);!also,!large!firms!can!meet!the!cost!of!providing!CSR!information!for!
the! stakeholders! in! their! annual! reports,! contrary! to! the! case! of! the! smaller! firms! (Firth,!
1979).!Thus,!firm!size!proxy!is!included!in!the!regression!model!as!the!control!variable!and!is!




measured! at! the! beginning! of! year! t! (Roychowdhury,! 2006;! Kim! et! al.,! 2012;! Choi! et! al.,!
2013).! The! predicted! sign! of! this! variable! will! not! be! determined! due! to! the! variations!
among!the!previous!literature!findings.!
Growth! Opportunities! (Market]To]Book! ratio,!MTBi,tN1):! Previous! research! controls! for! the!
life!cycle!of!the!firm!by!market]to]book!(MTB)!ratio.!According!to!the!evidence!that!earnings!
management! correlates! with! higher! growing! firms! (McNichols,! 2000;! Matsumoto,! 2002),!
and! the! argument! that! managers! are! more! likely! to! engage! in! aggressive! earnings!
management!to!avoid!negative!earnings!in!high]growth!firms!(Skinner!and!Sloan,!2002).!The!
results! vary! between! a! positive! relation! (e.g.,! Roychowdhury,! 2006;! Liu! et! al.,! 2017),! a!
negative!relation!(Kim!et!al.,!2012;!Choi!et!al.,!2013;!Cho!and!Chun,!2016)!and!no!relation!













Leverage! (LevtN1):! Leverage! addresses! the! total! debt! to! assets! of! the! firm! (likelihood! of!
bankruptcy).!The!higher!this!ratio!is,!indicates!a!higher!possibility!of!debt!covenant!violation!
(Gras]Gil,!2016),!and!increases!in!the!cost!of!equity!capital!(Prior!et!al.,!2008;!Ferrero!et!al.,!
2016).!Thus,! it! creates!a!good! incentive! for!managers! to!manage! the!earnings!upward! to!
avoid! loss! resulting! from! reporting! a! financial! problem! (Park! and! Shin,! 2004;! Sun! et! al.,!
2010).! On! the! other! hand,! Chih! et! al.! (2008)! provide! opposing! evidence! that! higher!
leveraged! firms! have! less! of! a! tendency! to! undertake! less! earnings! aggressiveness.!





lower! level!of!pressure! to! restrict!managers’!decisions!over!CSR! reporting!practice,!which!






calculated!as!the! lagged!of!total!debt! (WC03255)!scaled!by! lagged!total!assets! (WC02999)!
(Prior!et!al.,!2008;!Dhaliwal!et!al.,!2011;!Kim!et!al.,!2012,!Choi!et!al.,!2013).!
Firm!Age! (Age):! Firms’! CSR! practices! and! financial! reporting! act! could! be! affected! by! the!
different! development! levels! of! the! firm’s! life! cycle! (Christensen,! 2016).! Therefore,! to!
control! for! such! potential! effects,! this! study! controls! for! the! firm! age! impact! without!
suggesting! any! predictable! sign! for! the! inconsistent! findings! in! the! literature! results.! The!
firm!age!variable! is!measured!as! the!natural! logarithm!of! the!number!of! the! firms’! listing!
year!(BDATE)!plus!one!(Kim!et!al.,!2012;!Cho!and!Chun,!2016;!Liu!et!al.,!2017).!
International! Listing! (Listing):! According! to! Cooke! (1989),! Reverte! (2009)! and! Chiu! and!
Wang!(2015),!a!firm!will!report!more!CSR!information!when!operating!in!foreign!markets!
where! it! needs! to! consider! two! or! more! stock! markets’! reporting! rules.! Hence,! under!
international! listing,! firms! become!more! visible! to! the! public! and! under! higher! pressure!
from!stakeholders!and!analysts.!Moreover,!managers! in! listed! firms!are! subject! to!more!
scrutiny!from!stakeholders,!so!they!seek!to!enhance!their!performance!through!managing!
earnings! to! improve! reported! earnings! to! impress! stakeholders! and! to! protect! their!
interests! (Prior! et! al.,! 2008).! Following! Reverte! (2009),! this! study! controls! for! the!
international!listing!of!firms!by!adding!a!dummy!variable!‘Listing’,!equal!to!one!if!the!firm!is!
listed! in!one!or!more! international!markets,!and!zero!otherwise.! !However,!no!predicted!
sign!is!suggested!for!this!variable!for!the!different!results!found!in!the!literature.!
Research!and!Development!Intensity!(R&DI!i,t):!Research!and!development!investments!open!






al.,! 2008).! At! the! same! time,! investment! in! the! R&D! intensity! increases! the! managers’!









about! CSR! activities! to! impress! stakeholders! (Branco! and! Redrigues,! 2008;! Wang! et! al.,!
2008;! Chih,! 2010;! Chiu! and! Wang,! 2015).! Moreover,! managers! of! less! profitable! (lower!
income)! firms! are! more! incentivised! to! engage! in! earnings! management! activities! than!
managers! of! higher! profitable! firms! are,! where! they! can! present! better! performance! to!
investors! (e.g.,! Sun! et! al.,! 2010;! Kim! et! al.,! 2012;! Cho! and! Chun,! 2016).! Therefore,! later!
studies! include!either! return! on!assets! (ROA)!or! industry]adjusted!ROA! (Adj]ROA)! in! their!




















the! CG! from! 0! to! 100! using! measures! to! detect! the! following! main! headings:! ! board!
structure;! board! independence;! board! and! executive! diversity;! board! committees;! audit!
committee;! compensation! committee;! nomination! committee;! board! executive! activities;!
shareholder’s!rights;!annual!general!manager’s!voting!results;!and!global!initiative!reporting.!
Sensitive! Industries! (Sens.Ind! i,t):! Sensitive! industries! can! be! classified! as:! “mining,! oil! and!
gas,! chemicals,! construction! and! building! materials,! forestry! and! paper,! steel! and! other!
metals,!electricity,!gas!distribution!and!water”.!All!the!rest!of!the!industries!are!considered!
less!sensitive!(Brammer,!2008;!Reverte,!2009).!However,! firms! in!a!sensitive! industry!with!
high]risk! impact! on! the! environment! are! subject! to! higher! pressure! from! stakeholders!
compared!to!less!risky!firms.!Due!to!that,!sensitive!industries!report!more!CSR!information!
than! other! industries! do! (Brammer,! 2008;! Reverte,! 2009).! However,! no! predicted! sign! is!
suggested!for!this!variable!for!the!different!results!found!in!the!literature.!
4.6!Results!and!Analysis!





the! UK.! Moreover,! additional! tests! are! conducted! based! on! the! classification! of! CSR!
reporting!quality!as!high!or!low!separately.!
4.6.1!Univariate!Analysis!
In! this! section,! descriptive! statistics! of! all! variables! covered! in! this! study! are! presented.!
Table! 4.3! reports! the! sample! distribution.! Panel! A! in! Table! 4.3! shows! the! industry!
distribution! of! the! CSR! reporting! quality! sample!during! 2009]2017.! Seven!main! industries!
are! included! in!this!study!with!a!net!number!of!225!firms.!The!Manufacturing!and!Service!
industries!are! the!heaviest! represented! industries! (37.78%!and!19.88%,! respectively).! The!










Panel!A:!Industry!Distribution! ! ! !
Industry!Type! Freq.! Per!cent! Cum.!
Mining! 189! 11.67! 11.67!
Construction! 116! 7.16! 18.83!
Manufacturing! 612! 37.78! 56.6!
Transportation!&!Public!Utilities! 78! 4.81! 61.42!
Wholesale!Trade! 55! 3.4! 64.81!
Retail!Trade! 248! 15.31! 80.12!




Year! Freq.! Per!cent! Cum.!
2009! 168! 10.37! 10.37!
2010! 177! 10.93! 21.3!
2011! 183! 11.3! 32.59!
2012! 190! 11.73! 44.32!
2013! 209! 12.9! 57.22!
2014! 220! 13.58! 70.8!
2015! 226! 13.95! 84.75!
2016! 213! 13.15! 97.9!
2017! 34! 2.1! 100!
Total!
1620! 100! !
Note:! This! table! presents! the! frequency! of! CSR! reporting! firms! by! industry! and! year! over! the! period! 2009]2017!
including!the!missing!values.!





reported!by!prior! research27! (Kothari!et!al.,! 2005;!Gunny,!2010;!Al]Shattarat!et!al.,! 2018).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





However,! the! findings! imply!that,!on!average,! firms!are! likely! to!engage! in!REM!and!AEM!
practices!of!cutting!discretionary!expenses,!boosting!sales,!and!overproducing!inventory.!!
For! the! control! variables,! results! are! consistent!with! the! prior! literature! (e.g.,! Kim! et! al.,!
2012).!Regarding!firms’!size,!the!mean!firm!size!score!is!14.203!(equivalent!to!approximately!
£4,697!million!market!value!of!equity)!with!a!median! score! of!13.958.! ! The!Big4!auditing!
companies!audit!about!71%!on!average!of!the!sample!firms,!and!around!95%!of!the!sample!
firms!on!average!are!listed!in!one!or!more!international!markets!(in!addition!to!LSE),!where!
around! 19%! of! the! sample! firms! are! classified! as! sensitive! industries.! On! average,! the!
sample! firms’! present! profitability! of! 0.1%,!with! the! average! debt! ratio! of! 21%,! and! the!
average!value!of!R&D!expenditure! is!0.25%!of!the!net!sales.!Also,! the!results! indicate!the!
average!firms’!age!is!about!33!years,!and!firms’!score!of!reporting!CG!is!about!57!on!average!
out!of!a!full!score!of!100!which!is!considered!higher!than!CSR!reporting!score.!!
This! study!employed!a! series!of! sample! tests! to!verify! the! regression! results’! reliability.!A!
multicollinearity!test!is!implemented!and!found!to!be!normal!in!the!context!of!this!study.!A!
Newey]West! procedure! is! used! to! make! sure! the! model! is! free! of! auto]correlation! and!
heteroscedasticity!problems!following!Al]Shattarat!et!al.!(2018).!
Table!4.5!presents!the!pairwise!Pearson!correlation!matrix!including!all!different!variables!of!
this! study! reflecting! the! multicollinearity! test! results,! in! addition! to! testing! the! variance!
inflation! factor! (VIF),! which! indicates! the! normal! level.! The! analysis! of! the! Pearson!
correlation!matrix! shows! that! CSR! reporting! quality! significantly! and! positively! correlated!
with! both!Ab_Disc!and!REM1! aggregate!measures!with! about! 10%.! This! evidence! implies!
that! firms! with! higher! CSR! reporting! quality! are! more! likely! to! engage! in! real! earnings!
impression!theories,!this!finding!indicates!that!managers!use!CSR!reporting!as!a!sugar!cover!
management! through! cutting! discretionary! expenses! to! enhance! earnings! of! the! firm!











! Mean! Median! SD! Min! Max! N!
Variable!of!Interest! ! ! ! ! ! !
CSR_Score! 30.440! 28.000! 11.335! 11.000! 65.000! 1620!
Dependent!Variable! ! ! ! ! ! !
Ab_Prod! 0.032! 0.006! 0.253! ]2.128! 1.131! 936!
Ab_CFO! 0.009! 0.000! 0.076! ]0.359! 0.231! 1074!
Ab_Disc! 0.017! 0.019! 0.217! ]0.809! 0.532! 954!
Ab_Acc! 0.001! 0.003! 0.059! ]0.282! 0.250! 939!
REM1! 0.062! 0.012! 0.457! ]2.428! 1.438! 830!
REM2! 0.041! ]0.010! 0.296! ]2.117! 1.132! 935!
Control!Variables! ! ! ! ! ! !
Size! 14.203! 13.958! 1.514! 10.441! 18.127! 1620!
Growth! 3.334! 2.368! 4.782! ]12.980! 26.919! 1620!
BigN! 0.716! 1.000! 0.451! 0.000! 1.000! 1620!
Leverage! 0.211! 0.203! 0.170! 0.000! 1.014! 1620!
Age! 3.304! 3.401! 0.673! 1.099! 3.989! 1620!
!Age!in!years! 32.769! 30.000! 17.056! 3.000! 54.000! 1620!
List! 0.950! 1.000! 0.219! 0.000! 1.000! 1620!
R&DI! 0.025! 0.000! 0.084! 0.000! 0.979! 1620!
Adj_ROA! 0.010! 0.003! 0.078! ]0.312! 0.261! 1620!
CG_Score! 56.649! 57.000! 7.052! 39.000! 77.000! 1620!









1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9! 10! 11! 12! 13! 14! 15! 16! 17!
1.!CSR_Score! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
2.!Ab7Prod! 0.030! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
3.!Ab7CFO! 0.041! 0.492*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
4.!Ab7Disc! 0.094*& 0.734*! 0.180*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
5.!Ab7Acc! 70.020! 0.1881*! 0.445*! 0.120*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
6.&REM1! 0.085*& 0.942*! 0.383*! 0.920*! 0.156*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
7.!REM2! 0.032! 0.973*! 0.679*! 0.665*! 0.277*! 0.892*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
8.!Size! 0.581*& 70.062*! 70.156*! 70.017! 0.010! 70.027! 70.095*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
9.!Growth! 0.045! 70.083*! 70.135*! 70.120*! 0.033! 70.167*! 70.109*! 0.151*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
10.!BigN! 70.010! 70.040! 70.058*! 70.013! 70.043*! 70.022! 70.051*! 0.147*! 0.017! 1! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
11.!Lev! 0.063*& 0.110*! 0.074*! 0.161*! 70.023! 0.140*! 0.107*! 0.129*! 0.030! 0.052*! 1! ! ! ! ! ! !
12.!Age! 0.110*& 0.099*! 0.037*! 0.032! 0.110*! 0.066*! 0.094*! 0.115*! 70.012! 70.069*! 70.256*! 1! ! ! ! ! !
13.!List! 0.083*& 70.049*! 70.071*! 70.069*! 70.047*! 70.070*! 70.060*! 0.292*! 0.053*! 0.068*! 0.018! 70.098*! 1! ! ! ! !
14.!RDI! 70.097*& 0.053*! 0.190*! 70.213*! 70.037! 70.084*! 0.099*! 0.110*! 0.090*! 0.009! 0.148*! 70.075*! 0.073*! 1! ! ! !
15.!Adj_ROA! 70.024! 70.285*! 70.446*! 70.110*! 70.027! 70.256*! 70.360*! 0.142*! 0.181*! 0.028! 0.087*! 0.066*! 0.040! 0.307*! 1! ! !
16.!CG_Score! 0.678*& 0.029! 70.022! 0.054! 70.012! 0.049! 0.021! 0.571*! 0.059*! 0.101*! 0.029! 0.213*! 0.102*! 0.018! 0.007! 1! !







Table! 4.6! reports! OLS! regression! analysis! results! using! proxies! of! REM! and! AEM.! For! the!
regression!of!Ab_CFO,! the!estimated!coefficient! for!CSR!reporting!quality! is!positive!0.001!
and! significant! at! the! 1%! level! (t& =! 2.98).! Given! that! higher! level! of! abnormal! cash! flow!
implies! less! conservative! operating! decisions,! this! evidence! confirms! this! study! first!
hypothesis,!suggesting!that!CSR!reporting!firms!are!more!likely!to!engage!in!REM!practices!
through!inflating!cash!flow,!which!is!consistent!with!Prior!et!al.!(2008)!and!Choi!et!al.!(2013)!
and! in! line! with! impression! and! agency! theories! which! underpin! this! study.! Considering!
AEM,! no! evidence! is! found! about! a! relation! between! AEM! and! CSR! reporting! quality,!
indicating! that! firms! prefer! REM! activities! rather! than! AEM! activities! to! enhance! their!
earnings!performance.!
Turning! to! control! variables,! in! the! aggregate! REM! regressions,! the! coefficients! on! Size,!
Leverage,!and!Age!variables!are!positive!and!significant!suggesting!that! larger! firms,! firms!





Altogether,! these! results! demonstrate! that! managers! who! manipulate! earnings! through!
REM!activities!are!more!interested!in!reporting!CSR!as!a!sugar!cover!for!their!opportunistic!
behaviour.! Thus,! this! practice! is! considered! as! a! chance! for! the!managers! to! impress! the!


























CSR_Score! T0.0004! 0.001***% 0.0002! T0.0004! 0.0002! T0.0001!
! T(0.39)! (2.99)% (0.26)! T(0.24)! (0.20)! T(0.32)!
Size! 0.008! T0.001! 0.011*% 0.030**% 0.008! 0.005***%
! (1.30)! T(0.34)! (1.92)% (2.38)% (1.04)! (3.02)%
Growth! P0.006**% P0.001**% T0.003! P0.012**% P0.007***% 0.001%
! P(2.39)% P(2.38)% T(1.35)! P(2.46)% P(2.82)% (1.18)%
BigN! 0.019! T0.006! 0.024*% 0.049% 0.010! T0.004!
! (1.14)! T(1.31)! (1.71)% (1.54)% (0.55)! T(0.92)!
Lev! 0.181***% T0.005! 0.206***% 0.426***% 0.177**% P0.027*%
! (3.18)% T(0.31)! (4.38)% (4.07)% (2.55)% P(1.85)%
Age! 0.059***% 0.012***% 0.063***% 0.128***% 0.070***% 0.007**%
! (4.82)% (3.28)% (6.63)% (5.83)% (4.84)% (2.42)%
List! 0.060! 0.016*% 0.056! 0.103! 0.075! 0.004!
! (1.45)! (1.77)% (1.64)! (1.36)! (1.56)! (0.54)!
R&DI! T0.081! 0.003! P0.521***% P0.666***% T0.078! P0.049*%
! T(0.92)! (0.11)! P(4.29)% P(2.89)% T(0.71)! P(1.70)%
Adj_ROA! P1.054***% P0.411***% P0.629***% P1.691***% P1.465***% T0.030%
! P(8.57)% P(10.12)% P(6.42)% P(7.49)% P(9.45)% T(0.91)%
CG_Score! T0.001! P0.001***% T0.002! T0.004! T0.002! P0.001**%
! T(0.76)! P(3.15)% T(1.20)! T(1.31)! T(1.27)! P(2.46)%
Ind.Sens! 0.016! 0.0000! 0.013! 0.050! 0.016! 0.007!
! (0.94)! T(0.01)! (0.82)! (1.49)! (0.76)! (1.13)!
_cons! T0.346! 0.007! T0.374! T0.813! T0.338! T0.041!
! T(3.74)! (0.27)! T(4.49)! T(4.44)! T(3.21)! T(1.86)!
N!(firmTyears)! 936! 1074! 954! 830! 935! 939!
RTSquared! 0.158! 0.219! 0.174! 0.185! 0.202! 0.032!






the! relationship!between!mandatory!CSR! reporting!quality! (after! the!new! regulation)!and!
both!REM!and!AEM.!!
For! the! regression! of!Ab_Prod,!Ab_CFO,!REM1,! and!REM2,! the! results! of! the! interaction!
term!of!Reg*CSR_Score!provide!evidence!of!negative!coefficients!T0.003,!T0.001,!T0.004,!and!









The! relationship,! however,! could! be! clarified! in! line! with! the! agency! (opportunistic!
perspective)!and! impression! theories!by! indicating,! firstly,! that!managers!who!manipulate!








Turning! to! the! impact! of!mandatory! adoption! of! CSR! reporting! on!AEM,! results! show! an!
insignificant! coefficient! of!Ab_Acc! for! the! interaction! term!Reg*CSR_Score! indicating! that!


















CSR_Score! 0.001! 0.001***% 0.001! 0.001! 0.002! 0.0002!
! (0.61)! (4.14)% (0.63)! (0.54)! (1.42)! (0.58)!
Reg! 0.098**% 0.041***% 0.051! 0.137! 0.133% 0.016%
! (2.26)% (3.06)% (1.38)! (1.65)! (2.64)% (1.31)%
Reg*CSR_Score% P0.003**% P0.001***% T0.001! P0.004*% P0.004***% T0.001%
! P(2.26)% P(3.42)% T(1.32)! P(1.69)% P(2.74)% T(1.54)%
Size! 0.007! T0.001! 0.010*% 0.028**% 0.006! 0.005***%
! (1.14)! T(0.53)! (1.79)% (2.24)% (0.85)! (2.90)%
Growth! P0.006**% P0.001**% T0.003! P0.012**% P0.007***% 0.001%
! P(2.40)% P(2.32)% T(1.35)! P(2.46)% P(2.82)% (1.21)%
BigN! 0.017! T0.006! 0.024% 0.047% 0.008! T0.004!
! (1.03)! T(1.38)! (1.65)% (1.47)% (0.43)! T(0.94)!
Lev! 0.179***% T0.005! 0.206***% 0.421***% 0.176**% P0.027*%
! (3.12)% T(0.26)! (4.36)% (4.00)% (2.50)% P(1.85)%
Age! 0.062***% 0.013***% 0.064***% 0.131***% 0.073***% 0.007**%




List! 0.062! 0.017*% 0.057% 0.105! 0.077! 0.004!
! (1.50)! (1.83)% (1.68)% (1.40)! (1.63)! (0.54)!
R&DI! T0.084! 0.003! P0.523***% P0.670***% T0.082! P0.049*%
! T(0.96)! (0.10)! P(4.28)% P(2.88)% T(0.74)! P(1.69)%
Adj_ROA! P1.052***% P0.411***% P0.629***% P1.690***% P1.464***% T0.030%
! P(8.50)% P(10.10)% P(6.37)% P(7.44)% P(9.37)% T(0.92)%
CG! T0.001! P0.001***% T0.001! T0.004! T0.002! P0.001**%
! T(0.47)! P(2.91)% T(0.95)! T(1.11)! T(0.99)! P(2.32)%
Ind.Sens! 0.017! 0.0001! 0.013! 0.050! 0.017! 0.007!
! (0.98)! (0.02)! (0.82)! (1.49)! (0.81)! (1.14)!
_cons! T0.402! T0.010! T0.402! T0.884! T0.409! T0.047!
! T(4.1)! T(0.39)! T(4.68)! T(4.64)! T(3.7)! T(2.08)!
N!(firmTyears)! 936! 1074! 954! 830! 935! 939!
RTSquared! 0.161! 0.227! 0.175! 0.187! 0.207! 0.035!






In! general,! endogeneity! arises! primarily! from! simultaneity! (Larcker! and! Rusticus,! 2010),!
which! happens! when! the! independent! variable! is! simultaneously! determined! by! the!
dependent! variable! (Wooldridge,! 2002).! Accordingly,! as! some! studies! argued! it!might! be!































CSR_Score! 0.000! 0.001**! 0.000! 0.001! 0.001! 0.000!
! (0.55)! (2.20)% T(0.02)! (0.41)! (1.06)! T(0.44)!
Size! 0.007! 0.001! 0.014**! 0.030**! 0.008! 0.005***!
! (1.19)! (0.66)! (2.52)% (2.56)% (1.19)! (3.03)%
Growth! T0.005***! T0.002***! T0.004**! T0.010**! T0.007***! 0.000!
! P(2.64)% P(2.98)% P(2.00)% P(2.40)% P(3.18)% T(0.31)!
BigN! 0.017! T0.009! 0.026! 0.041! 0.009! T0.002!
! (1.18)! P(2.01)% (1.74)% (1.43)! (0.51)! T(0.37)!
Lev! 0.152***! T0.013! 0.222***! 0.400***! 0.140**! T0.007!
! (2.89)% T(0.70)! (4.59)% (3.97)% (2.21)% T(0.53)!
Age! 0.063***! 0.012***! 0.061***! 0.127***! 0.074***! 0.009***!
! (5.90)% (2.92)% (6.12)% (6.32)% (5.72)% (2.68)%
List! 0.043! 0.019**! 0.043! 0.072! 0.057! 0.001!
! (1.11)! (2.00)% (1.21)! (1.01)! (1.29)! (0.17)!
R&DI! T0.083! T0.004! T0.463***! T0.605***! T0.087! T0.067**!
! T(1.05)! T(0.13)! P(3.91)% P(2.99)% T(0.88)! P(2.53)%
Adj_ROA! T0.956***! T0.412***! T0.654***! T1.660***! T1.369***! 0.015!
! P(9.16)% P(10.12)% P(6.91)% P(8.48)% P(10.53)% (0.42)!
CG_Score! T0.001! T0.001***! T0.001! T0.003! T0.002! T0.001**!
! T(0.65)! P(3.26)% T(0.79)! T(1.17)! T(1.37)! P(2.15)%
Ind.Sens! 0.009! T0.001! 0.007! 0.038! 0.008! 0.003!
! (0.59)! T(0.09)! (0.44)! (1.21)! (0.43)! (0.45)!
_cons! T0.354***! T0.002! T0.430***! T0.852***! T0.353***! T0.049**!
! P(4.14)% T(0.06)! P(5.04)% P(4.97)% P(3.57)% P(2.20)%
N!(firmTyears)! 936! 1074! 954! 830! 935! 939!
RTSquared! 0.165! 0.229! 0.192! 0.194! 0.211! 0.051!
Year!Effect! Included! Included! Included! Included! Included! Included!
Notes:!*,!**,!and!***!represent!significance!at!10%,!5%,!and!1%!levels.! !This!table!presents!the!regression!analysis!of!
five! proxies! of! REM! in! addition! to! AEM!proxy! on! CSR! reporting!quality!over! the! study! period! 2009T2017! taking! into!














Regression% of% the% Quality% of% CSR% Reporting% Post% the% New% Regulation% on% Real% Earnings% Management:%
Controlling%for%Endogeneity%














CSR_Score! 0.001! 0.001***! 0.000! 0.002! 0.002*! 0.000!
! (1.34)! (2.93)% (0.27)! (1.02)! (1.92)% T(0.74)!
Reg! 0.087**! 0.037***! 0.050! 0.136*! 0.122**! T0.007!
! (2.09)% (2.71)% (1.30)! (1.69)% (2.55)% T(0.56)!
Reg*CSR_Score% T0.003**! T0.001**! T0.001! T0.004*! T0.004**! 0.000!
! P(2.22)% P(2.66)% T(1.14)! P(1.75)% P(2.61)% (0.68)!
Size! 0.006! 0.001! 0.014**! 0.028**! 0.007! 0.005***!
! (1.03)! (0.46)! (2.38)% (2.38)% (1.00)! (3.05)%
Growth! T0.005**! T0.002***! T0.004**! T0.010**! T0.007***! 0.000!
! P(2.66)% P(2.98)% P(2.02)% P(2.42)% P(3.21)% T(0.31)!
BigN! 0.016! T0.009***! 0.024*! 0.039! 0.007! T0.002!
! (1.08)! P(2.15)% (1.69)% (1.36)! (0.39)! T(0.36)!
Lev! 0.153**! T0.012! 0.221***! 0.399***! 0.142**! T0.008!
! (2.90)% T(0.67)! (4.57)% (3.95)% (2.22)% T(0.54)!
Age! 0.065***! 0.013***! 0.063***! 0.130***! 0.077***! 0.009***!
! (6.03)% (3.16)% (6.30)% (6.44)% (5.92)% (2.69)%
List! 0.044! 0.019**! 0.044! 0.074! 0.059! 0.001!
! (1.14)! (2.06)% (1.25)! (1.04)! (1.34)! (0.16)!
R&DI! T0.085! T0.005! T0.465***! T0.609***! T0.090! T0.067**!
! T(1.10)! T(0.16)! P(3.92)% P(3.01)% T(0.93)! P(2.55)%
Adj_ROA! T0.955***! T0.412***! T0.654***! T1.660***! T1.368***! 0.015!
! P(9.14)% P(10.11)% P(6.90)% P(8.47)% P(10.51)% (0.43)!
CG! T0.001! T0.001***! T0.001! T0.003! T0.002! T0.001**!
! T(0.41)! P(2.89)% T(0.52)! T(0.94)! T(1.07)! P(2.14)%
Ind.Sens! 0.010! 0.000! 0.008! 0.039! 0.009! 0.003!
! (0.62)! T(0.04)! (0.47)! (1.23)! (0.47)! (0.45)!
_cons! T0.394***! T0.019! T0.459***! T0.913***! T0.410***! T0.047**!
! P(4.40)% T(0.74)! P(5.23)% P(5.15)% P(3.98)% P(2.10)%
N!(firmTyears)! 936! 1074! 954! 830! 935! 939!
RTSquared! 0.179! 0.255! 0.186! 0.192! 0.219! 0.064!
Year!Effect! Included! Included! Included! Included! Included! Included!
Notes:!*,!**,!and!***!represent!significance!at!10%,!5%,!and!1%!levels.!This!table!presents!the!regression!analysis!of!five!
proxies!of!REM!in!addition!to!AEM!proxy!on!mandatory!CSR!reporting!over!the!study!period!2009T2017!taking!into!account!
potential!endogeneity!problems.!The!number!of!observations! include!missing!variables!due! to! lagging! the! independent!
variables.!All!variables!are!as!defined!in!Appendix!A.!
4.6.3.2&SubOSample&Tests&on&High&and&Low&CSR&Reporting&Quality&
To! validate! the!main! regression! results! and! check!whether! these!would! hold! after! using!
alternative!dependent!variables,!the!following!test!is!conducted.!In!this!study,!CSR!reporting!










variables! used! in! the! original!model.! This! study! uses! OLS! regression! to! run! the! specified!
models.! The! results! of! the! first! and! second! models! present! positive! coefficients! 0.001!
significant! at! the! 5%! and! 10%! levels! (t! =! 2.5! and! 1.7,! respectively)! for! the! regression! of!





chance! for! the!managers! to! impress! the! stockholders!with! their! performance!or! to! cover!
their!poor!performance,!in!line!with!opportunistic!and!impression!theories.!
Considering!AEM,!no!evidence!is!found!about!a!relation!between!AEM!and!high!or!low!CSR!




term! (Reg*CSR_Score),! the! regressions! of! Ab_Prod,! Ab_CFO,! and! REM2! present! negative!
coefficients!of!0.004,!0.001,!and!0.006,!respectively,! that!are!statistically!significant!at!the!
1%! level! (t& =! T2.37,! 2.92,! and! 2.77).! These! findings! indicate! that! firms! that! practice! REM!
activities! through! overproducing! inventory! and! inflating! cash! flow! lose! their! interest! in!
employing! CSR! reporting! to! cover! the! latter! types! of! manipulation,! particularly! because!
mandating!CSR!reporting!lost!managers!the!competitive!advantage!of!voluntarily!reporting!
CSR.! This,! however,! supports! the! original! sample! regression! results! which! are! consistent!







at!the!1%!level! (t!=! T2.85).!This!result! indicates!that!mandatory!adoption!of!CSR!reporting!






results,! regression! shows! an! insignificant! coefficient! of! Ab_Acc! for! the! interaction! term!


































CSR_Score& *0.0003! 0.001**& 0.001! 0.0002! 0.0005! 0.000! 0.000! 0.001*& 0.002! 0.002! 0.001! 0.001!
! *(0.21)! (2.50)& (1.10)! (0.08)! (0.32)! (0.00)! (0.12)! (1.70)& (0.70)! (0.37)! (0.34)! (0.99)!
Size! 0.003! *0.002! 0.010& 0.026& 0.002! 0.003& 0.019& 0.002& 0.018*& 0.044**& 0.019& 0.007**&
! (0.44)! *(0.87)! (1.64)& (1.89)& (0.27)! (1.45)& (1.55)& (0.56)& (1.88)& (2.00)& (1.40)& (2.43)&
Growth! C0.007***& C0.002***& *0.003! C0.015**& C0.010***& 0.001& *0.002! *0.001! *0.001! *0.006! *0.002! 0.000!
! C(2.96)& C(3.21)& *(1.22)! C(2.62)& C(3.78)& (1.29)& *(0.38)! *(0.71)! *(0.31)! *(0.69)! *(0.48)! (0.32)!
BigN! 0.006! C0.013**& 0.033*& 0.039& *0.012! C0.012*& 0.032! 0.001! 0.016! 0.052! 0.032! 0.003!
! (0.30)! C(2.39)& (1.98)& (1.06)& *(0.52)! C(1.98)& (1.20)! (0.08)! (0.69)! (1.03)! (1.08)! (0.54)!
Leverage! 0.116& 0.025! 0.141**& 0.340**& 0.160*& *0.022& 0.224***& *0.019& 0.232***& 0.482***& 0.203**& C0.034*&
! (1.55)& (1.03)! (2.07)& (2.26)& (1.71)& *(0.82)& (2.83)& *(0.90)& (3.62)& (3.36)& (2.22)& C(1.97)&
Age! 0.046***& 0.012***& 0.066***& 0.123***& 0.057***& 0.011**& 0.071***& 0.013**& 0.065***& 0.136***& 0.083***& 0.006!
! (3.26)& (2.60)& (5.90)& (4.82)& (3.34)& (2.29)& (3.64)& (2.44)& (4.41)& (4.02)& (3.72)& (1.41)!
List! 0.323***& 0.050**& 0.281***& 0.551***& 0.370***& 0.006! *0.028! 0.006! *0.026! *0.058! *0.026! 0.006!
! (2.92)& (2.30)& (2.82)& (2.65)& (2.89)& (0.34)! *(0.73)! (0.54)! *(0.88)! *(0.88)! *(0.63)! (0.63)!
R&DI! C0.549**& C0.147**& C1.181***& C1.885***& C0.669**& *0.048& *0.013& 0.010& C0.437& C0.518**& *0.011& *0.048&
! C(2.29)& C(2.03)& C(7.89)& C(6.08)& C(2.36)& *(0.69)& *(0.14)& (0.34)& C(3.62)& C(2.29)& *(0.10)& *(1.50)&
Adj_ROA! C0.754***& C0.270***& C0.466***& C1.151***& C1.010***& *0.008& C1.199***& C0.500***& C0.662***& C1.891***& C1.708***& *0.045!
! C(5.22)& C(5.25)& C(4.43)& C(4.56)& C(5.51)& *(0.19)& C(6.69)& C(8.74)& C(4.58)& C(5.86)& C(7.76)& *(0.9)!
CG_Score! 0.000! C0.001**& *0.002! *0.003! *0.001! 0.000& *0.001& C0.001*& 0.000& *0.002& *0.002& C0.001**&
! *(0.03)! C(2.55)& *(1.56)! *(0.99)! *(0.72)! *(0.77)& *(0.37)& C(1.85)& (0.11)& *(0.42)& *(0.58)& C(2.32)&
Ind.Sens! *0.005! 0.000! 0.015! 0.034! *0.007! 0.006! 0.011! *0.005! *0.016! 0.012! 0.007! 0.010!
! *(0.26)! *(0.03)! (0.93)! (0.90)! *(0.26)! (0.86)! (0.43)! *(0.46)! *(0.60)! (0.22)! (0.23)! (0.92)!
_cons! *0.514! *0.011! *0.569! *1.194! *0.521! *0.059! *0.496! *0.029! *0.537! *1.069! *0.516! *0.058!
! *(3.60)! *(0.33)! *(4.19)! *(4.21)! *(3.14)! *(1.82)! *(2.83)! *(0.56)! *(3.44)! *(3.22)! *(2.56)! *(1.28)!
N!(firm*years)! 458! 527! 455! 394! 458! 458! 478! 547! 499! 436! 477! 481!
R*Squared! 0.253! 0.250! 0.278! 0.302! 0.289! 0.037! 0.1489! 0.2357! 0.1506! 0.1591! 0.1992! 0.0486!




































CSR_Score! 0.002! 0.002***& 0.002! 0.003! 0.003*& 0.000! *0.001! 0.003**& *0.001! *0.002! 0.002! 0.002*&
! (1.17)! (3.60)& (1.40)! (0.95)! (1.87)& (1.04)! *(0.11)! (2.44)& *(0.23)! *(0.20)! (0.42)! (1.73)&
Reg! 0.162**& 0.053**& 0.055! 0.173! 0.217**& 0.026! 0.078! 0.116***& *0.052& *0.014& 0.193! 0.050&
! (2.22)& (2.58)& (0.87)! (1.24)! (2.55)& (1.26)! (0.61)! (2.87)& *(0.50)& *(0.06)& (1.29)! (1.23)&
Reg*CSR_Score! C0.004**& C0.001***& *0.002! *0.005! C0.006***& *0.001! *0.002! C0.005***& 0.003& 0.003& *0.007! *0.002&
! C(2.37)& C(2.92)& *(1.03)! *(1.46)! C(2.77)& *(1.35)! *(0.33)! C(2.85)& (0.7)& (0.27)& *(1.03)! *(1.42)&
Size! 0.003! *0.002! 0.010& 0.025*& 0.002! 0.003& 0.017& 0.001& 0.018*& 0.042*& 0.017& 0.007**&
! (0.42)! *(0.87)! (1.60)& (1.81)& (0.24)! (1.44)& (1.44)& (0.35)& (1.83)& (1.93)& (1.25)& (2.35)&
Growth! C0.007***& C0.002***& *0.003! C0.015**& C0.010***& 0.001& *0.002! *0.001! *0.001! *0.006! *0.003! 0.000!
! C(2.90)& C(3.13)& *(1.20)! C(2.56)& C(3.70)& (1.32)& *(0.42)! *(0.90)! *(0.29)! *(0.70)! *(0.56)! (0.23)!
BigN! 0.007! C0.012**& 0.034**& 0.040& *0.010! C0.011*& 0.028! *0.002! 0.015! 0.048! 0.026! 0.003!
! (0.36)! C(2.21)& (2.00)& (1.08)& *(0.45)! C(1.93)& (1.03)! *(0.25)! (0.64)! (0.94)! (0.84)! (0.42)!
Leverage! 0.109& 0.025! 0.138**& 0.331**& 0.153& *0.023& 0.225***& *0.016& 0.231***& 0.481***& 0.206**& C0.033*&
! (1.45)& (1.02)! (2.02)& (2.18)& (1.61)& *(0.84)& (2.81)& *(0.76)& (3.61)& (3.34)& (2.23)& C(1.90)&
Age! 0.043***& 0.010**& 0.064***& 0.118***& 0.052***& 0.010**& 0.077***& 0.016***& 0.066***& 0.142***& 0.091***& 0.006&
! (3.00)& (2.30)& (5.63)& (4.52)& (3.03)& (2.09)& (3.99)& (2.94)& (4.56)& (4.24)& (4.14)& (1.38)&
List! 0.326***& 0.049**& 0.281***& 0.552**& 0.373***& 0.006! *0.024! 0.006! *0.024! *0.053! *0.023! 0.005!
! (3.03)& (2.38)& (2.84)& (2.68)& (3.01)& (0.36)! *(0.66)! (0.62)! *(0.82)! *(0.8)! *(0.54)! (0.57)!
R&DI! C0.561& C0.151**& C1.190***& C1.910***& C0.684**& *0.050& *0.021& 0.008& C0.441***& C0.528**& *0.021& *0.048&
! C(2.28)**& C(2.05)& C(7.78)& C(5.99)& C(2.34)& *(0.72)& *(0.23)& (0.29)& C(3.64)& C(2.32)& *(0.19)& *(1.49)&
Adj_ROA! C0.752***& C0.271***& C0.468***& C1.153***& C1.009***& *0.008& C1.193***& C0.497***& C0.659***& C1.882***& C1.702***& *0.046!
! C(5.20)& C(5.30)& C(4.42)& C(4.54)& C(5.50)& *(0.19)& C(6.56)& C(8.64)& C(4.55)& C(5.77)& C(7.61)& *(0.91)!
CG_Score! 0.000! C0.001***& *0.002! *0.004! *0.002! 0.000& 0.000& *0.001& 0.000& *0.002& *0.001& C0.001*&
! *(0.09)! C(2.79)& *(1.59)! *(1.06)! *(0.85)! *(0.83)& *(0.11)& *(1.11)& (0.12)& *(0.32)& *(0.18)& C(1.97)&
Ind.Sens! *0.009! *0.001! 0.013! 0.028! *0.011! 0.006! 0.013! *0.005! *0.015! 0.014! 0.009! 0.010!
! *(0.43)! *(0.18)! (0.79)! (0.73)! *(0.45)! (0.78)! (0.48)! *(0.44)! *(0.56)! (0.27)! (0.28)! (0.91)!
_cons! *0.578! *0.024! *0.581! *1.241! *0.602! *0.068! *0.527! *0.087! *0.498! *1.036! *0.609! *0.086!
! *(4.11)! *(0.7)! *(4.33)! *(4.45)! *(3.72)! *(2.13)! *(2.89)! *(1.59)! *(3.08)! *(3.00)! *(2.91)! *(1.78)!
N!(firm*years)! 458! 527! 455! 394! 458! 458! 478! 547! 499! 436! 477! 481!
R*Squared! 0.260! 0.263! 0.280! 0.305! 0.299! 0.040! 0.152! 0.249! 0.153! 0.161! 0.203! 0.056!












Following# the# expectation# that# adopting# mandatory# CSR# reporting# regulation# leads# to#
improvements#in#accounting#reporting#quality,#this#study#examines#whether#mandatory#CSR#








evidence# endorses# the# underlined# directional# trend# by# Prior# et# al.# (2008)# and# Choi# et# al.#
(2013)# in# addition# to# opportunistic# and# impression# theories.# Accordingly,# these# findings#
indicate#that#some#CSR#practices#might#be#abused#and#employed#as#a#mechanism#to#mask#
other# harmful# practices,# which# reflects# negatively# on# the# accuracy# of# stakeholders’#
decisions,#and#the#quality#of#the#financial#reporting.#
Secondly,#the#findings#manifest#restrictions#on#REM#practices#after#mandating#CSR#reporting,#
specifically# REM# practices# of# overproducing# of# inventory# and# salesXboosting,# with# no#
presence# of# AEM# practice.# However,# mandatory# CSR# reporting# lost# managers# their#
competitive# advantage# of# reporting# CSR# voluntarily,# which# in# turn# caused# them# to# lose#









quality# CSR# reporting# firms# compared# to# low# quality# CSR# reporting# firms,# the# conclusion#
reached# by# this# study’s# results# is# consistent# with# impression# and# opportunist# theories,#
implying#that#mandatory#regulation#restricts#providers#of#both#high#and# low#CSR#reporting#
quality# from#practising#REM#activities.# Specifically,#mandating#CSR# reporting#has#a#greater#
effect#on#restricting#REM#practice#(through#sales)#in#firms#that#report#low#CSR#quality.#
Generally,# the# study# findings# provide# insights# into# regulation# setters# and# policymakers# to#
enhance# the# new# regulation,# which# in# turn# enhances# CSR# performance# and# quality# in#
general.#Also,#it#sends#a#red#flag#to#policymakers#that#some#CSR#practices#might#be#abused#
and# employed# as# a# mechanism# to# mask# other# harmful# practices# which# is# useful# to#
differentiate#accurate#and#reliable#information#from#less#transparent#reported#information.#
Moreover,# this# regulation# would# increase# the# harmony# in# the# financial# reporting#
domestically# and# across# countries# and,# in# turn,# increase# the# possibility# of#more# equitable#
comparability#for#the#firm’s#performance#and#their#real#impact#on#the#community.##
The# thesis# findings,# however,# certainly# does# not# encourage# firms# to# decrease# their#
investments#in#CSR#activities#or#enhance#their#reporting#quality#but# it#does#investigate#the#
real# potential# for# negative# impact# behind# these# activities.# In# so# doing,# it#might# clarify# to#
those# opportunistic# managers# the# damage# which# they# would# cause# to# the# firm,# and#
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Ind.Sens# Indicates# the#sensitivity#of# the# industry#which#a# firm# is#
classified# under.# Sensitive# industries# are:# “mining,# oil#
and#gas,#chemicals,#construction#and#building#materials,#




























I# investigate# the# influence# of# mandating# corporate# social# responsibility# reporting# on#
subsequent# financial# performance# through# accountingXbased#measures# and#marketXbased#
measures.#I#provide#evidence#about#the#negative#impact#of#reporting#CSR#voluntarily#on#the#









The# increasing# awareness# of# environmental# and# social# practices# among# public# users# of#
annual#reports#raises#the#pressure#on#firms#to#report#more#CSR#information#using#different#
channels.# For# instance,# they# communicate# their# CSR# activities# to# stakeholders# using# CSR#





and# Li,# 2015).# Therefore,# it# is# necessary# for# a# firm# to# be# aware# of# and# have# a# good#

















1983).# Due# to# this# argument,# CSR# activities# and# their# impact# on# firms’# performance# have#
been# studied# extensively# in# the# literature,# but# the# variations# in# the# findings# about# the#
Environmental,#Social#and#Governmental#(ESG)#effect#on#the#future#performance#of#the#firm#
are#still#unclear,#specifically#when#a#new#regulation#mandates#such#type#of#reporting#rather#
than# the# reporting# being# voluntary.# In# other#words,# this# regulation#might# have# a# positive#
outcome#by#improving#the#firm’s#CSR#performance,#which#is#considered#as#a#motivation,#or#
it#might# have# a# negative# outcome#by# the# firm# having# to# use# extra# costs# to# compete# and#
distinguish#itself#from#the#rest#of#its#competitors# (Ioannou#and#Serafeim,#2017).#Therefore,#
this# study# discusses# the# influence# of# CSR# reporting# practice# on# firms’# subsequent#
performance#in#the#context#of#mandatory#CSR#reporting#in#the#UK.#Two#common#indicators#














the# related# benefits# of# CSR# reporting# on# firms’# performance# is# to# boost# sales,# enhance#
operational# efficiency# and# mitigate# litigation# risk.# # It# would# also# enhance# the# analysts’#
anticipation#of#the#firm’s#positive#performance#(Dhaliwal#et#al.,#2012).#Another#incentive#for#
enhancing# CSR# reporting# is# protecting# the# firm’s# value# against# highXprofile# misconduct.#
Accordingly,# they# avoid# and# legitimate# themselves# against# any# penalties# resulting# from#
misconduct# events# (Christensen,# 2016).# However,# reporting# CSR# practices# would# have# a#
positive# impact# on# the# marketXbased# financial# performance;# this# longXterm# development#
impact# is# related# to# the#main# interest# of# the# firm# that# positively# signals# the#market# and#
legitimises#its#self#(Liu#and#Zhang,#2017;#Nekhili#et#al.,#2017).#Furthermore,#in#the#context#of#
mandatory#CSR#reporting,#increases#in#the#firms’#CSR#reporting#post#the#new#regulations#are#
documented,# in# parallel#with# the# enhancement# of# the# future# performance# of# those# firms#
(Ioannou#and#Serafeim,#2017).#
Conversely,#some#evidence#documents#disadvantage#and#the#negative# impact#of# reporting#
CSR# on# the# firms’# performance.# For# instance,# the# market# might# underXprice# firms# in# a#
sensitive# industry# after# reporting# CSR,# or# regulations# may# penalise# them# if# they# do# not#
disclose#their#environmental#impact#for#the#market#(Matsumura#et#al.,#2014),#this#explaining#



















research# findings# enrich# the# literature# through# three# points.# Firstly,# the# study# provides#
evidence#that#CSR#practices#and#projects#would#temporarily#harm#firm’s#profitability#due#to#
the#increased#spending#on#and#costs#related#to#such#activities,#which#is#consistent#with#Liu#
and# Zhang# (2017)# and# Chen# et# al.# (2018)# neoclassical# economic# and# agency# theories.#
Secondly,#in#line#with#Ioannou#and#Serafeim#(2017),#and#stakeholder#and#signalling#theories,#
mandating# CSR# reporting# enhance# firms’# future# performance# by# signalling# to# the# market#
about# the# firm’s# positiveness# toward# sustainability# issues.# Thirdly,# the# new# regulation#
improves#a#firm’s#future#performance,#specifically,#mandating#CSR#reporting#effects#appears#
clearly# in# the# twoXyearsX#and# threeXyears# X# ahead#performance# through#both#marketX#and#
accountingXbased# indicators,#which#support# later#discussion#of#the#multivariate#findings#of#
this#study.#
The# thesis# offers# a# number# of# contributions# to# the# accounting# literature.# First,# it# is# a#
response#to#Christensen’s# (2016,#p.138)#call# for#papers,# that#“…#future#research#could#also#
examine# how#mandatory# CSR# reporting# affects# firms”# to# complement# the# literature# that#
evinces# the# impact# of# voluntary# CSR# reporting.# These# findings# add# to# a# growing# body# of#
literature# that# studies# the# consequences# of#mandating# CSR# reporting.# One# such# research#
stream#focused#on#firm#value#and#market#responses#to#disclosure#(Grewal#et#al.,#2015;#Chen#
et#al.,# 2018),#whereas#another# focuses#on# disclosure#activities#and#environmental# impacts#
(Hung#et#al.,#2015;#Ioannou#and#Serefeim,#2017).#This#study#provides#a#new#research#insight#










characteristics# and# capital# market# aspects# than# other# environments# that# mandate# CSR#
reporting.# Also,#UK# institutional# investors# collect# private# social# information# to# assist# them#





firms# and# financial# industry# firms# compared# to# LSE#which#mandates# CSR# reporting# for# all#
listed# firms# in# the#main#market.# Also,# the# required# information# to# be# disclosed# vary# from#
region# to# another# between# requiring# ESG# reporting,# or# CSR# reporting# (which# includes#
environmental#and#social#information#according#to#Act#2006#(regulation#2013)).#Accordingly,#
this# study#contributes# to# the# literature#by# investigating# the#consequences#of#adopting# the#
regulation#of#CSR#reporting#and#the#intentions#behind#the#CSR#practices#in#a#firm,#and#how#








the# firm# would# incur# new# costs,# or# face# more# pressure# than# usual# to# increase# CSR#
performance# to# be# able# to# compete# with# other# firms.# Specifically,# this# would# harm# the#
original# sustainable# firms# with# superior# CSR# performance.# To# conclude,# such# regulations#
have#both#benefits#and#costs,#but#if#the#costs#offset#the#potential#benefits,#this#might#harm#
the# shareholder’s# interest# (Ioannou#and#Serafeim,#2017).# Thus,# this# study#contributes#and#







Concluding,# this# research# contributes# to# the# literature# in# various# ways.# First,# it# provides#
insights# and# feedback# for# regulation# setters# and# policyXmakers# (who# adopt# this# new#
regulation# or# who# are#willing# to# do# so)# about# the# effect# of# the# new# regulation# on# firms,#
Second,# it# extends# the# literature# on# the# potential# benefits# of# enforcing# these# regulations,#
and#to#what#extent#these#regulations#affect#the# firm’s#subsequent#performance.#Finally,# it#





with# developing# the# related# hypotheses# of# this# study.# Section# 5.3# discusses# the# research#
approach.# Section# 5.4# emphasises# the# data# sources# and# sample# selection.# Section# 5.5#










status,#and#risk#evaluation#by#the# investor#to#make#a#fair# judgment#about#this# firm,#which#
improves# the# transparency# and# efficiency# of# the# capital# markets# (Harjoto# and# Jo,# 2015).#
Consequently,#practising#CSR#is#considered#an#action#related#to#the#longXterm#improvement#
of#a#firm’s#interests#(Liu#and#Zhang,#2017).#
Several# empirical# studies# examine# the# relation# between# CSR# and# firm’s# financial#
performance# through# various# (positive# and# negative)# theoretical# perspectives.# From# a#




unnecessarily# additional# costs# to# a# firm,#which# is# a# disadvantage# against# the# competitors#
(Friedman,# 1970;# McWilliams# and# Siegel,# 1997;# Jensen,# 2002).# Another# theoretical#
perspective# supported#by# the#agency# theory#argues# that# financial# resources# spent#on#CSR#
practices# would# produce# managerial# benefits# instead# of# financially# benefiting# the#
shareholders#of#the#firm#(Brammer#and#Millington,#2008).#In#particular,#a#few#studies#assert#
that# enhancing# CSR# practices#would# not# improve# the# customer# purchase# behaviour#when#
the#customers#recognise#that#the#firm#intends#to#increase#their#profits#rather#than#act#in#the#
stakeholders’# interests# (Peloza# and# Zhang,# 2011).# Furthermore,# employees’# satisfaction#
might#not#be#enhanced#when#better#CSR#practices#are#employed#in#a#firm#due#to#some#other#
factors# such# as# treating# employees# unfairly# (Rupp# et# al.,# 2013).# # Accordingly,# the# firm# ’s#
performance#will#not#be#enhanced.##
Conversely,# another# stream# of# studies,# supported# by# the# stakeholder# theory# perspective,#
such#as#Waddock#and#Graves#(1997),#evince#that#CSR#reporting#quality#has#a#positive#impact#
on#the#firm#in#that#it#would#attract#more#qualified#employees#(Greening#and#Turban,#2000),#




capital#market.# As# Clarkson# (1995,# cited# by# Nekhili# et# al.,# 2017,# p.43)# argues,# this# theory#
emphasises# that# “a& firm& can& be& viewed& as& a& set& of& interdependent& relationships& among&
stakeholders,&which& comprise& not& only& shareholders& but& all& groups& or& individuals&who& can&
affect&or&be&affected&by&the&company's&activities”.#This#perspective#asserts#that#stakeholders’#
satisfaction# is# the# main# factor# of# firm# success;# accordingly,# CSR# is# a# key# factor# to# gain#
stakeholders’#satisfaction#and#support.#On#the#other#hand,#such#type#of#extensive#reporting#
would#provide#critical#information#that#meets#shareholders’#demand#and#affects#the#firm’s#
future#profits#and#cash# flows,#which# in# turn#could# reduce# the# information#asymmetry#and#
agency#problem#between#managers#and#shareholders#(Dhaliwal#et#al.,#2011).#
Prior# literature# has# examined# the# relation# between# CSR# reporting# and# a# firm’s# financial#
performance.#Various#measurements#of#financial#performance#are#used#such#as#accounting#





Ioannou# and# Serafeim,# 2017;# Liu# and# Zhang,# 2017)# and# negative# (e.g.,# Jones# et# al.,# 2007;#
Zhao# and# Muller,# 2016;# Chen# et# al.,# 2018)# under# voluntary# and# mandatory# reporting#
practices.##
5.2.1.1&Voluntary&Corporate&Social&Responsibility&Reporting&
Regarding# voluntary# CSR# reporting,# Porter# and# van# der# Linde# (1995)# suggest# that# CSR#
practices#would# improve#the#firm’s#relationship#with# its#creditors,#investors#and#regulators#
which# reflects#positively#on# the# firm’s# financial# performance.# Their#evidence# relies#on# the#
notion# that# CSR# practices#would#motivate# productivity# in# a# firm,#which# affects# the# firm’s#
competitive# situation# due# to# the# good# management# of# resources.# Reduced# resource#






evidence# about# the# impact# of# CSR# on# future# performance,# and# they# document# a# positive#
impact# of# CSR# on# the# firm's# future# performance# measured# using# return# on# equity# ratio.#
These# results# are# considered# as# a# motivation# for# firms# to# report# more# about# their# CSR#
activities#to#the#public.##




CSR#performance.# In#addition,# firms,#which#experience#an# increase# in#the#cost#of#capital#in#
the# last# year,# would# initiate# superior# CSR# performance# in# the# current# year,# therefore#









cost# and# reducing# information# asymmetry# by# improving# stakeholders’# engagement.# They#
find#that# firms#with#higher#performance#of#environmental,#social,#and#governmental# (ESG)#
disclosure#get#better#access# to# finance,#and,# in#particular,# capital# constraints#are# reduced.#
Furthermore,#Lys#et#al.# (2015)#document#similar#results#regarding#the#positive#relationship#
between# CSR# and# future# performance# of# a# firm# but,# unlike# most# of# the# literature,# they#
explain#these#results#from#a#different#perspective#(causality#behind#this#relation);#they##state#
that# “causality& does& not& necessarily& go& from& CSR& expenditures& to& financial& performance.&
Rather,&we&posit&that&a&firm&may&undertake&a&CSR&initiative&because&the&firm&expects&strong&
future&financial&performance”#(Lys#et#al.,#2015,#p.56).#This#argument#is#built#on#the#signalling#
value# perspective,# which# attributes# the# positive# relation# to# the# signalling# value# of# CSR#
expenditures# (using# CSR# as# a# signalling# instrument)# instead# of# being# a# positive# return# on#
these# expenses.# In# other#words,# they# argue# that# firms# are#more# likely# to# spend# financial#
resources#on#CSR#activities#to#communicate#a#positive#private#vision#of#managers#about#the#
future#financial#performance#of#the#firm#to#stakeholders.##
Similarly,#Plumlee#et#al.# (2015)# find#evidence#among#US# firms#for#the#association#between#
the#quality#of# the#environmental#disclosure# (as#one# type#of#CSR# reporting)#and# firm#value#




Cahan# et# al.# (2016)# conduct# a# crossXcountry# study# to# investigate# the# variation# in# the#
relationship#between#CSR# reporting#and# firm#value,#providing#evidence#about# the#positive#
impact# of# CSR# reporting# on# market# valuation# of# the# firm.# Further,# Christensen# (2016)#
presents# firm# value# protection# of# misconduct# as# another# incentive# for# practising# CSR#
activities# and# reporting# related# extensive,# transparent# information.# Firms# would# also#
voluntarily#report#CSR#information#to#avoid#and#legitimate#themselves#against#any#penalties#










consequently# significantly# enhance# investors’# evaluation# of# the# firm.# In# line# with# that,#
Kiessling# et# al.# (2016)# investigate# the# relationship# between# CSR# practices# and# firm# value#
utilising#a#Sweden#CSR# index#that# includes#the#top#100#firms#traded#on#the#NASDAQXOMX#
Stock#Exchange.#They#document#a#positive#association;#“As&CSR&is&a&customer&focused&tactic,&
firms& with& strong& CSR& are& awarded& for& their& efforts& by& a& higher& performance& from&
customers”#(Kiessling#et#al.,#2016,#p.278).#
Further,# Nekhili# et# al.# (2017)# present# similar# evidence# regarding# the# positive# relationship#
between#CSR# reporting# and#marketXbased# financial# performance# relating# to# some#specific#
factors# of# the# ownership# structure# of# the# firm.# Another# study# of# Liu# and# Zhang# (2017)#
investigates#the#Chinese#market#regarding#the#impact#of#CSR#reporting#on#firm#performance#
and# finds# that# “social& responsibility& information& relates& to& the& long?term& development& of&
enterprises”# (Liu# and# Zhang,# 2017,# p.1075),# inferring# that# the# main# aim# of# the# firm# in#
reporting#CSR#information#is#to#signal#the#market#positively#and#legitimise#itself.##
On# the# other# hand,# some# studies# find# a# negative# relationship# between# voluntary# CSR#
reporting#and#firms’#performance.##For#example,#Richardson#and#Welker#(2001)#observe#that#
enhancing#CSR#activities#of#a# firm# increases#the#cost#of#capital#of# firms.# Jones#et#al.# (2007)#
also# document# a# negative# association# between# CSR# reporting# and# firm# value.# In# a# more#




impact# for# the#market.# Thus,# a# negative# relationship# is# found# between#CSR# reporting# and#
market#value#of#the#firm.#
Additionally,# in# their# replication# of#Waddock# and# Graves’# (1997)# study,# Zhao# and#Muller#
(2016)# revisited# the# relationship# between# prior# CSR# reporting# and# its# impact# on# the#




they# evince# that# CSR# reporting# does# not# have# a# positive# impact# on# a# firm’s# financial#





mandated#CSR# reporting# to# the#present# time,#and# for# those# that#do,# the# regulation# is#not#
very# clear# about# the# exact# required# information# and# the# form#of# the# reporting# that# firms#
need#to#apply.#For#instance,#Ioannou#and#Serafeim#(2017)#examine#the#impact#of#mandatory#
CSR# regulation# across# four# countries# (South# Africa,# Malaysia,# China,# and# Denmark).# One#
remarkable#point#the#study#documents#is#that#some#of#these#regulations#rely#on#the#‘apply#
or# explain’# rule# and# this# regulation# does# not# offer# accurate# guidance# about# the# required#
reporting#information#and#its#form.#However,#the#study#documents#an#increase#in#the#firms’#
CSR# reporting# post# the# new# regulations,# in# parallel# with# enhancement# of# the# financial#





However,# they# find# that# this# increase# in#expenditure# is# related# to#predicting#unfavourable#
stakeholder#reactions#around#the#mandatory#reporting#of#CSR#performance.##
Conversely,#based#on#a#Chinese#sample,#Chen#et#al.#(2018)#document#an#improvement#in#the#
spending# associated# with# CSR# practices# (specifically# environmental# protection# spending).#
Also,#they#observe#a#decrease#in#the#firm’s#profitability#after#enforcing#the#new#regulation,#in#
addition#to#a#negative#stock#market#response#to#the#mandated#regulations.#In#line#with#that,#









impact# of# both# voluntary# and# mandatory# CSR# reporting# on# the# firms’# performance.# This#




This# regulation# has# a# number# of# benefits.# # It#would# enhance# firms’# operational# efficiency&
through# forcing# them# to# decrease# carbon# emissions# and# energy# consumption,# enhance#




et#al.# (2018,#p.9)#state,#“better& information&can& improve&the&ability&of& investors&to&monitor&
firms& on& dimensions& potentially& having& cash& flow& implications& (e.g.,& environmental&
performance);& this,& too,&would&generate&a&positive&stock&price&reaction.”#Accordingly,# firms#
would# benefit# from# this# regulation# likewise# by# signalling# to# the# market# about# the# firm’s#
positiveness#toward#sustainability#issues.#
Conversely,# CSR# reporting# new# regulation# would# negatively# affect# the# firm’s# value# if# the#
expected# costs# exceed# the# anticipated# benefits;# in# turn,# this# would# lead# the# investors# to#
respond#negatively#to#this#regulation.#One#example#of#cost#comprises#the#preparation#of#this#






civil# society,# regulators# and# government# to# pressure# firms# to# invest# their#money# in# some#
new# projects# such# as# purchasing# new# expensive# machines# that# cause# less# harm# to# the#
environment,#enhance# the#employability# conditions,#or# to#direct# their# financial# sources# to#




shareholders# to# other# nonXshareholding# stakeholders;#which# in# turn# generates# a# negative#
response#to#this#regulation.#
Overall,#the#new#regulation#that#mandates#CSR#reporting#would#generate#both#benefits#and#
costs.# Due# to# that,# it# would# be# difficult# to# predict# this# relationship;# therefore,# this# study#
developed#the#following#hypotheses:!
!!!!!!!!!!Hypothesis! 1:! There& is& an& impact& of& CSR& reporting#quality& on& the& firms’& subsequent&
financial&performance.#





















































































































































































































































































































































































































value.# Signs# identified# as# follow:# significant# positive# relationship# (+),# significant# negative# relationship# (X),# insignificant#
relationship#(0).#
5.3,Research,Approach,
As# discussed# in# chapter# three# section# 3.3,# this# study# adopts# the# inductive# approach# to#
extract#the#primary#data#of#the#financial#performance#of#firms#and#CSR#reporting#net#score#in#
addition#to#the#control#variables.#However,#the#deductive#method#is#employed#to#collect#the#
secondary# data,#which# found# in# the# prior# literature,#which# discusses# similar# relationships.#












































































CSR# reporting# in# the#UK# in#2013.#The# sample# is#extended# to# 2017# for# the# requirement#of#
measuring#a#firm’s#future#financial#performance.##
Following#prior# literature#(e.g.,#Reverte#2009;#Sun#et#al.,#2010;#Chen#et#al.,#2018),# firms#of#
financial# institutions# (banks,# insurance,# and# investment)# (SIC# 6000X7000)29# and# utility#
industries# (SIC# 4400X5000)# are# excluded.# Later# literature# confirms# that# these# exclusions#
enhance#the#comparability#of#the#results#among#the#sample,#where#the#mentioned#sectors#
operate# in# highly# regulated# industries# whose# accounting# rules# differ# from# those# in# other#
industries.#Thus,#this#treatment#reduces#the#initial#sample#from#3390#observations#to#1563#



































data# related# to# its# specific# industry# and# then# weights# each# item# in# the# score# by# its#
importance#(Gutsche#et#al.,#2017).#The#ESG#Bloomberg#score#includes#the#following#headings#
for#the#environmental#dimension;#CO2#emissions,#energy#consumption,#water#use,#and#total#
waste.# The# social# dimension# items# are# the# number# of# employees,# contract# type# and#
turnover,# community# service# expenditure,# and# human# rights.# The# last# dimension# is#
corporate# governance# (CG),# which# consists# of# information# about# board# structure,# board#
independence,# board# executives# and# diversity,# board# committees,# audit# committee,# and#
compensation#committee,#among#others#(Bloomberg#database).#
With#regards#to#the#new#regulations#of#mandating#CSR#reporting#in#the#UK,#it#requires#the#























reasons.# First,# it# reflects# a# forwardXlooking# proxy# as# it# is# grounded# on# the# market# stock#
prices.#Secondly,#it#reflects#the#stakeholders’#perceptions,#which#enhances#the#assessments#
of#CSR#practices’#value#over#the#long#term#(Orlitzky#et#al.,#2003).##In#particular,#marketXbased#
indicators# such# as# Tobin’s#Q# are# considered# as# reputable# assessors# of# firms’# performance#
(Surroca#et#al.,#2010).#
On#the#other#hand,#several#studies#prefer#the#accountingXbased#measures#rather#than#the#
marketXbased# indicators# due# to# their# sensitivity# and# ability# to# “reflect# internal# decisionX
making#capabilities#and#managerial#performance#rather#than#external#market#responses#to#
organizational#actions”#(Orlitzky#et#al.#2003,#p.408).##




on#Assets# (ROA)# and# Tobin’s#Q.# # In# terms# of# calculation,# ROA# is# calculated# as# net# income#
before#interest#and#tax#on#the#total#assets#(Waddock#and#Graves,#1997;#Zhao#and#Murrell,#
2016),#and#Tobin’s#Q# is#calculated#as#the#market#value#of#equity# (MVE)#and#total#debt# (D)#
divided#by#total#assets#(TA)#(Nekhili#et#al.,#2017).#
5.5.3,Empirical,Models,,
The# purpose# of# this# study# firstly# is# to# capture# the# impact# of# CSR# reporting# quality# on# the#
firms’# subsequent# financial# performance.# Secondly,# it# aims# to# capture# the# impact# of# CSR#






Firstly,# to#address#the#first#hypothesis#which#suggests& ‘There&is&an& impact&of&CSR&reporting&
quality&on&the&firms’&subsequent&financial&performance’,&the#first#model#(5.1)#examines#the#
relation#among#the#full#sample#period:#
FP& i,t+1&=&α0&+&β1&CSR_Score& i,t& +&β2& Size& i,t& +&β3& Lev& i,t& +&β4&Age& i,t& +&β5& Listing& i,t& +&β6&CG& i,t& +&β7&
Ind.Sens&+&β8&&FP&i,t&+!Year&+εi,t&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&(5.1)&&&&&&
Secondly,# to# assess# the# second# hypothesis,# which# suggests& ‘The& impact& of& CSR& reporting&
quality& on& the& firms’& subsequent& financial& performance& will& be& stronger& after& the& new&

















CSR_Scorei,t# Indicates# the# CSR# reporting#
score#at#the#end#of#the#year.#
Disclosure# net# score# ranges#
from#0#to#100.#
+#
Reg&i,t# Indicates# the# new# regulation#
of# Act# 2006# (Regulation#
2013).#
A#dummy#variable#equals#zero#
if# the#year# is#before# 2013#and#
one#otherwise.#
+#
Size&i,t# Indicates#the#size#of#the#firm.# The# natural# logarithm# of# the#
market# value# of# equity#
(MVE_WC08001)# of# firm# i,#
measured#at#the#end#of#year#t.#
+#
Lev&i,t& Indicates# the# leverage# (debt)#
of#the#firm.#
The# total# debt# scaled# by# total#
assets#at#the#end#of#year#t.#
?#
Age&i,t& Indicates#the#firm’s#age.## The# natural# logarithm# of# the#
number# of# the# firms’# listing#
year#(BDATE)#plus#one.#
+#
Listing&i,t& Indicates# the# crossXlisting#
status#of#the#firm.#
An# Indicator# variable# equal# to#





one# or# more# international#
market#and#zero#otherwise.#
CGi,t&&& Indicates# the# corporate#





Ind.Sens& Indicates# the# sensitivity# of#
the# industry# under# which# a#
firm#is#classified.#
Sensitive# industries# are:#
“mining,# oil# and# gas,#
chemicals,# construction# and#
building# materials,# forestry#
and# paper,# steel# and# other#
metals,# electricity,# gas#
distribution#and#water”.##
All# the# rest# of# the# industries#
are# considered# as# less#
sensitive.#
?#




of# applying# a# new# regulation# –# that# is,# in# this# study,# the# new# regulations# of# Act# 2006#
(Regulation# 2013)# –# to# mandate# CSR# reporting# quality# on# the# subsequent# financial#
performance.# This# is# to# avoid# a# problem# of# correlated# omitted# variables.# Therefore,# this#
study# includes# the# most# commonly# used# control# variables# following# some# studies# (e.g.,#
Brammer#and#Pavelin,#2008;#Chiu#and#Wang,#2015;#Zhao#and#Murrell,#2016;#Nekhili#et#al.,#
2017):#
Size& (LnMVEI,t):& McWilliams# and# Siegel# (2000)# and# Prior# et# al.# (2008)# argue# that# CSR#
disclosure#and#size#of#firm#are#associated,#considering#the#firm#size#as#a#widely#used#control#
for# CSR# disclosure.# Particularly# in# that# large# firms# can# meet# the# cost# of# providing# CSR#
information# for# the# stakeholders# in# their# annual# reports,# which# is# not# the# case# with# the#
smaller# firms# (Firth,# 1979).# However,# the# sign# of# this# association# across# most# of# the#
literature# indicates# a# positive# relation# (Reverte,#2009;# Boubakri# et# al.,# 2016;# Cahan# et# al.,#
2016).# Firm# size# proxy# is# included# in# the# regression#model# as# the# control# variable# and# is#
defined# as# the# natural# logarithm#of# the#market#value# of# equity# (MVE_WC08001)# of# firm# i#
measured#at#the#end#of#year#t.#






which# are# indirectly# related# to# the# financial# success# of# the# firm.# This# study# controls# for#









al.,# 2008;# Jo# and# Harjoto,# 2011# ,2012;# Flammer# and# Luo,# 2017;# Liu# and# Zhang,# 2017).#
Hence,#this#study#controls#for#the#CG#impact#using#a#net#score#provided#by#the#Bloomberg#
database.#This#net#score#scales#the#CG#from#0#to#100#using#measures#under#the#following#
main# headings:# # board# structure;# board# independence;# board# and# executive# diversity;#
board# committees;# audit# committee;# compensation# committee;# nomination# committee;#
board# executive# activities;# shareholder’s# rights;# annual# general#manager’s# voting# results;#
and#global#initiative#reporting.#
International& listing& (Listingi,t):# According# to# Cooke# (1989),# Reverte# (2009)# and# Chiu# and#
Wang# (2015),# a# firm# will# disclose# more# CSR# information# when# it# operates# in# foreign#
markets#where# it# needs# to# consider# two#or#more# stock#markets’# reporting# rules.#Hence,#














the# impact#of#mandating#CSR# reporting#on# future#performance# for# the#whole# sample.# For#
this#point,# the#study# relies#on#both# the#accounting#performance#measures# (e.g.,#Waddock#





voluntary#and#mandatory#adoption#of# reporting# CSR# in# the#UK#over# two# lagged#phases# to#




















Panel,A:,Industry,Distribution# # # #
Industry#Type# Freq.# Per#cent# Cum.#
Mining# 180# 11.52# 11.52#
Construction# 105# 6.72# 18.23#
Manufacturing# 596# 38.13# 56.37#
Transportation#&#Public#Utilities# 74# 4.73# 61.1#
Wholesale#Trade# 53# 3.39# 64.49#
Retail#Trade# 242# 15.48# 79.97#
Services# 313# 20.03# 100#
Total# 1563# 100# #
Panel,B:,Time,Distribution,,
Year# Freq.# Per#cent# Cum.#
2009# 166# 10.62# 10.62#
2010# 172# 11# 21.63#
2011# 179# 11.45# 33.08#
2012# 186# 11.9# 44.98#
2013# 208# 13.31# 58.29#
2014# 218# 13.95# 72.23#
2015# 222# 14.2# 86.44#
2016# 212# 13.56# 100#
Total# 1563# 100# #
Note:#This#table#presents#the#frequency#of#CSR#reporting#firms#by# industry#and#year#over#the#period#2009X2017# including#
the#missing#values.##
Table# 5.4# reports# descriptive# statistics# for# all# incorporated# variables# in# this# study31.# Two#





















firms# on# average# are# listed# in# one# or#more# international#markets# (in# addition# to# LSE),# of#
which#18%#of#the#sample#firms#are#classified#as#sensitive#industries.#In#average,#the#sample#





# Mean# Median# SD# Max# Min# N#
Variables#of#Interest# # # # # # #
ROA&& 0.061# 0.058# 0.079# X0.292# 0.336# 1563#
Tobin’s&Q& 1.552# 1.276# 1.035# 0.336# 7.341# 1562#
Dependent#Variable# # # # # # #
CSR_Score& 29.608# 28.000# 11.511# 11.000# 65.000# 1563#
Control#Variables# # # # # # #
Size& 14.248# 14.032# 1.425# 10.496# 18.127# 1563#
Lev& 0.222# 0.214# 0.171# 0.000# 1.014# 1563#
Age& 3.266# 3.367# 0.687# 0.693# 3.989# 1563#
&Age&in&years& 31.748# 29.000# 16.885# 2.000# 54.000# 1563#
List& 0.962# 1.000# 0.192# 0.000# 1.000# 1563#
CG_Score& 56.338# 55.000# 7.035# 39.000# 77.000# 1563#
Ind.Sens& 0.182# 0.000# 0.386# 0.000# 1.000# 1563#
Notes:#This#table#presents#sample#descriptive#statistics#for#all#variables#incorporate#in#this#study#over#the#period#2009X2017.#
All#variables#are#winsorised#at#1%#of#their#distribution#and#are#as#defined#in#Appendix#A.#












# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# 7# 8# 9#
(1)#Tobin’s#Q#
1#
# # # # # # # #
(2)#ROA# 0.447*# 1# # # # # # # #
(3)#CSR_Score# X0.109*# X0.095*# 1# # # # # # #
(4)#Size# 0.105*# 0.137*# 0.567*, 1# # # # # #
(5)#Lev# X0.058*# X0.119*# 0.077*# 0.127*# 1# # # # #
(6)#Age# X0.181*# 0.070*# 0.199*# 0.116*# X0.242*# 1# # # #
(7)#List# 0.097*# X0.011# 0.083*# 0.285*# 0.021# X0.099*# 1# # #
(8)#CG_Score# X0.084*# X0.054*# 0.678*, 0.559*, 0.052*# 0.213*# 0.102*# 1# #
(9)#Ind.Sens# X0.225*# X0.165*# 0.185*# 0.079*# X0.108*# 0.003# X0.038*# 0.196*# 1#
Notes:#*#Represents#significance#at#the#10%#level.##
This# table# presents# the# Pearson# correlation#matrix# for# all# variables# covered# in# this# study.# All# variables# are# as#defined# in#
Appendix#A.#
5.6.2,Multivariate,Analysis,
In# this# section,# the# empirical# analysis# results# of# OLS# regression# are# presented.# First,# the#
impact#of#CSR# reporting#quality#on#the#firm’s# future#profitability#is#explored#for#the#whole#
sample.#Second,#Tobin’s#Q#and#ROA#proxies#are#regressed#on:#a#dummy#variable#indicating#
whether# the# period# is# preX# or# postXnew# regulation# of# mandatory# CSR# reporting;# an#
independent# variable# of# CSR# reporting# net# score;# and# the# regulation# and# CSR# net# score#
interaction#term.#Thus,#this#study#explores#how#CSR#reporting#quality#influences#the#future#
performance#of#a#firm.#
Moreover,# this# study# employed# a# series# of# sample# tests# to# verify# the# regression# results’#
reliability.#Multicollinearity# test# is# implemented#and# found# to#be# normal# in# the#context#of#




regression# of# ROA,# the# estimated# coefficient# for# CSR# reporting# quality# (CSR_Score)# is#
negative# 0.001# and# significant# at# the# 1%# level# (t&=# X2.78).# A# higher# level# of# CSR# reporting#
#############################################################







that# firms# undertaking# CSR# practices# consume# resources# and# increase# costs# of# the#
subsequent#accounting#period#of#a#firm#for#oneXyearXahead;#accordingly,#it#is#reasonable#to#
assume# that# practising# and# reporting# CSR# would# decrease# firms’# financial# performance.#






























# Coef.# tXTest# Coef.# tXTest#
CSR_Score, &0.001# &(1.14), &0.001***# &(2.78),
Size# X0.025***# X(2.69), 0.004***# (2.57)#
Lev# 0.028# (0.35), 0.015# (1.12)#
Age# 0.031*# (1.74)# 0.004# (1.66),
List# X0.043# X(0.83)# X0.016**# X(2.06),
CG_Score# 0.004*# (1.69), 0.000# X(0.56),
Ind.Sens# X0.136***# X(5.18), X0.011**# X(2.18),
Lag#Tobin’s#Q/ROA# 0.885***# (37.59), 0.617***# (15.96),
_cons# 0.342***# (2.65)# X0.004# X(0.20)#
N#(firmXyears)# 1562# # 1563# #
RXSquared# 0.744# # 0.404# #














quality,# which# increases# stakeholders’# satisfaction.# Specifically,# mandating# CSR# reporting#
would# enhance# investors’# assessment# of# firm# future# performance# (Grewal# et# al.,# 2018).#
Additionally,#firms#would#obtain#benefits#from#this#regulation,#likewise,#by#signalling#to#the#
market#about#the#firm’s#positiveness#toward#sustainability#issues.##
Table# 5.8# reports# the# mean# tXtest# difference# between# preX# and# postXnew# regulation#






the#average#profitability# increased#after#adopting# the#new# regulation.#Also,# the#difference#





# Coef.# tXTest# Coef.# tXTest#
CSR_Score# X0.002# X(1.42), X0.001***# X(2.80),
Reg# X0.162***# X(2.68), X0.015# X(1.65)#
Reg*CSR_Score, 0.004**, (2.18), 0.000, (1.08),
Size# X0.024***# X(2.59), 0.004***# (2.70)#
Lev# 0.032# (0.40), 0.015# (1.13)#
Age# 0.023# (1.32)# 0.004# (1.36),
List# X0.049# X(0.93)# X0.017**# X(2.12),
CG_Score# 0.003# (1.24), 0.000# X(0.90),
Ind.Sens# X0.139***# X(5.20), X0.012**# X(2.27),
Lag#Tobin’s#Q/ROA# 0.886***# (37.40), 0.616***# (15.84),
_cons# 0.442***# (3.26)# 0.007# (0.36)#
N#(firmXyears)# 1562# # 1563# #
RXSquared# 0.745# # 0.408# #





























when# the# independent# variable# is# simultaneously# determined# by# the# dependent# variable#
(Wooldridge,#2002),#and#as#some#studies#argued#it#might#be#that#CSR#reporting#quality#and#
firm# performance# are# simultaneously# determined# (Jo# and# Harjoto,# 2012).# Following# the#
literature,#to#check#the#possible#impact#of#endogeneity,#I#conduct#the#lagged#approach#(e.g.,#
Christensen;#Dhaliwal,#2011)#to#tackle#the#endogenous#association#between#CSR# reporting#
quality# and# firm# performance.# Jo# and# Harjoto# (2012,# p.# 64)# argue# that# “While& CSR&









Lagged#Independent#Variables# Coef.# tXTest# Coef.# tXTest#
CSR_Score, X0.002# X1.220# X0.001*# &1.930,
Size# X0.049***# &3.110, 0.001# 0.460#
Lev# 0.065# 0.480# 0.031# 1.670#
Age# 0.056*# 1.730, 0.009**# 2.170,
List# X0.095# X0.980# X0.022*# &1.990,
CG_Score# 0.008**# 2.040, 0.000# X0.120#
Ind.Sens# X0.268***# &6.000, X0.018**# &2.300,
Lag#Tobin’s#Q/ROA# 0.805***# 22.780, 0.526***# 11.260,
_cons# 0.590**# 2.450, 0.022# 0.780#
N#(firmXyears)# 1562# # 1563# #
RXSquared# 0.760# # 0.432# #
Year#Effect# Included# # Included# #
Notes:#*,#**,#and#***#represent#significance#at#10%,#5%,#and#1%#levels.#This#table#presents#the#regression#analysis#of#CSR#
reporting# quality# on# future# performance#measured#by# Tobin’s#Q#and#ROA#over# the# study# period# 2009X2017# considering#









Lagged#Independent#Variables# Coef.# tXTest# Coef.# tXTest#
CSR_Score# X0.002# X1.120# X0.001**# &2.570,
Reg# X0.347***# &3.510, X0.030**# &2.000,
Reg*CSR_Score, 0.007**# 2.510, 0.001# 1.088,
Size# X0.049***# &3.130, 0.001# 0.560#
Lev# 0.078# 0.590# 0.031# 1.680,
Age# 0.040# 1.280# 0.008*# 1.990,
List# X0.108# X1.120# X0.023**# &2.050,
CG_Score# 0.006# 1.480# 0.000# X0.290#
Ind.Sens# X0.273***# &6.000, X0.018**# &2.360,
Lag#Tobin’s#Q/ROA# 0.812***# 22.710, 0.527***# 11.390,
_cons# 0.800***# 3.190, 0.033# 1.180#
N#(firmXyears)# 1562# # 1563# #
RXSquared# 0.745# # 0.408# #
Year#Effect# Included# # Included# #
Notes:#*,#**,#and#***#represent#significance#at#10%,#5%,#and#1%#levels.##This#table#presents#the#regression#analysis#of#CSR#
reporting#quality#post#the#new#regulation#on#future#performance#measured#by#Tobin’s#Q#and#ROA#over#the#study#period#
























# Lag#CSR#one#phase# Lag#CSR#two#phases# Lag#CSR#one#phase# Lag#CSR#two#phases#
CSR_Score, &0.001, &0.001, 0.0004*, 0.0001,
, &(0.67), &(0.79), &(1.93), &(0.57),
Size# X0.026***# X0.029***# 0.003**# 0.003#
# X(2.75)# X(2.69)# (2.13)# (1.56)#
Lev# X0.010# 0.000# 0.016# 0.016#
# X(0.12)# (0.01)# (1.22)# (1.10)#
Age# 0.014# 0.009# 0.006**# 0.006**#
# (0.73)# (0.41)# (2.05)# (2.10)#
List# X0.076# X0.082# X0.018**# X0.019*#
# X(1.36)# X(1.24)# X(2.11)# X(1.92)#
CG_Score# 0.005**# 0.004# 0.000# 0.000#
# (2.15)# (1.60)# X(0.44)# X(1.19)#
Ind.Sens# X0.151***# X0.142***# X0.016***# X0.019***#
# X(4.92)# X(4.35)# X(2.78)# X(2.86)#
Lag#Tobin’s#Q/ROA# 0.886***# 0.892***# 0.620***# 0.605***#
# (33.74)# (30.24)# (14.22)# (12.86)#
_cons# 0.376***# 0.490# X0.010# 0.006#
# (2.68)# (2.92)***# X(0.50)# (0.24)#
RXSquared# 0.737# 0.726# 0.393# 0.366#






Table#5.12#presents# the#analysis# for# the# regression# of# profitability#measured#by#Tobin’s#Q#





an# action# related# to# the# longXterm# improvement# of# a# firm’s# interest# (Heal,# 2005;# Liu# and#
Zhang,#2017).#
Similarly,# using# the# ROA# measure# of# profitability,# an# incremental# increase# in# the# firm’s#




financial#performance,# respectively)#with#positive# coefficients#0.0004#and#0.001# significant#
at#the#1%#level#(t#=#2.44#and#3.10,#respectively).#Witnessing#significant#results#among#both#
phases#could#be#related#to#the#sensitivity#and#ability#of#the#accountingXbased#measures#such#
as# ROA# to# reflect# a# firm’s# management# performance# and# internal# decisionXmaking#
proficiencies# (Orlitzky# et# al.,# 2003).# However,# this# evidence# supports# the# suggestion# that#
mandating#the#adoption#of#CSR#reporting#by#FTSE#AllXshare#firms#listed#in#LSE#enhances#the#










CSR_Score# 0.000# X0.001# 0.000**# 0.000#
# X(0.09)# X(0.41)# X(2.24)# X(1.11)#
Reg# X0.058**# X0.144***# X0.012**# X0.006#
# X(2.07)# X(5.31)# X(2.39)# X(1.57)#
Reg*CSR_Score, 0.001, 0.004***, 0.0004**, 0.001***,
, (0.64), (3.92), (2.44), (3.10),
Size# X0.027***# X0.030***# 0.003**# 0.003#
# X(2.77)# X(2.85)# (2.16)# (1.53)#
Lev# X0.007# 0.011# 0.016# 0.015#
# X(0.09)# (0.12)# (1.18)# (1.10)#
Age# 0.009# 0.005# 0.006*# 0.007**#
# (0.50)# (0.25)# (1.99)# (2.25)#
List# X0.081# X0.089# X0.018**# X0.019*#
# X(1.43)# X(1.36)# X(2.15)# X(1.91)#
CG_Score# 0.004# 0.003# 0.000# 0.000#
# (1.68)# (1.07)# X(0.63)# X(1.01)#
Ind.Sens# X0.152***# X0.139***# X0.016***# X0.018***#
# X(4.91)# X(4.25)# X(2.82)# X(2.84)#
Lag#Tobin’s#Q/ROA# 0.888***# 0.897***# 0.622***# 0.606***#
# (33.48)# (30.28)# (14.26)# (13.02)#
_cons# 0.455***# 0.639***# X0.003# 0.006#
# (3.12)# (3.72)# X(0.13)# (0.26)#
RXSquared# 0.737# 0.728# 0.399# 0.380#
Year#Effect# Included# Included# Included# Included#
Notes:#*,#**,#and#***#represent#significance#at#10%,#5%,#and#1%#levels.##This#table#presents#the#regression#analysis#of#CSR#








This# study# assesses# the# firm’s# subsequent# performance# response# to# mandated# CSR#
reporting.#Specifically,#it#examines#the#subsequent#performance#through#two#measures#X#the#
marketXbased# indicator# (Tobin’s# Q)# for# detecting# the# financial# benefits# of# CSR# reporting#
(Hillman# and# Keim,# 2001),# and# the# accountingXbased#measures# (ROA)# to# “reflect# internal#






engaging# firms# in#CSR#practices#and#projects#would# temporarily#harm#a# firm’s#profitability#




Second,# the# findings# emphasise# the# enhancement# of# a# firm’s# future# performance# after#
mandating#CSR#reporting.#Specifically,#this#enhancement#appears#clearly#through#the#market#
indicator#of#Tobin’s#Q,#with#no#presence#of#impact#on#firms’#profitability#measured#by#ROA.#
However,# firms# would# obtain# benefits# from# this# regulation,# likewise,# by# signalling# to# the#
market#about# the# firm’s#positiveness# toward# sustainability# issues.#This# indication#confirms#
the#directional#trend,#which#is#emphasised,#by#Ioannou#and#Serafeim#(2017)#and#stakeholder#
and# signalling# theories.# This# result# is# consistent# with# the# idea# that# the# new# regulation#
requires# firms#to#comply#with#reporting#CSR,#thus,#investors’#assessment#of#a# firm’s# future#
performance#and# risk# status#will#be#enhanced#when# the# firms#comply#with# this# regulation#
and#avoid# the# risk#of#governmental#penalties#or# society#undervaluation# in# the#case#of#not#
complying#with#reporting#CSR.#Unlike#voluntary#CSR,#which#consider#as#an#extra#cost# from#
investors#and#stakeholders#perspective.#
Third,#with#regards#to#the# influence#of#adopting# the#new# regulation# in#the#twoXyearsX#and#






mandating# CSR# reporting# appears# clearly# through# both# marketX# and# accountingXbased#
indicators.##
Generally,# this# study# provides# insights# for# regulation# setters# and# policyXmakers# about# the#
effect#of#the#new#regulation#on#firms,#which#in#turn#would#increase#firms’#reporting#quality,#
enhance#their#environmental#and#social#roles,#and#be#more#in#line#with#sustainability#issues.#
Also,# this# study# extends# the# literature# on# the# potential# benefits# of# enforcing# these#
regulations;# it# assessed# the# extent# to# which# these# regulations# affect# the# quality# of# CSR#
reporting,# and# in# turn,# affect# the# firm’s# subsequent# performance.# The# findings# also# are#
important# to# the# shareholders,# where# CSR# firms# attract# a# more# positive# investors’#
assessment#of#their# firms’# future#value.#Also,# it# is# important#to#the#stakeholders#regarding#
firms’#performance#and#the#impact#of#such#new#regulations#on#their#interests.#However,#the#
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Ind.Sens#i,t# Indicates# the# sensitivity& of& the& industry& under# which# a#
firm# is# classified.# Sensitive# industries# are:# “mining,# oil#
and#gas,#chemicals,#construction#and#building#materials,#












In# this# thesis,# I# examine# the#new# regulation#of#Act#2006# (Regulation#2013)# that#mandates#
CSR# reporting# in# the# UK.# More# particularly,# I# provide# a# comprehensive# overview# of# CSR#




London# Stock# Exchange# from# 2009# to# 2017.# Overall,# although# there# is# some# evidence#
regarding# the# outcome# of# the# adoption# of# the# new# regulation,# there# is# none# in# the# UK#






Firstly,# the# thesis# investigates# the# influence# of#mandating# CSR# reporting# on# the# quality# of#
CSR# reporting.# Firms# employ# CSR# reporting# as# a# strategic# investment# to# benefit# from#
presenting# their# ethical# practices# to# stakeholders# and# society# to# legitimise# themselves,# in#
addition# to# enhancing# the# firm’s# image# and# reputation# (Branco# and# Rodrigues,# 2006).#
Several# researchers# have# suggested# exploring# mandatory# CSR# reporting,# and# how# other#
firms’# characteristics# influence# these# regulations#(e.g.,#Christensen,#2006).#Consistent#with#











CSR# reporting# and# CSR# reporting# quality.# Specifically,# it# could# strengthen# the# impact# of#
adopting#this#new#regulation#on#the#quality#of#CSR#reporting.##
A# second# point# arises# from# testing# the# sample# separately# as# highX# and# lowXCSR# reporting#
quality#in#the#context#of#the#new#regulation.#Adopting#the#new#regulation#enhances#the#low#
quality# of# CSR# reports,# specifically# for# older# firms,# highly# leveraged# and# listed# in#
multinational# markets# firms.# Conversely,# the# regulation# does# not# influence# producers# of#
highXquality#CSR# reporting#directly,#except# for# the# large# firms#where# it# is# a#motivation# for#
them# to# increase# their# reporting# quality# to# an# extreme# level.# Similarly,# it# is# found# that#
multinational# listed# firms# boost# their# high# CSR# reporting# quality# after# the# mandatory#
regulation.##
Secondly,# in# this# thesis,# literature#documents# that# firms#are#practising#CSR#activities# react#
differently# in#earnings#management#behaviour# than#other# firms#do# (e.g.,#Kim#et#al.,# 2012;,
Dhaliwal#et#al.,#2012).# In# light#of#this,#this#study#examines#the# influence#of#mandatory#CSR#
reporting#on#earnings#management#practices,#and#whether#it#would#lead#to#a#reduction#of#
earnings#management#practices# for#the#UK# firms#by#considering#the#most# commonly#used#
forms#of#EM#–#i.e.#REM#and#AEM.##
Consistent#with#Prior#et#al.#(2008)#and#Kim#et#al.#(2012),#this#study#proves#that#managers#are#
more# interested# in# reporting# CSR# voluntarily# as# a# sugar# cover# for# their# opportunistic#
behaviour# towards# earnings#management.# Conversely,#mandatory# CSR# reporting# deprived#
managers#of#their#competitive#advantage#of#reporting#CSR#voluntarily,#which#in#turn#caused#
them#to#lose#interest#in#utilising#CSR#reporting#to#cover#their#earnings#manipulation.#
A# further# important#point# results# from# testing# the# sample#separately#as#high#and# low#CSR#
reporting# quality# in# the# context# of# the# new# regulation.# This# indicates# that# new# regulation#
constrains#providers#of#both#high#and#low#CSR#reporting#quality#from#manipulating#earnings#





Thirdly,# the#thesis#presents#the#expected#advantages#of# forcing#the#new# regulation,#which#
improves# the# firm’s#CSR#performance# through# influences# investors’# assessment#about# the#
firm’s# future# value# (Kapstein,# 2001;# Boubakri# et# al.,# 2016).# Conversely,# it# might# have# a#
negative#outcome#from#the#firm#having#to#use#extra#costs#to#compete#and#distinguish#itself#
from# the# rest# of# its# competitors# (Ioannou# and# Serafeim,# 2017).# Therefore,# this# study#
examines#the#influence#of#CSR#reporting#practice#on#firms’#subsequent#performance#in#the#
context# of#mandatory# CSR# reporting# in# the#UK.# Two# common# indicators# are# employed# to#
examine# this# impact;# these# are# the# marketXbased# indicator# (Tobin’s# Q)# for# detecting# the#
financial# benefits# of# CSR# reporting# (Hillman# and# Keim,# 2001),# and# accountingXbased#
measures# (ROA)# to# indicate# the# internal# decisionXmaking# proficiencies# and# managerial#
performance#(Orlitzky#et#al.,#2003).#This#study#demonstrates#that#engaging#firms#in#voluntary#
CSR# activities# would# temporarily# harm# a# firm’s# profitability# (from# the# accountingXbased#
perspective)# due# to# the# increased# spending# on# and# costs# related# to# such# activities.# This#
finding#is#in#line#with#Liu#and#Zhang#(2017)#and#Chen#et#al.#(2018).#
On# the# other# hand,# after# mandating# CSR# reporting,# an# improvement# in# a# firm’s# future#
performance# is# positively# reflected# through# the#market# indicator# X# specifically# in# the# long#
term#–#which#could#be#related#to#the#benefits#accrued#from#signalling#the#market#about#the#
















































































































































































regulation$ or$ are$willing$ to$ do$ so$would$ need$ to$ understand$ the$ consequences$ of$ such$ a$
decision$ in$ terms$ of$ their$ efforts$ to$ improve$ communication$ between$ firms$ and$
stakeholders$in$the$annual$report$(CSR8section)$(FASB$2013,$FRC$2013).$
Also,$ this$ study$ sends$ a$ red$ flag$ to$ regulation$ setters$ that$ some$ CSR$ activities$ could$ be$
abused$ and$ utilised$ as$ a$ mechanism$ to$ mask$ other$ harmful$ practices.$ Such$ an$ indicator$
would$help$avoid$the$fake$over8investment$in$CSR$practices$which$reflects$negatively$on$the$
accuracy$of$stakeholders’$decisions,$and$the$quality$of$the$financial$reporting.$
Another$ important$ aspect$ of$ this$ study$ is$ related$ to$ assessing$ the$ extent$ to$which$ these$
regulations$ affect$ the$ quality$ of$ CSR$ reporting,$ and$ in$ turn,$ affect$ the$ firm’s$ subsequent$
performance.$This$impact$would$influence$firms’$environmental$and$social$roles$and$brings$
them$ more$ in$ line$ with$ sustainability$ issues$ by$ getting$ the$ positiveness$ of$ applying$ this$
regulation$or$by$being$enforced$to$extend$their$CSR$practices$by$external$parties$such$as$civil$
society,$regulators$and$government$pressure.$$




and$ return,$ and$ the$ stock$ price$ feedback$ into$ the$ firm’s$ investment$ choices$ (e.g.,$ Gao,$
2010).$ In$other$words,$when$ investors$decide$where$to$ invest$their$money,$then$they$will$









the$ earnings$ management$ and$ financial$ performance.$ The$ available$ ESG$ score$ from$ the$
Bloomberg$ Database$ is$ a$net$ score$ for$ each$ dimension$ of$ ESG$ individually$ (which$ comes$




ability$ to$ specify$ which$ component(s)$ of$ the$ environmental$ level,$ social$ level,$ or$
governmental$level$would$enhance$or$harm$the$relationships$in$the$context$of$the$study.$$
Therefore,$a$ future$ research$direction$could$ separately$assess$ the$different$dimensions$of$
CSR$reporting$to$find$out$how$relevant$each$of$its$components$is$a$firm’s$performance.$For$
example,$ it’s$worth$ to$ understand$ the$ influence$ of$ each$ element$ of$ the$ social$ dimension$
items$ (the$ number$ of$ employees,$ contract$ type$ and$ turnover,$ the$ community$ service$
expenditure,$and$human$rights)$on$the$quality$of$CSR$reporting,$the$EM$practices,$and$firm$
performance.$Moreover,$ a$ promising$ direction$would$ be$ to$ investigate$what$ benefits$ the$
reporting$of$CSR$commitment$brings$to$other$groups$of$ firms’$stakeholders$ (including,$but$
not$ limited$to,$regulatory$bodies,$non8governmental$organisations$(NGOs),$ the$community$
and$ employees).$ $ Of$ note$ is$ that$ different$ stakeholder$ groups$ do$ not$ demand$ the$ same$
levels$of$information$(Adams$et$al.,$1998)$from$firms$that$report$their$CSR$activities.$
Further,$a$fruitful$topic$for$future$research$is$a$comparison$between$regions$that$adopt$CSR$
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